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ABSTRACT 
 
This work is an attempt to analyze some of the conditions and activities that 
surround improvisation. I will argue that the process of improvisation and even the 
attempt at improvisation can offer the curriculum scholar an important pedagogical 
model. Importantly, this model will offer no direct solutions which might improve one’s 
pedagogical stance. Instead, these models are best interpreted as a provocation, or an 
invitation to think of a better relationship, for example, of teacher and student. I 
interrogate jazz improvisation, theatrical improvisation, and popular culture. I also 
examine a version of performativity that could provide a degree of agency to those who 
wish to challenge the status quo or the taken for granted.  
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“…If I knew where good songs came from, I’d go there more often…” (Cohen, Burger, 
2014, p. 251). 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In John Dewey’s landmark work, Art As Experience, (2005) he successfully 
makes the case for the importance of the arts in human development. Dewey deftly 
describes the impact and necessity of art, in its broadest sense, when he writes, “…works 
of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and 
man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience” 
(p. 109).  This transformational impact is felt by the creator of art and the person who 
participates in this esthetic experience as an observer, however, what is problematic is 
that these observations lean more towards the observer as spectator instead of the more 
fruitful role of participant and equal. The philosopher Jacques Rancière (2009) in his 
book, The Emancipated Spectator, challenged me to reconsider my definition of the term 
spectator while he also calls for a new way of conceiving of the relationship between 
audience and performance. With regards to the spectator, and audiences in general, 
Rancière challenges us to re-think our positions as he proposes one of his central themes: 
“equality of intelligence.” Indeed, he writes,  
Being a spectator is not some passive condition that we should transform into 
activity. It is our normal situation. We also learn and teach, act and know, as 
spectators who all the time link what we see to what we have seen and said, done 
and dreamed. There is no more a privileged form than there is a privileged 
starting point. Everywhere there are starting points, intersections and junctions 
that enable us to learn something new if we refuse, firstly, radical distance, 
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secondly the distribution of roles, and thirdly the boundaries between territories. 
(p. 17) 
In this work I wrestle with the relationship between spectator and performer since 
it serves as a way for me to examine similar relationships, such as teacher and students. 
Rancière’s remarks regarding “distance,” “roles,” and “boundaries” in some ways 
bolsters one of the themes- a refutation of administration from the top down- I propose in 
my original play in chapter 5. But since I am also interested in the artist and her 
relationship to her audience, I also look to John Dewey (2005). As Dewey analyzes the 
various artists as they create and perfect their work he perhaps, unintentionally, promotes 
a method of creation and re-creation that is decidedly linear in its approach.   “Writer, 
composer of music, sculptor, or painter can retrace, during the process of production, 
what they have previously done. When it is not satisfactory in the undergoing or 
perceptual phase of experience, they can to some degree start afresh. This retracing is not 
readily accomplished in the case of architecture-which is perhaps one reason why there 
are so many ugly buildings…”  (p. 53), Dewey writes to describe the process of creative 
production: linear, re-imagined, and revised. I do not wish to denigrate this method of 
artistic production. I do not wish to malign the way so many people work as they attempt 
to create something of value and beauty. Indeed, the seemingly solitary act of creation 
and revision is vital to the continued growth and development of the arts and by 
association the development of humankind. And, in what will eventually become clear as 
ironic and perhaps hypocritical, it is the way in which the work you see in front of you is 
being created. And yet it is not the only way to work. My mention of Dewey in this 
introduction is not meant to foreground his philosophy as emblematic of my own, nor is it 
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meant to be central to an understanding of the words that follow. To be sure a discussion 
that is in many ways an arts based inquiry must mention Dewey (1960, 2001, 2005). But 
my interests are non-linear and for that I must turn to Derrida (1982, 1997) in his words 
and J. Hillis Miller’s words (2007, 2009). Indeed, so much of Derrida’s task of 
“deconstruction” seems to mirror that of the jazz and theatrical improviser, not in their 
products, per se, but rather in the tensionalities that comprise the improvisational process, 
which paradoxically could never be a process. Perhaps this is why Walter Benjamin 
appears in the preface to Miller’s (2009) book, For Derrida. Briefly yet brilliantly, 
Benjamin says, “Method ist Umweg [Method is detour]” (p. xv). Improvisation and 
“deconstruction” in all their complexity embody risk as they search for the school to 
come, justice to come, democracy to come, or something wonderful to come, for 
example, as one (individual or informal collective) responds to a “wholly other.”  In 
remarking on a lifetime of friendship and scholarship with Derrida, Miller (2009) writes, 
“…It is a wager that his works will continue to function in the future, but in ways that are 
impossible to predict, except that he can be sure that they are perhaps destined to errance, 
to erring and to wandering…” (p. 47).   Non-linear methods of creation and iteration, like 
improvisation, tend to be pushed to the margins for reasons that are argued as practical as 
well as pedagogical. A performative culture which praises top down control, and a strict 
production quota hasn’t the time to allow people to “wander.” I would like to change this 
arrangement. I do not desire, nor am I arguing, to replace the linear process of creation, 
revision and recreation and its variants. Instead, I would like to see improvisation de-
marginalized. I would like to give it a seat at the academic table alongside those who 
create in the more accepted fashion. Charlie Parker deserves to sit next to Igor 
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Stravinsky; Jonathan Winters deserves the same recognition as James Thurber, since all 
of those mentioned created works of value, intelligence, and beauty, despite their 
different methods of creation. And to continue with a Derridean thought and my 
metaphor of the dinner table, I would suggest that the table in question reserve an empty 
seat for the guest to come. Miller reminded me of the importance of the guest to come in 
his discussion of Derrida within the context of the Jewish tradition to leave a seat for 
Elijah (p. 47).  I write these words in full awareness of the paradox of my situation. I 
write these words with the full knowledge of the irony I demonstrate as I propose 
privileging the improviser (always a collaborative activity?) alongside the  solitary artist 
of careful vision and re-vision, while employing the seemingly linear method of the 
solitary writer, looking back on what I’ve written and looking ahead at what still needs to 
be done. The solitary artist who struggles to innovate is important to creation but so is the 
one who works in collaboration(?) with others, or the Other within the individual self,  
attempting to create something new, something wonderful right away, or at the very least, 
the seed(s) of something wonderful. My desires do not come lightly or without careful 
thought. For almost three decades I have worked as a teacher in a variety of public 
schools, with students of different ages, interests, talents and academic abilities. I’m 
proud of what I do, although I acknowledge my mistakes. I am mindful of what needs to 
be done. This mindfulness has been informed and transformed by largely traditional 
education (my undergraduate and graduate degrees in history have proven invaluable to 
me), instinct, intuition, reflection, a Reform Jewish upbringing, and for the past several 
years, my immersion into the world of curriculum studies. Although I always suspected 
something was wrong with so much of public education I was unaware of the 
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specificities: patriarchy, heteronormativity, unregulated capitalism, literalism, racism, 
xenophobia, American exceptionalism, commodified play, violence, performativity, and 
ironically, scientific illiteracy has all found its way into the hidden and public curriculum. 
Indeed, given the current situation it would be easy and understandable to retreat into 
despair. To retreat into one’s nest surrounded by the totems and comforts of the 
bourgeoisie. I’ve done that. At one point in my life I was the married father of two. I was 
part of a two income family that was able to afford a nice home in a relatively upscale 
middle-class community: swimming pool, tennis courts, and yard of the month. I was 
Charles Babbitt (1922), incapable of self-reflection and un-willing to try to find a way out 
and as such did not feel the need to start anything that might approach self-realization. 
Babbitt was Sinclair Lewis’ scathing critique of what man had become by the early 
twentieth century. Lewis’ fictive Babbitt was his aesthetic response to the deleterious 
effects of unregulated industrialization on humankind. In this sense Lewis’ critique 
coincides with that of Marx and the Frankfurt School. Was I the product of a society that 
encourages alienation from one another? Was I complicit as an educator, delivering a 
product that seems to nurture passivity toward those things that should matter in 
exchange for a comfortable couch and a large screen television? Those questions didn’t 
seem to matter to me because when things seemed especially unfulfilling for reasons that 
I wouldn’t fathom,  I could always medicate myself with weed, alcohol, and sports, 
reveling in the ,“thrill of victory and the agony of defeat.” It was therefore fortunate for 
me that for most of my life I not only possessed a sense of humor, but the ability to make 
other people laugh, because I was able to exploit this “talent” when I enrolled in a class in 
“comedy improv” in 1988, which coincidentally was the second year of my teaching 
13 
 
 
 
career in the Georgia public school system. It was also about the time I discovered jazz 
music. Although I didn’t know it then, my experience as a student and eventual performer 
in improvisational comedy, and my eventual immersion into live and recorded jazz 
music, would open me up to a new way of being in the classroom and interacting with my 
students. 
 For now, I would like to situate myself as a “White Jewish male” and examine 
when, and perhaps why, jazz music, ostensibly a Black aesthetic, resonated with me. I 
was a White, twenty something Jewish male, from Long Island, now living and teaching 
in a predominantly Christian part of the South, in McDonough, Georgia. As it happened, 
one day as I was driving and listening to music on the radio (and switching between the 
stations of Georgia State and Georgia Tech), I chanced upon a jazz piece that 
surprisingly, impacted me to the point where I couldn’t drive and listen at the same time. 
So, I pulled over. When the DJ finally got around to naming the five or so songs in that 
set I learned that the music that essentially “blew me away” was made by John Coltrane 
and his quartet playing Irving Berlin’s “Russian Lullaby” from an album entitled 
Soultrane (1958), which was coincidentally released the year of my birth.  Up to that 
point my musical menu consisted mostly of rock and pop music, and some classical 
music, some of which I was forced to attempt to play during that time in my youth when I 
took (although not by choice) piano lessons. My father only listened to sports on the radio 
and Muzak. He claimed the “elevator music” calmed him down. It did not. Occasionally 
my father listened in our home to klezmer, the music of eastern European Jews, especially 
the songs with a singer, since the lyrics were in Yiddish and he loved to sing along. 
Although my father was born in the Bronx, NYC, his parents, Russian Jewish immigrants 
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who arrived in 1920, spoke Yiddish in the home. Even as an adult he was fluent in this 
language that inexplicably made him happy and sad simultaneously. And since my father 
and I rarely spoke about anything at any length, I never found out why he had that 
reaction to klezmer music, although I have my suspicions.  My mother loved Broadway 
Musicals and took me to as many musicals as she could (when they had Wednesday 
matinees) in Manhattan during most of the 1970’s.  To be sure there is something of a 
commonality between “show tunes,” and jazz for example, and yet I would argue in 
retrospect that they contained enough diverse musical genres to perhaps make me more 
willing to listen to different types of music. Coltrane’s version of Berlin’s Russian 
Lullaby sounded somewhat familiar to me yet also different. Berlin, a Russian born Jew, 
must have absorbed elements of klezmer music and these elements can be heard in some 
of his tunes, like Russian Lullaby. This was the familiar part of the song. But the way 
Coltrane transformed that song, in the improvised choruses and in the statement and re-
statement of the melody, was brilliant. It’s difficult to really know why this music had 
such an emotional impact. What can be said is that song by Berlin and Coltrane, and his 
quartet, began my informal exploration of jazz music (and a possible re-birth) and my 
obsession with record collecting. It is purely coincidental that my teaching career in 
Georgia, introduction to improvisational theatre, and immersion into jazz happened at 
roughly the same time. But in retrospect, improvisational theatre, jazz, teaching, and 
eventually curriculum studies would all impact the way I approach knowledge and being 
in the classroom. 
 Before I discuss the efficacy of a pedagogy which comes from the teacher who is 
willing to step out from behind the lectern, to remove the cloak of expert, to be aware of 
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the gap and use the  gap between teacher and  students, and take that leap with them in 
pursuit of a real education, to improvise with them, to seek out surprise, I would like to 
offer some examples of what improvisation is and is not: Although it can be and is often 
used as such, improvisation is not a “fun way” to learn and remember the material. It’s 
not a method to improve one’s grades, or make lawyers better able to argue a case in 
court (at one point as an improviser me and my improvisational partners were employed 
by a group of lawyers as part of their mock trials. My friends and I portrayed a variety of 
witnesses, all to help hone the skill of the lawyer to think on his feet, before the case went 
to trial). It’s not a way to give one an edge in the business world by improving one’s 
ability to innovate. And it’s not an easy path to creation or the lazy man’s approach to 
composition. While it is true that improvisation can be those things and for many people 
this is enough, I would argue that we should hold out for improvisation’s greater 
possibility(s). We should adopt Jacques Derrida’s pronouncement (1982) that 
improvisation is an impossibility. His reasoning isn’t meant to sound defeatist. Instead, as 
I discuss in chapter 3, Derrida is opposed to the possibility of improvisation because by 
accepting it as part of the possible one limits its achievements.  One reduces 
improvisation to just another tool to use in the pursuit of a pre-determined goal. When 
this happens any chance at a dialogical encounter suggested by William Pinar (1994) is 
removed, and the rupture of something new being created, whether it be the justice 
Derrida sought in the law or the democracy to come; a new form of art, like cubism, a 
new scientific theory, like relativity, or a new way of shaking up the academic canon 
suggested by Pinar when he writes, “…The possibility is staggering. What is possible is a 
genuinely experimental field which sees itself as deliberately abandoning present 
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understandings, unearthing material of which we have been unconsciousness…” (p. 122) 
will be locked away under the cloak and “safety” of a conservative approach that limits 
access to information, prevents the unexpected; all the while it nurtures a passive student. 
 For me and many who study curriculum, William Pinar’s work looms large. For 
example, in Autobiography, Politics and Sexuality: Essays in Curriculum   Theory 1972-
1992 (1994), he provides inspiration regarding the “process of education” (p. 120), while 
promoting the necessity and willingness to take risks (p. 122), and the need to learn from 
the tension between theory and practice (p. 123). Indeed, regarding the relationship 
between theory and practice Pinar reminds us that, “…It is a call for authentic 
investigation of experience, in which our theoretical expositions are dialectically linked 
with that of experience…” (p. 123). I find a striking similarity between the tensionality of 
theory and practice in the field of curriculum, with the tensionality between technique 
and musicality I discuss later as described by curriculum scholar and musician Marla 
Morris (2009).  Morris makes the important point that, “…technique is part of the 
musicality not separated from it…” (p. 76). Given Morris’ and Pinar’s insights a strong 
case could be made for the requirements in theatre and music education never to separate 
technique from theatricality and musicality respectively. Pinar (1994) also looms large 
because he calls us to be attentive to the idiosyncratic moment when he writes: 
What is special, what is unrepeatable, potentially interesting and on occasion 
revelatory, is the moment by moment experience of particular individuals in 
particular room [sic] at particular times. There are always issues to be addressed, 
often not conscious for either students or teachers, which the aware teacher can 
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help identify, and make use of in order to ground whatever the planned lesson is 
in the actual and immediate experience of everyone in the room (p. 126).  
Although Pinar is far more articulate than I regarding the importance of that idiosyncratic 
moment, in retrospect I had an inkling of its importance when my life was starting to fill 
with and focus on teaching in the classroom, improvisational comedy and jazz. I also find 
it interesting that as I explored the field of curriculum my writings organically gravitated 
toward an understanding of those nascent moments of creation within an aesthetic 
context, when creativity erupts and is pursued. My work attempts to examine those 
moments that are unplanned yet as Pinar says, “revelatory.”  
     As I hope to demonstrate with the words I have written, at its admittedly 
utopian best, improvisation is about future realization(s) and connection(s). It is about 
moving beyond the difficulty of recognizing the individual self and the potential for 
transformation that can occur when that self is seen as part of the collective Self (Sarath, 
2013). For Dewey, the arts was a way for him to let us know that if we participated in 
that aesthetic experience, in the manner in which he describes, it would be possible for us 
to connect our individual experiences with the larger community of experience. As I’ve 
already mentioned, I am not critiquing Dewey’s compositional approach, nor the artists 
he finds so praiseworthy to the arts. Instead, I wish to offer another option for realization 
of the individual self and the possibility of transcendence that can occur with connection 
to the collective Self.   As a classroom teacher and student of curriculum, I am interested 
in what we are creating together as we improvise our way through, playing with time, 
being out of time, in that nascent moment of creation through its “final?” form, not to rest 
on our laurels, nor to revel in the alleged magic of improvisational creation, but rather to 
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demystify those moments of improvisational creation. I want to be able to be part of the 
moment yet retain the ability to step outside, if only briefly, so as to observe, reflect, 
critique, and possibly improve that moment.  But, for those who might expect a 
technique, or a series of methods to be employed in the classroom (seven ways to use 
improvisation in the classroom might appeal to teachers, administrators and publishers 
but I’ll never do it), as a guaranteed way to ensure student success, as defined by 
mandated standards, I’m afraid the words I write will prove to be a disappointment.  The 
attentive teacher instinctively knows the folly of considering a surefire methodology that 
claims to produce good teaching, as do the many Curriculum   scholars I have read, such 
as William Pinar (1994, 2006), Ted Aoki (2005), Cleo H. Cherryholmes (1988), William 
Ayers (2004), Peter Appelbaum (2006, 2012, 2013), Marla Morris (2009)and Henry 
Giroux (1983), for example,  who seek a way out of the taken for granted; who seek 
transformative experiences.  
 I would like to offer another personal recollection in the hopes of explaining 
myself better.  About seventeen years ago from when I write these words, I was asked by 
the social studies coordinator of our county to come up with a presentation for an 
upcoming workshop for social studies teachers. She was aware of my teaching and had 
heard of my experience as an improvisational performer. Although I normally shy away 
from those things I agreed. My presentation consisted of several improvisational “games” 
that had been used as a vehicle for comedy which were now modified to help the student 
remember, understand, and analyze some important historical themes and develop 
historical thinking skills. I introduced, for example, a game known as “expert panel.” In 
this game there is a host and a panel of three experts. I played the host, and three teachers 
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at the workshop volunteered to be the experts on the panel. Typically, the host asks the 
audience to suggest a topic for the experts to discuss and if this game were being played 
in an improvisational comedic performance comedy would hopefully ensue. Since the 
majority of the people at the workshop were honors and advanced placement U.S.  
History teachers, the topic suggested was the gilded age and the experts were three well-
known figures from that time period: Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and J.P. 
Morgan. This configuration seemingly had little chance at creating comedy, which was 
fine since the goal was to give the teachers a novel way to help the students understand 
the significant themes, and historical skills, of the gilded age. My job as host was to field 
questions from the audience and in time they caught on to the structure and content of 
improvised questions and answers. They also came to realize that they might have a turn 
“on stage” when the next game is played.  The novel approach of interacting with and 
presenting the material (and interacting with one another) combined with the nervousness 
that comes when someone is outside of their comfort zone, (people fear performing and 
public speaking, for example) produced laughter from the audience and participants on 
the panel. I find it fascinating that teachers with years of experience in the classroom fear 
public speaking, despite having spoken to and allegedly with their students for years. 
How limited must be their discussions for them to fear public speaking and performing so 
strongly?! Predictably, some of the participants tried to show off with either their 
knowledge of the material or their ability to make what was for them a joke.  When the 
workshop was over I learned that the participants enjoyed my workshop and they claimed 
that they would play some of the improv games in their classrooms. I want to talk about 
what they enjoyed and why they enjoyed it. I would first argue they enjoyed what was for 
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them a novel approach to the teaching of what has become for many a boring time period 
of U.S. history, the gilded age. I would also argue that they enjoyed stepping out of their 
usual persona as teacher (but not of expert) as they pretended to be one of the robber 
barons from the gilded age. Interestingly, their nervousness made them inclined to hide 
behind the laughter being produced, that in turn produced more laughter, although it was 
a laughing at rather than a laughing with, but more on that later. What could have been a 
serious and informational exercise became constrained by the laughter. However, when I 
spoke with the teachers who played the game or those who watched it, it became clear 
that they saw the laughter as one of the highlights of the game. For them it was the proof 
they needed to try the game in their classroom. Their reasoning was that if the teacher can 
help the students have fun and learn something then it was a win-win situation for 
everyone. Now don’t get me wrong. I’m not against laughter in the classroom unless it’s 
being used to bolster the powerful at the expense of the weak, obscure information or 
prevent interrogation that could potentially change what we know about a given subject. 
In other words, the game they played was useful to them because it was a fun way for 
both students and teacher to learn an immutable body of information, not a potential 
vehicle for iteration and innovation. In their nervousness and thinking they had to 
perform, they hid behind the masks of funny accents and gestures. Interestingly, when 
given the opportunity to unveil they found another way to conceal. They avoided risk, 
retreated from the funktionslust (the joy of doing), avoided the difficult, did not notice the 
ambiguity, avoided the chaos, presenting instead, a false and limited joy cloaked in 
superficial humor. In her book, On Not Being Able to Play: Scholars, Musicians and the 
Crisis of Psyche, (2009) curriculum scholar and musician, Marla Morris, describes an 
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honest and more complete joy as she contrasts the times she could with the times she 
couldn’t play music. Indeed, Morris writes,  
There is playing and then there is practicing. When I am able to play, I wouldn’t 
call it practicing. I play. I do not separate out the practice from the play as I did 
when I was studying as a classical pianist. My practicing days are clearly over. I 
just play and that is a totally different thing from practicing. I do not do grueling 
repetitions, I do not play slowly for an hour, I don’t care what my fingering is and 
I don’t care if I get it right. After two injuries, I play. Playing means technique is 
part of the musicality not separated from it (p. 76).   
Those of us in the classroom trying to find a way to be with the students and for the 
students can learn a lot from musicians, especially those who also happen to be engaged 
in the type of scholarly work that demands an unflinching honesty and the willingness 
and capability to reflect. Indeed, Morris’ observation regarding the relationship between 
technique and musicality (or in the case of theatre, technique and theatricality)  is seen 
and often repeated in the reflections of jazz musicians and theatre game players that 
comprise much of this study.   Their observations partially serve to validate my study of 
aesthetics as a way out of our performative culture.  
  Unfortunately, the grasp of that performative culture is strong. This is why the 
teachers in the audience and the panel tried to make jokes. Jokes can be useful but only 
when they speak truth to power, when they disrupt, when they challenge the status quo, 
when they point out contradictions, and when they inspire others to dig deep to reveal the 
truth, albeit truth with a small (t).  That day in Griffin, Georgia, I saw the misuse and 
misunderstanding of improvisation.  And I saw no real disruption to the status quo. 
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Instead, what I saw and participated in was the continuation of a conservative approach to 
education. This is education that is controlled from the top down- process and product. It 
is education that is tainted by the control of a largely damaging, centralized, yet at times 
inept, authority. The novelty of the improv games and humor produced only superficial 
changes to a conservative pedagogy: a pedagogy that controls teachers and students by 
limiting access to information, and  managing students and teachers It is a pedagogy 
which insists upon over testing the students, over evaluating the teachers through a 
complex, unintelligible, inaccurate method of observation, all while maintaining the 
claim of accountability for students and teachers, and the proclamations of a job well 
done.  
We teach in a real and metaphorical toxic environment. The industrial and 
postindustrial age, and our response to these ages, has robbed us of the joy we once had 
in doing, what I talk about later as funktionslust, and replaced it with the production 
requirement of being done. The pressures of production have of necessity impacted the 
approach people take to work of all sorts and as a result academics have suffered. The 
students in my advanced placement class in United States history are advertised by the 
College Board as the cream of the intellectual crop, and yet, they typically shy away from 
the difficult, viewing it only as an obstacle instead of a source for inspiration. They are 
reluctant to embrace complexity, especially if it entails what for them is an inherent 
contradiction, such as a historical writing prompt that contains the requirements of 
precision and ambiguity. In a sense, the current system of top down education, which 
utilizes what Freire (2000) has described as the banking model, discourages students to 
take risks and play with ideas, especially those which are complex and ambiguous.  My 
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student’s reluctance to embrace apparent contradictions is symptomatic of a series of 
larger problems: tradition is either revered or reviled but never both; emotion, passion, 
and desire are viewed as incompatible with rational thought, and tensionalities between 
two positions are avoided as no one apparently wishes to dwell in the in-between. 
Ambiguities are to be shunned, not mediated, as they should be.   We in the public 
schools need to revise our non-aporetic stance regarding what we know, what needs to be 
known, and the way(s) in which we attempt to get there and if Peter Appelbaum (2012, 
2013) and Jacques Rancière (2009) are right intellectuals who wrestle with curriculum 
studies and the arts respectively, need to reevaluate what they do, that is to say their 
pedagogical stance lest they recreate the very thing they are attempting to fix.   This is 
not to say what we know is completely wrong. It’s not.  Instead, I am suggesting that we 
need to nurture what I talk about later as “relational intelligence:” To know ourselves and 
others, and to empathize with and understand the Other.  This is why I fight for 
improvisation in the way that Derrida (1982) perceives it. We can be capable of the 
simultaneous skills of being fully enmeshed with the moment yet still retain the capacity 
to be critical of that moment. We can shed light on the invisible to make it more visible. 
We can embrace and occasionally conquer the difficult as did Einstein as is revealed in 
Arthur Miller’s book, Einstein Picasso: Space, Time, And The Beauty That Causes 
Havoc, (2001) and perhaps exclaim like Einstein did when he stated, “…It is a wonderful 
feeling to recognize the unity of complex phenomena which appear to direct sense 
observation as totally separate things” (p. 71).  I’ve experienced those improvisations in 
the classroom and on the stage. I’ve experienced the joy that comes from being part of an 
ensemble, whether that ensemble is a group performing on a stage, or a class of students 
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and their teacher, navigating their way through a subject that must remain difficult. I have 
come out from behind my lectern, removing the appointed label of “expert.” While it is 
true that I know more history and about the study of history than my students, it would be 
misleading of me to pretend to be anything but a participant in a journey that from the 
beginning has always been theirs to take. This is why I agree with William Ayers (2004) 
when he states that, “…Our first commitment, then, is this: to recognize and call out the 
humanity in each of our students. We become students of our students. We take their 
side” (p. 66). Thus, when I speak of improvisation in the classroom I do so not to replace 
the more widespread method of creation, revision, and re- creation. It works and will 
continue to work. I simply offer this: real improvisation in the classroom, not the games 
previously discussed, has the potential to serve the students by giving them experience in 
and the expectation of insight that comes from the doing, and possibly, an understanding 
of the past, present, and an abstract of a better future to come. It is my hope that my work 
differentiates itself from the work of others because of the worlds I have inhabited and 
the boundaries that I have crossed. At its best and perhaps most simplest, improvisation 
has always entailed a type of disciplined wandering. The trick is, of course, not allowing 
the tensionality between the two positions, discipline and wandering, to become so 
overwhelming that one either quits or succumbs to the pull of one at the expense of the 
other. As you will see in the study which follows, that goal can be somewhat elusive if 
not impossible. 
CHAPTER 2 
i PLAY THEREFORE I AM: POCKETS OF  
PROTEST 
In chapter 2 I talk about jazz and improvisational theatre as a potential model for 
a way out from the moribund, the taken for granted, from the usual ho-hum that passes 
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for education today. I examine the impact that true improvisation has on jazz music and 
theatrical performances.   Some, like Curriculum scholar Ted Aoki (2005) have found in 
jazz a possible way out of the morass, which of course served to validate my initial 
instinct that there was something there. I incorporate the writings of jazz musicians 
(Bailey, 1993), and some, like Nat Hentoff (1976) who write about jazz, calling it the 
“sound of surprise” (p. 25).  In my research I found a consistent search for surprise by the 
musicians or, in the case of musician Pee Wee Russell, surprise after the fact, for example 
when a student musician transcribed an improvised performance of Russell’s showing 
him the written musical transcript of the previous night’s improvisational performance. I 
expand on the potential of improvisation to improve a previously written piece by 
comparing a musician’s take on the power of jazz improvisation to imbue a standard song 
with something new, with that of comedian Lenny Bruce’s take on how his written 
material is improved when he improvises.  The conclusions are the same for musicians 
and comedian: in each case they remarked, in retrospect, that when they performed 
something old it was changed by the inclusion of improvisation, even if the time spent 
improvising was minimal.  I write about the disruptive power of jazz in a way that 
suggests a power distribution from the bottom up rather than the top down.  I also write 
about jazz music’s ability to foreshadow a political future to come (Attali, 1999). French 
economist and jazz aficionado Jacques Attali, seems to expand upon the cultural 
connection discussed by me of the Frankfort school in his arguments regarding the 
music’s ability to serve as an abstract for a new social order. And, lastly in this chapter, I 
talk about play in its broadest sense. I connect an older, non-commodified conception of 
play by Friedrich Schiller, (2004) because his insight on play for our current generation 
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can make us better use play for what many would agree are serious purposes: I will argue 
that the origins of spontaneity, crucial to improvisation, is found in play, not before play, 
and I anticipate a fundamental epistemological debate regarding spontaneity: Is it 
constructed or immanent to the situation? When jazz musicians perform they play, when 
theatrical improvisers perform (and rehearse) they play, and when teachers and students 
interact in the classroom they should play. They should do this to expand rather than 
conserve; they should do this to disrupt, rather than maintain.   
CHAPTER 3 
IMPROVISATION AND THE DESIRE FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE 
 
This chapter is fascinating and frustrating.  A lack of consensus among those who 
write on creativity, spontaneity, autonomy, and originality, within jazz and theatrical 
improvisation, has compelled me to consider the merits of their disparate arguments, and 
to dwell in ambiguity and inconclusiveness. This situation exists because there seems to 
be no definitive situation that will produce that improvisational moment.  For example, 
when interpreting the influence of constraints on creativity, writers like Nachmanovitch 
(1990) view them as crucial to igniting the “essential surprises” (p. 86) which constitutes 
a creative moment or moments. In contrast, other constraints, like racist infused popular 
culture prove impossible to surmount as seen for example in the work of Amy Seham 
(2001) who writes about improvisational theatre.  Indeed, instead of creating a spark that 
might ignite a creative surprise the large majority of improv players Seham describes 
succumb to a group mind infected with an assortment of social ills. And adding insight 
while complexifying the discussion is Jacques Rancière (2009), because his work forced 
me to reconsider what I assumed about the performer and audience, both literally and 
figuratively.   Moreover, I discover another obstacle as jazz musicians fight to improvise 
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within the time constraints of thirty two bars. Why do some musicians fall prey to time 
constraints and offer up recycled clichés, while others use the same constraints of time as 
moments of inspiration? I found some explanations within sports analyses (Gumbrecht, 
2006) and in the work of Ekkehard Jost (1994), a professor of musicology and a musician 
at the University of Giessen, as they describe a similar type of muscle memory shared by 
athlete and musician. Indeed, Jost writes about a musician who, “will fall back on ideas 
he has worked out at one time... he plays what ‘live under his fingers’” (p. 137).    A 
similar kind of memory seems to exist in our conversations. Today, for example, far too 
many people are satisfied with the exclamation, “It is what it is!”  What they actually 
mean to say is, “I give up. I have no thought, original or otherwise that might shed some 
light on your situation. I lack the information to place your problem in historical context 
and I lack the empathy to care about your situation in the first place.” I describe how the 
process of improvisation is negatively impacted by commodification as I compare a 
forced spontaneity of the stage actor with the play of a child learning theatre games 
during the Depression (Spolin, 1986), from a woman who understood what it meant to 
teach. She understood spontaneity and knew how to tease it out of the children she 
worked with. Spolin enjoyed and encouraged spontaneity because “…through 
spontaneity we are re-formed into ourselves…” (p. 4).  Thus, when a spontaneous 
moment is created and employed, the things we work with, athletic play, theatre, music, 
and curriculum   are potentially improved. A desire is inculcated within the people who 
play for infinite malleability. But don’t get me wrong. I am not proposing an infinite 
malleability that can serve as a justification for anything goes.  Instead, I propose an 
infinite malleability because it will hone our skill in dealing with the complex: filled with 
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precision and ambiguity, but not understood as mutually exclusive. 
CHAPTER 4 
“YOU SHOULDN’T NEED A WEATHERMAN TO KNOW WHICH WAY THE 
WIND BLOWS: POPULAR CULTURE AND IMPROVISATION 
 
Chapter 4 continues a discussion on the merits and pitfalls of popular culture. I 
will argue that the problem regarding popular culture as it relates to the musician, 
theatrical improviser, or audience is largely a function of the stance one takes regarding 
popular culture, rather than placing the blame on popular culture itself. In the beginning 
of chapter 4 I work to compare contemporary popular culture with medieval folk 
traditions to try and exact from the latter the impact and transformation written about and 
noticed by Bakhtin (1984). As I read Bakhtin’s descriptions of this folk culture I was 
struck by the similarity it had with contemporary popular culture improvised and 
composed. I describe the difficulties of using popular culture as a site and a source of 
praxis with help from cultural theorists such as Daspit and Weaver (2000), Lyotard 
(1984), Heidegger (1977), and The Frankfurt School (1973, 2002, and 2007). My reason 
for focusing on popular culture as a site for praxis is because, in its various iterations, 
popular culture has served as the raw material for improvisation, as is the case when a 
jazz artist quotes a popular song while improvising; making the song fit the time 
signature, harmonic, and melodic structure. Also, at different times in the modern and 
postmodern era, jazz has served as an example of popular culture. Thus, as I interrogate 
improvisation in jazz and theatre it makes sense to examine popular culture because of its 
association with the arts, high and low, improvisational and composed, as part of my 
overall analysis of the connection between good teaching and improvisation. 
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 Perhaps one of the reasons why the Bakhtinian folk tradition seems 
worthy of our attention is the connection between that folk tradition and the people who 
created, nurtured, and transformed that tradition. While illiteracy and genuine fears of 
their eternal souls burning in hell contributed to a largely passive stance when it came to 
organized Christianity, Bakhtin’s analysis of medieval folk traditions refutes that 
passivity. Indeed, the participants of that folk tradition took an active role in the creation 
of their songs, stories, and theatre. Bakhtin reminds us that these creative outlets, which 
at times were vulgar, served as an outlet and critique of political and economic discord. I 
wonder, therefore, whether or not our largely passive stance regarding popular culture 
can be changed. Is it possible for us to create our culture? Or are we stuck as passive 
consumers of a product that is largely unsatisfying despite its large portions? Or am I 
stuck on my high horse so to speak, regarding popular culture and the way in which that 
culture is accessed? Am I behaving like one of 
the elite upset about the “low level” of journalism or television always assumes 
that the public is moulded by the products imposed on it. To assume that is to 
misunderstand the act of “consumption.” This misunderstanding assumes that 
“assimilating” necessarily means “becoming similar” to what one is, making it 
one’s own, appropriating or reappropriating it (De Certeau, 1984, p. 166).  
Leif Gustavson’s (2008) important study of youth culture, which I discuss in chapter 6, 
and Constance Penley’s (1997) NASA/TREK, which I discuss in chapter 3, supports De 
De Certeau’s assertion regarding a perhaps more accurate way to conceive of 
“consumption” and “assimilation.” 
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To be sure some popular culture, especially the ones which exist on the margins, 
can critique the status quo and remove, or at least minimize passivity from the observer. 
This is why I discus the film, The Rocky Horror Picture Show. As I will argue, Rocky 
Horror mostly works as an act of resistance and creates an alternative public space for 
the filmmaker and filmgoer to work out their sexual ambiguities in the safe environment 
of a mythical, late night, non-judgmental “feature show.”  Certainly part of the allure of 
Rocky Horror is the in your face sexuality, camp and kitsch that make up so much of the 
film. Perhaps the more important conclusion that one can derive from the Rocky Horror 
film experience is the significance of the organic way in which the film goers interacted 
with the film as they attended the midnight showings (the only time to release films like 
Rocky Horror or Pink Flamingoes, by John Waters) during the 1970’s and early 1980’s. 
It is important to examine the source of those improvisations, not in the vain hopes for a 
recipe for improvisation, since that would be a waste of time, but to continue my attempt 
at demystifying the act of improvisation. Interestingly, as time wore on many of the 
“spontaneous remarks” made by the audience members of Rocky Horror quickly became 
part of the film experience. What was at one time the constructed improvisational 
response of an audience member or members eventually became part of the film’s 
“script.”  Week after week audiences yearned to hear their favorite improvised lines or 
reenact one of a series of actions, like the tossing of toast in the air that at one point was 
the spontaneous response to a filmic cue (It is reasonable to ask why an audience member 
had an available piece of toast to throw up in the air. It’s possible that a smuggled in 
sandwich served as the initial prop). In this way, Rocky Horror demonstrates how 
popular culture that dwells in and is created in the margins, by non-compositional 
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methods like improvisation, can lose its ability to shock. Lose its ability to provoke 
improvisation, and instead return the participant to his more familiar role of spectator and 
consumer.  
CHAPTER 5 
PLAYWRITING AS SOLO IMPROVISATION: MY TURN TO TAKE A SOLO 
 
 In chapter 5, I create a form of popular culture, the play. I wrote this play 
that takes place in a dystopian future for many reasons: I wrote this play because I 
thought it would be a way to distance myself from a linear, organized, academic work. I 
got the idea to include a work of fiction within an academic work when I read the 
monumental Academic Outlaws (1997), by William G. Tierney. In his book he offers a 
work of “ethnographic fiction” (p. xxi), entitled “Ashes”. Tierney wrote this story, 
“…with the hope that its narrative structure would give me greater leeway to present life 
in the academy than other textual techniques might afford” (p. xxi). I thought a play 
might give me a similar leeway in promoting an improvisational approach to being in the 
classroom. When I initially set about to write this play I did so with the intention of using 
as much of the improvisational moment and techniques as possible in the construction of 
the play, while also attempting to portray that improvisational moment(s) through the 
words and actions of the characters of the play. I treated the play like an elaborate 
improvisational game. For example, I assembled the who, what, where, and when for 
each scene in the same manner in which a player on stage asks the audience for that 
information prior to the creation of an improvisational scene (with the very important 
distinction that I asked and answered all of the questions). In other words I assembled the 
ingredients for the improvisational scene to come. I knew who my characters were, what 
they were doing, and a good degree of information regarding place and time. I purposely 
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refrained from story boarding the plot. Instead, I wanted the action of the play to emerge 
organically from the character’s interactions and to set myself up for the possibility of 
surprise within the writing process. I wrote the play because it was a way for me to “take 
a solo.” Solo improvisation is taken up by  Judith Lewis (2013) who writes that “…in 
solo improvisation, the inherent qualities and purest possibilities of improvisation…may 
become apparent to an extent, which might even influence the way in which we look at 
possibilities in collaborative improvisation.” (p. 256). Additionally, I learned about an 
idea of Slavoj Žižek’s in an essay by Peter Appelbaum (2013) called “…retrodictive 
curriculum   theorizing…in which one writes the fictional history of an imagined 
future…to suggest that we confront the catastrophe by perceiving it as fate, totally 
unavoidable, and then projecting ourselves into it” (p. 85). Indeed, my description of a 
dystopian future was a way for me to expose and perhaps attack the insult to intelligence 
and humanity that is the current school experience.   Lastly, I wrote the play because I 
wanted to play with hyperbole. My thinking was hyperbole could describe the insanity of 
school in ways that traditional scholarship could not. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
IMPROVISATION, INSTITUTIONS AND STANDARDS 
 
In chapter 6, I examine the impact that improvisation has on standards and 
institutions. I examine whether or not improvisation can serve to give us some distance 
from those standards in order to critique them and eventually to improve them. In my 
analysis I discover that improvisation can fully separate from the standard its attempting 
to critique. I do find it useful to examine opportunities for improvisation in the classroom, 
jazz hall, and theatre to still engage in praxis despite the limitations. I am helped in this 
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discussion by Curriculum   scholars like William Ayers (2004), William Pinar (1994) 
Henry Giroux (1983) and Ted Aoki (2005). Once again I look outside of the academy to 
others who might offer insight into my query. For example, I benefit from the work of 
anthropologist, Laurie Frederik Meer (2007) and her analysis of a Cuban theatre form 
that uses improvisation and the Cuban authorities’ reaction to improvisation. I found it 
interesting that a society which praises collective action fears improvisation to such a 
degree that the players are never allowed to improvise in public.  I also reexamine the 
American improv scene, especially from the 1950’s through the 1980’s with the help of 
Amy Seham’s (2001) encyclopedic history of improv. The analyses of the Cuban and 
American improv scene demonstrated the significance of the group mind. Unfortunately, 
improvisation alone was incapable of isolating the systemic problems of white reign, 
heteronormativity, commodification, colonization and the usual assortment of ills the 
critical theorist is attempting to expose so as to empower the oppressed. I also gain some 
insight from the great British Theatre director Peter Brook (2008). Interestingly, in my 
analysis of the interaction of the new thing created by and through improvisation with the 
accepted standard of a given institution I discovered a common theme: the actor or 
musician who improvises, who seeks to create something new, rarely let’s go of her hold 
on the standard which came before. Instead, a tension exists between the old and the 
attempted new or as Aoki (2005) likes to write, the, “… ambiguous, ambivalent space 
between this or that, between planned curriculum   and live(d) curriculum  …” (p. 421-
422). I found it interesting that the space between planned and live(d) was more dynamic 
if the participants in that space had a desire or urgency to do, or at least make known, 
what needs to be done, as did the participants of Playback Theatre described by Meer 
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(2007) Those Cuban actors were filled with anger and passion. They were also pre-
disposed to take risks. In contrast, the space between planned and live(d) inhabited by the 
majority of white improvisers described by Amy Seham (2001) lacked energy or urgency 
since the participants of that space were more inclined to accept the status quo rather than 
reject it.  
CHAPTER 7 
BEYOND PERFORMATIVITY AND A COOKBOOK CURRICULUM   
 
 In chapter 7 I examine improvisation, performativity, and good teaching. I 
acknowledge the negative interpretation of performativity brought largely to our attention 
by Lyotard (1984), and Cherryholmes (1988) and the continued existence of performative 
pedagogy in American schools and elsewhere. For example, in England Anne Storey 
(2007) gave me some insight into an important cultural shift that has taken hold in 
England, which has been repeated in America.  Alarmingly, many new teachers are 
entering the field from a background of mid-level managerial positions, outside of the 
world of education. Although they are being pushed out of their old professions because 
of changes within the economy, their placement as teachers is being promoted as a coup 
for education since their “skills” as managers are seen as directly applicable to and 
desirable in the classroom.  Like the United States, England is placing emphasis on 
“…defining and ‘managing’ the performance of teachers” (p. 253).  And I examine the 
possibility of agency which emerges out of an alternative version of performativity that 
come from scholars such as J. Hillis Miller (2007), Karen Barad (2003), and Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) (who build upon the work of Austin, Butler and Derrida) in 
addition to others, and in conjunction with those who have written about improvisation 
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within jazz and dramaturgical settings, in my attempt to promote a richer experience in 
the classroom. Sedgwick’s work is especially intriguing since she examines performative 
speech and what she terms as periperformative speech (2003). Sedgwick acknowledges 
the relative strength of  performative speech acts to either maintain or challenge the status 
quo, yet maintains that the more nuanced periperformative responses such as, “…I won’t 
take you up on it. Who are you to dare me? Who cares what you dare me to do?…tend to 
have a high threshold of initiative…” (p. 70).   In other words, she argues that the 
periperformative has a greater ability to buck conventional thought. Her insight into the 
power of various speech acts is useful to the teacher in the classroom as she and her 
students make their way through classes that at times can be contentious.   
CHAPTER 8 
CODA AND CURRICULUM   
 
In chapter 8 I wind down. Like the musician who returns to the coda after a 
lengthy journey. My intention with this brief chapter was to “restate the melody” in a way 
that is familiar yet different enough to instigate continued conversations. And central to 
my work is my continued dwelling in between two poles: what Aoki (2005) has described 
as living within the ambiguity of curriculum as planned and curriculum as live(d). I hope 
that I was able to convey the importance of not simply dwelling in between those poles.  
More important is the response to the inevitable tensionality of those two poles. The jazz 
musicians, theatrical improvisers, audience members, teachers and students who do good 
work did so because, instead of succumbing to the pull of one or the other extreme, they 
offered a response, some mediated and thought through beforehand, and others seemingly 
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spontaneous, that addressed both concerns. In this sense they were able to mediate their 
wandering with the discipline which comes from hard work.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
         i Play Therefore I am 
 
“Above all, don’t fear difficult moments, the best comes from them.” 
Rita Levi Montalcini (Nobel Prize Winning Scientist) 
 
“In jazz you never know what’s coming.” 
Nat Hentoff (Jazz writer) 
 
 In my youth I had some stage time. High school plays, community theatre, and 
the small yet potent semi-professional theatre. None of my performances were 
extraordinary save for a few memorable lines that had more to do with the playwright 
than the actor. When I was twenty-eight I enrolled in a class that focused on 
improvisational comedy. Predictably, it was hard and many of the “performances” were 
ragged and unpolished. In the beginning we were only performing for ourselves so it 
didn’t matter as much whether or not we put on a good show. Finally, when we did 
perform for a live audience we created shows which were very uneven and amateurish. 
For reasons that are still unknown to me I endured these “performances” for many 
months. Gradually we (improvisational theatre is usually performed as an ensemble) got 
better.   The first time I was part of something really good I was playing (more on the 
importance of play later) a theatre game called interview. It’s a deceptively simple game 
played by two actors. The audience comes up with the name of the show and the field of 
the “expert” who is interviewed. The questions and answers are made up on the spot. We 
killed (a theatrical expression meaning the audience really liked us). In retrospect this is 
the first time I experienced the power of improvisation within an aesthetic context. This 
chapter is the beginning of an exploration for me.  I wish to examine the promise of 
improvisation within two fields that I feel intuitively, and know intellectually, share an 
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aesthetic connection: Jazz and improvisational theatre. My reason for this examination is 
that will argue that that improvisation has important things to teach us, especially in the 
realm of educational pedagogy.  For now, I will focus on the perceived impact of 
improvisation on jazz and comedic performances.  
 Those who believe in the power of improvisation feel that improvisation can 
imbue a pre-written performance with not only renewed energy but also change its form. 
In his study of improvisation, Jazz guitarist and writer Derek Bailey (1980) ostensibly 
goes beyond his field, because in his examination of improvisation he quotes the great 
comedian Lenny Bruce: “‘If I do an hour show, if I’m extremely fertile, there will be 
about fifteen minutes of pure ad-lib. But on average it’s about four or five minutes. But 
the fact that I’ve created it in ad-lib seems to give it a complete feeling of free form’” 
(p.65).  Bruce’s monologue takes on an added strength and changes its form because of 
the inclusion of an improvised bit. Indeed, Bailey writes, “...Lenny Bruce often compared 
his working method with those of the jazzman and here he emphasizes the importance of 
the introduction of new material. It doesn’t only supply fresh stuff to work on, it imbues 
the whole with a spirit of freedom” (p. 65).  Thus for Bruce and Bailey the act of 
improvisation is transformative. In this sense the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts.  
 Whitney Balliett (1992), longtime jazz critic for the New Yorker, calls jazz “the 
sound of surprise” (p.25). Often it’s the musician who experiences this surprise. Jazz 
writer Nat Hentoff (1976) recalls an incident when, 
One night, in the late 1940’s, a student from the New England Conservatory of 
Music came into a jazz room in Boston where Pee Wee [jazz clarinetist Pee Wee 
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Russell] was playing, went up to the stand, and unrolled a series of music 
manuscript pages. They were covered, densely, with what looked like the notes of 
an extraordinarily complex, ambitious classical composition. ‘I brought this for 
you,’ the young man said to Pee Wee Russell. ‘It’s one of your solos from last 
night. I transcribed it.’ Pee Wee, shaking his head, looked at the manuscript. ‘This 
can’t be me,’ he said. ‘I can’t play this.’ The student assured Pee Wee that the 
transcribed solo, with its fiendishly brilliant structure and astonishingly sustained 
inventiveness, was indeed Russell’s. ‘Well,’ Pee Wee said, ‘even if it is, I 
wouldn’t play it again the same way-even if I could, which I can’t’ (p. 13). 
There is a lot in Russell’s statement. First, this incident is an example of what can happen 
when jazz music is played by a powerful improviser. Russell was able to improvise a 
brilliant piece of music on the spot. But more importantly, this incident, like so many in 
jazz, shows a constant, often repeated tenet of jazz improvisation in particular, and 
improvisation in a more general sense: Most improvisations, musical, theatrical, or other, 
combine the well-learned tenets of an aesthetic tradition with the creation of something 
new through improvisation. Importantly, there is a problem regarding the way 
improvisation is understood by its practitioners: The improvisational creation is viewed 
as new and spontaneous, completely unfettered by the past and its connection to an 
aesthetic tradition. This conversation has been complicated by Jacques Derrida (1982), 
Michel de De Certeau (1984), Judith Lewis (2013), and Edward Sarath (2013) as their 
arguments complexify the improvisational moment and its components.  
  But to return to my earlier statement regarding the apparent merging of old and 
new and the consequential tension which exists between those two things, there are 
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fascinating parallels between an improvised jazz piece and the Buddhist Mandala. 
(Although it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the similarities between jazz 
and Eastern religions like Buddhism, I would like to offer one example of an important 
similarity.  In a combined study of symbols within dreams Carl G. Jung and others (1964) 
write in the important book, Man and His Symbols, "The mandala serves a conservative 
purpose—namely, to restore a previously existing order. But it also serves the creative 
purpose of giving expression and form to something that does not yet exist, something 
new and unique…. The process is that of the ascending spiral, which grows upward while 
simultaneously returning again and again to the same point" (p. 225). I find it striking that 
in the same way the mandala serves to conserve and create, so does the attempt by the 
jazz musician to create something new with improvisation). The jazz musicians’ creation 
arguably does conserve in the sense that so much of his improvisations rests on, and is a 
reaction to, the tradition of jazz music.  But when improvisation is used, as understood by 
many who practice the art, something new is also created, as is argued by the musicians 
in Bailey’s study (1980), alluded to in Jung’s take on the mandala (1964) and seen in 
Paul Berliner’s (1994) mammoth study of jazz.  Thus, when shown a manuscript of the 
previous night’s performance, Pee Wee Russell couldn’t believe it was he who produced 
it. Moreover, allowing it was he who produced it for a moment Russell would eventually 
claim that he couldn’t re-produce it. Nor would he want to. Jazz isn’t about playing 
what’s already been played. In fact one of its primary attributes paradoxically is its 
ephemeral character. Importantly, Russell would not have been able to recreate the 
performance that so impressed that student from the New England Conservatory of 
Music-whose name alone is anathema to the spirit of jazz- were it not for his ability to 
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improvise.  Indeed, Bailey writes, “There is no doubt that the single most important 
contribution to the revitalization of improvisation in Western music in the 20th century 
was that made by jazz...” (p. 64).  Thus improvisation in jazz not only improved jazz 
itself, and the performers who play jazz, but other forms of Western music that had 
deemphasized (for example classical music) the importance of improvisation.   
 A lot has been written on the power and influence of improvisation to improve 
music and the musician: Bailey (1980), Corbett (1994), and Berliner (1994). Indeed, this 
theme of improvisational transformation is fundamental to a Canadian journal on 
improvisation called, Critical Studies in Improvisation (2004-present). Jacques Attali 
(1999), a French economist employed by Francois Mitterrand, published a seminal book 
in the 1980’s on jazz music’s ability to do more than just improve the music. Attali’s 
Noise The Political Economy of Music was in one way a rebuke to the pessimism of the 
Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School, who emigrated from Germany in the 1930’s 
and 1940’s. Clearly, their idealistic fervor and attempt to create a better metanarrative 
that saw the value of popular culture had been crushed by the realities of National 
Socialism. Indeed, as Martin Jay has written (1993), Kracauer, Horkheimer, and Adorno, 
“...rarely showed anything but visceral distaste for all variants of mass culture...” (p. 
369). Their point is well taken. The horrific realities of National Socialism thus make 
Attali’s arguments all the more significant. Indeed, in his forward to Attali’s book (1999) 
postmodernist Frederic Jameson writes, “The originality of Jacques Attali’s book then 
becomes clear: he is the first to have drawn the other possible consequence of the 
‘reciprocal interaction’ model-namely, the possibility of a superstructure to anticipate 
historical developments, to foreshadow new social formations...” (p. xi).  Jazz music for 
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Attali, especially free jazz, the most experimental form of jazz to date, became for him an 
abstract manifestation of a new social order. It reflects a new way for humankind to exist 
in a world that is designed to alienate, although the specific forms of this society to come 
remain far from fully formed. In free jazz Attali sees an abstract of the promise of 
liberation and the fulfillment of humankind’s capabilities. It isn’t so much the inherent 
properties of Jazz music per se that Attali is attracted to but rather the fact that jazz is 
music that is forever concerned with creating something new. It stirs things up. It 
threatens the status quo. Power operates from the bottom up, or from side to side, at times 
it’s hard to tell who is in charge: Importantly, in jazz power never operates from the top 
down.  Thus, what is most radical in jazz is not the product but the process, despite the 
fact that the two are inextricably linked. It is perhaps this characteristic of jazz that is the 
reason it is seen as threatening by some. Since its creation in the late 19th century, jazz 
music has been Othered. In Balliett’s study of jazz (1959) we understand the initial 
marginalization of jazz music and the musicians who play it in a scathing review of jazz 
icon Louis Armstrong: “...Grossman heaps most of the evils he finds in swing, bebop, 
and progressive jazz on poor Armstrong, describing him as playing with ‘an 
undisciplined emotional expansiveness,’ and ‘wildness’...” (p. 18). The critic’s 
condemnation of Armstrong is due to many factors and while I would argue that the 
central reason is race, another important reason is jazz music’s abstract disruption of 
power structures. To be sure, white America, in the early 20th century, held distorted, 
inaccurate views on African Americans, especially the African American male. Since 
jazz music was the creation of African Americans, mostly male, jazz music started off as 
damaged goods in the eyes of white America, because of its association with the African 
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American male.  Jazz also suffered from its connection to brothels (jazz music, either live 
or recorded, was often played there), and the act of sex, for which jazz was a euphemism. 
It tainted jazz from the beginning. Jazz music existed on the margins of society. Jazz 
could not be anything but Othered. “To jazz” was to engage in sexual intercourse and in 
that sense is analogous to early rock music. Indeed the terms ‘jazz’ and ‘rock’ were 
initially euphemisms for the act of sex. It’s interesting that both terms have lost their 
ability to shock. They have been tamed. I will examine a few of the reasons behind this 
phenomenon in the latter part of my chapter. Interestingly, jazz as a musical form also 
met resistance from many within the musical academy, for reasons that go beyond race. 
This resistance remains to this day.   Indeed, commenting from his position as a college 
music instructor, Ken Prouty (2008) writes, “If we accept Attali’s argument that 
improvised music creates new forms of social interaction and new dynamics, we can 
posit that the reaction against jazz improvisation in the academy taps into a similar belief 
that improvisation represented a challenge to the existing order...” (p. 5) In other words, 
jazz improvisation and jazz music (not synonymous) was accurately seen as a political 
threat. Thus, the drive within the academy to defend the canon from a radical element is 
based on their accurate perception that improvisational jazz represented a larger political, 
economic, and social threat. One could argue that their defensiveness bolsters Attali’s 
thesis.  
 For now I would like to continue my discussion of Attali’s thesis that jazz music 
contains a foreshadowing of a new way to politically and economically organize society 
and examine two additional claims. I would argue that Attali’s thesis and these two 
claims are related. The first important claim is that jazz music can reduce or eliminate 
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humankind’s alienation. The second claim is jazz music’s ability to allow the musician to 
live in the moment, to achieve what Hans Gumbrecht (2004) has termed an “epiphany” 
(p. 113).  Gumbrecht’s use of the term epiphany is important to my analysis of that 
nascent moment of creation that does two important things: First, it is a response that, in 
the case of the jazz musician, is a musical response to all that has come before. Second, it 
is simultaneously a direction for the rest of the players, or in the case of solo jazz, a 
direction for the solo artist as she continues her piece. Still, in many ways epiphanies 
remain more of a mystery than expected event in the course of an improvisational 
player’s aesthetic life. Indeed, they are unpredictable and of course difficult, if not 
impossible, to pre-ordain by virtue of one’s skill or breadth of knowledge. At this point it 
seems reasonable to accuse Attali of giving to jazz that which it couldn’t possibly 
possess: the power to reduce alienation.   In light of this concern Attali (1999) writes, 
“...Alienation is not born of production and exchange, nor of property, but of usage: the 
moment labor has a goal... the producer becomes a stranger to what he produces…” 
(p.134-135).  Clearly musicians like the previously mentioned Pee Wee Russell and 
scores of others have been able to compose brilliantly conceived music yet afterward 
have no idea how they accomplished it or even what their accomplishment was. Russell 
and others of his ilk would make very bad assembly line workers or any other kind of 
employee as far as corporate America is concerned, because as they produce they would 
intuitively create products that are counter to the requirements of the CEO and his 
allegiance to the stockholders. They would also alter the production process in ways that 
would make Frederick Taylor, who perfected the assembly lines of the early twentieth 
century, wince. Indeed, for Attali the fact that he and the other musicians were unaware 
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of their end goal is central to their ability to potentially move away from alienation and 
open up to who they are, in contrast to the commodified version of what they are 
expected to be.  What is happening to them? They are playing in the fullest sense of that 
term, instead of succumbing to what Peter McLaren (1995) has referred to as, “…a 
culture modeled on a masculinist heroics, a reactive desire and a compulsive need to 
consume…” (p. 88). Indeed, within this play is a refutation of McLaren’s concern: 
Importantly, within their play lies an act of disruption, since the very thing being 
disrupted is a passivity, cloaked in consumerist action, which McLaren critiques. In this 
type of play is also an opportunity for freedom. Indeed, in Releasing the Imagination 
(1995), Maxine Greene writes: 
But then I think of how much beginnings have to do with freedom, how much 
disruption has to do with consciousness and the awareness of possibility that has 
so much to do with teaching other human beings. And I think that if I and other 
teachers truly want to provoke our students to break through the limits of the 
conventional and taken for granted, we ourselves have to experience breaks with 
what has been established in our own lives; we have to keep arousing ourselves to 
begin again…to act in such a way that I break loose from anchorage and that I stir 
others to break loose along with me, so that we all become different, that we all 
engage in a dialectic to reach beyond where we are (p 109-110). 
To be sure, Greene isn’t referring to the type of play exhibited by jazz musicians, 
but I think the freedom she desires is at times displayed by those who improvise and seek 
to improvise, like jazz musicians.  I would argue that the play exhibited by jazz musicians 
can serve as a model for teachers who desire to break out of the taken for granted. 
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Teachers should play with ideas as they’re introduced in classroom discussions. In this 
way they can model an approach to information. In time, perhaps their students can take 
the same approach.  
  In a similar manner, the social fabric that supports alienation, and its necessary 
components, like commodified play are hurt when actual play, like that of the jazz 
musician is part of the human experience.  The political stability, informed by a type of 
political passiveness, that is necessary for an unregulated industrial society, would be at 
risk if people extrapolated ideas from the jazz musician’s experience and applied them 
toward societal organization, or play. Unfortunately, the ability to break free from the 
controlling elements of that society has been corrupted by the various components of 
society that support a flawed economic system, such as commodified play, or a violent 
patriarchy described by McLaren.  I talk more about liberating play in chapters three and 
four, but for now I would like to remark on this one thought by Schiller (2004).    In his 
study of art and society Schiller writes, “...Man plays only when he is in the full sense of 
the word a man, and he is only wholly Man when he is playing...” (p. 80). Although it 
would give my high school Latin teacher fits to have to revise Descartes’ famous dictum, 
I agree with Schiller. Thus it would be more accurate to say, i play therefore I am. (I 
thought I was oh so clever with my variation on Descartes, however, a quick Google 
search showed me I wasn’t the first to come up with this expression)  Schiller understood 
that humankind would be somewhat undeveloped if she lived only in her head, accepting 
and dwelling within a play that is artificial, commodified, and disconnected to whom we 
actually are.  Gumbrecht (2006) knows this too as is evidenced in his examination of the 
interplay of athletes. 
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 The best in jazz musicianship embody this concept of play. Bailey (1993) and the 
musicians he interviews explain this very serious play in their discussions of ideomatic 
and non-ideomatic jazz. In a nutshell, ideomatic jazz refers to the technical skills 
necessary to play the instrument and the ability to use a “vocabulary” that has already 
been created. This vocabulary is part of a complex harmonic and melodic structure. This 
is the “language” of the academy. It is a language of consensus. It’s been peer reviewed 
and verified by “experts” in the field. It works, so use it. Non-ideomatic improvisation 
occurs when musicians appear to play the “wrong” notes. Non-ideomatic expression isn’t 
always the goal, per se, but it can result from the unbridled play of musicians willing to 
take a risk and play without a predetermined end product in mind. Occasionally, this type 
of unbridled play produces radical results, as was the case when “be-bop” first appeared 
on the scene in the 1940’s.  In many ways, musically and socially for example, be-bop 
was an act of violence, albeit violence of a musical sort. Jazz music had become co-opted 
by white musicians, almost from the very beginning (who typically sanitized the music). 
Be-bop was therefore an attempt to take it back, however, the deleterious nature of Jim 
Crow also contributed to the musicians’ need for violence, even, as was apparent in this 
case, in the abstract sense (Charlie Parker was reputed to have remarked to the poet, 
Amiri Baraka that he plays jazz the way he does so he doesn’t have to kill white people).   
Gumbrecht has argued (2004) that some aesthetic experience contain an element of 
violence that I would argue is part of the process that allows the musician to switch 
between idioms or devise new ones. While his examples are a Bullfight or a boxing 
match, (2004) literal acts of violence, I would argue that jazz contains a similar act of 
violence, both in the abstract and in its execution. Indeed, since the 1930’s jazz musicians 
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have engaged in “cutting contests” whereby they would attempt to outplay any musician 
who dared to challenge them on the stage. In fact the early reputation of sax great 
Coleman Hawkins was based on his ability to outplay his opponents. It was said that he 
destroyed them. I find it intriguing that jazz incorporates language that refers to violence.  
Interestingly, a similar violence occurs within improvisational theatre. Indeed, coming 
out of Wisconsin in the late 1980’s “Theater Sports” combines the competitiveness of an 
athletic event with the unpredictable theatricality of improvisational theatre. Moreover, it 
is common for the comic or the improvisational comedienne to use the expression “I 
killed” in reference to her relationship with the audience. To do well is to kill them and 
despite its metaphorical status still produces the same effect that Gumbrecht (2004) refers 
to in his description of the bullfight or boxing match.  To kill them is to welcome “...the 
risk of losing control over oneself-at least temporarily” (p. 116).   
 For musicians like Prouty (2008), when the best musicians play they are able to 
switch back between the older idioms and the one they just created. “...improvisation lies 
not just with the creation of new spaces and possibilities, but also with the adherence to 
established techniques and approaches, with what has come before...” (p. 9).    In time the 
new idioms successfully change the structure and content of the older idioms and in this 
way revitalize them. Non-ideomatic playing, discussed by Murphy (2004) keeps things 
fresh: “Ideomatic improvisational techniques are the key to the continuity and stability of 
jazz (and other musical idioms), not just because of the way they form a framework for 
clear expression and communication among those competent in the idiom, but also 
because of their pedagogical utility...” (p. 135). But for jazz music to not merely survive 
but thrive, its practitioners must engage with non-ideomatic playing. The same concept 
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holds true for any aesthetic medium.   Of course the real question is where the musicians 
get these new idioms from. We might also ask ourselves the same thing about those 
athletes who have just made the play of a lifetime. Are they the result of mastering the 
fundamentals?  The athletes, like the great musicians, have so wholly mastered the 
fundamentals that not only can they apply them when needed but because of their 
attentiveness to the moment, in a Benjaminian (2007) sense, now have the ability to alter 
that moment, and by extension the fundamentals, as necessary, yet when examined in 
retrospect know not from where it came (“I’m just glad to help us get a win”).   
Gumbrecht (2004), in his discussion of the arts, writes, “...if it occurs we do not know 
what form it will take and how intense it will be: there are no two bolts of lightning... and 
no two orchestra performances that will interpret the same score in exactly the same way. 
Finally (and above all), epiphany within aesthetic experience is an event because it 
undoes itself while it emerges…” (p. 113).  Admittedly, Gumbrecht is referring to 
interpretations of classical compositions but his point still has merit for our discussion 
because the performers of his orchestra are improvising, albeit at a lesser rate than most 
jazz performers. For in that moment of improvisation (and for Gumbrecht this can occur 
in team sports too) the player has rid herself of the shackles of production in a Marxian 
sense. Perhaps this is what Gumbrecht means when he states that the event “undoes 
itself.” Or he could be referring to the ephemeral nature of the event: in other words one 
will never hear in the case of music, or see in the case of sports another event exactly like 
the one that so impressed us again.  Gumbrecht’s analogy of team sports and its natural 
association with play are fitting. When we witness a beautiful play in team sports (pick 
your favorite if you’re a sports fan) all that was once prominent-commercials for erectile 
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dysfunction, bad beer, and trucks; or who’s winning the game- fades away, and if we are 
attentive to the beauty that is happening we too can get lost and gain something from the 
“temporality of the moment” (p. 113).  In sports, this moment might only last a few 
seconds, if that. In jazz it depends on the time and the performer. A favorite anecdote 
among jazz aficionados concerns the young Louis Armstrong. His ability to improvise for 
thirty or forty choruses is well documented. Moreover, Armstrong’s playing seemed to 
defy temporal limitations. He was able to create that epiphany in aesthetic experience that 
Gumbrecht praises so highly. Armstrong’s ability to create these epiphanies is part of the 
reason for his legendary status among musicians in the know and attentive listeners.  
Armstrong’s improvisational skills are what Attali (1999) refers to as his ability to 
compose. He writes, “...To compose is to stay repetition and the death inherent in it...to 
locate liberation not in a faraway future... but in the present, in production and in one’s 
own enjoyment” (p. 143).  Attali’s use of the term composition is perhaps problematic, 
because it implies that improvisation is simply fast composing. Musician and professor of 
music Edward Sarath (2013) will dispute this claim.  
 For now I would like to return to my discussion of the nascent, improvisational 
moment of creation.   Although they are working from two very different theoretical 
frameworks, Attali and Gumbrecht both see the importance of creating and appreciating 
these moments of intensity; however, while Attali finds references to a utopian future to 
come (a threat to the modern and postmodern eras) Gumbrecht’s findings are less 
grandiose, but still important and perhaps more realistic. He seems to concentrate on 
ways for the individual to overcome that Cartesian split of mind and body, which for 
Gumbrecht are more important than overcoming the constraints of a superstructure, 
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which seem to fuel Attali’s efforts to find clues embedded within the music of a utopian 
society to come. Gumbrecht (2004) is refreshingly honest in his declaration that “... There 
is,... no pedagogically  guaranteed way of leading students... ‘toward’ aesthetic 
experience;... there is no predictable, obvious or typical yield that aesthetic experience 
can add to our lives in the everyday world's...” (p. 101-102). In my analysis of 
improvisational theatre, jazz music, and popular culture, I have found Gumbrecht’s 
pronouncement, regarding the impossibility of predicting how or when these intense 
moments of improvisational creation can or will happen, to be an honest feature of the 
improvisational moment. Perhaps this characteristic of improvisation can help us 
understand why improvisation can never be taught or learned through a specific method. 
As Roland Barthes (1972) has reminded us, “The invariable fact is that a piece of work 
which ceaselessly proclaims its determination for method is ultimately sterile: everything 
has been put into the method, nothing is left for writing:…No surer way to kill a piece of 
research and send it to join the great waste of abandoned projects than Method…” (p. 
201). Method kills liberating pedagogy.  
  Given Barthes’ and  Gumbrecht’s proclamations on method, the one surefire 
way of preventing a student from experiencing possible moments of creative intensity is 
to make things too simple for them, by suggesting that there exists a method to get there.  
In other words, it is purposeful creation of complexity that forces a student to react in 
innovative ways that at times creates moments of sheer brilliance. For musicians like the 
previously mentioned Pee Wee Russell his brilliance is a consequence of having to react 
to the instantaneous decisions made by his fellow musicians. The music he played had to 
fit with what his fellow musicians created and he in turn had to make sense of their 
52 
 
 
 
complexity.  They in turn had to react appropriately to his creations.  Sometimes these 
complicated conversations work and sometimes they don't. To be sure Russell’s ability to 
improvise brilliantly is based on years of playing and honing his skills as a musician. In 
learning the ideomatic structure well enough to be able to, when necessary, turn it on its 
head, so to speak.  Gumbrecht (2004) further writes, “For good academic teaching is a 
staging of complexity; it is drawing our students’ attention toward complex phenomenon 
and problems, rather than prescribing how they have to understand certain problems...” 
(p. 128).   Thus, it would be reasonable to suggest that the stimulus to create these 
moments of intensity within an aesthetic experience is for students, or jazz musicians, or 
actors in improvisational theatre, to be forced to deal with an array of complexities.  To 
be sure accurately deciding the nature and makeup of these complexities can be 
problematic. Many in the academy resort to an established canon that can potentially 
reinforce the existing order and prevent the student from creating something new and 
wonderful. This is the critique that has accompanied the charge of neo-conservativism 
against Stanley Crouch and Wynton Marsalis (1990).  In the jazz world the critique 
against this well-known jazz writer and jazz musician is that their approach to jazz is 
similar to that of a museum curator rather than an active creator of the “products” that 
wound up in the museum. I understand the attachment to the canon. Neither Russell nor 
Armstrong would have been able to create something wonderful in jazz music if they had 
not mastered the idiom of jazz, although in Armstrong’s case he invented much of that 
idiom.  Also, as a live performer it is tempting to rely on something that has worked 
before. And yet both comedians and jazz musicians have experienced playing the same 
song, or telling the same joke twice and not getting the same result. Failure feels bad and 
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no one wants to die (violence in language again) on stage or in the classroom.  
Armstrong’s and Russell’s “genius” however lies in their new response to that idiom 
instead of their rigid adherence to it (and more importantly to their willingness to take a 
risk and try something new or allow something new to occur). In improvisational theatre 
there is a saying, well known to those who practice and perform its art:  “You can’t break 
the rules until you learn the rules.” Perhaps their “genius” lies in knowing when and how 
to break the rules; or allowing oneself to be attuned to the moment that in effect makes 
that decision for you.  Still, the origins of spontaneity are complicated. It is quite possible 
that true spontaneity is an impossibility, if both the act and the product must represent 
something entirely new created as an ephemeral epiphany. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) 
seem to suggest that the musician constructs her improvisational response to the needs of 
a complex musical problem rather than give thanks to the gods of spontaneity. The 
musician and athlete have taken part in an aesthetic experience that Deleuze and Guattari 
would describe as being “immanent to itself.”  In this way they can explore and open up 
the song or the athletic play in ways that are solely concerned with what is happening 
within that play or song at that moment rather than lose focus to a concern that is external 
to the event. John Corbett (1994), who examines music in his book, Extended Play: 
Sounding off from John Cage to Dr. Funkenstein, has this to say on the subject of 
spontaneity:   ‘...We say quite the opposite: desire only exists when assembled or 
machined. You cannot grasp or conceive of a desire outside a determinate 
assemblage...each group or individual should construct the plane of immanence on which 
they lead their life and carry their business...It is constructivist, not at all spontaneist’” (p. 
85).  I am very interested in the examination of spontaneity since it seems integral to the 
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study of improvisation. It would seem clear, however, that every jazz musician who 
effectively answered the demand of complexity, and construct what appears to be a 
spontaneous reply to a musical prompt, did so because she was extremely well versed in 
the idioms that have already been created. In other words she knew the rules.  
For Attali the most important movement within jazz began in the late 1950’s and 
continues to this day, however not in the economic relationship Attali would like. The 
movement is known as free jazz and many jazz artists work in this mode (or perhaps it 
would be better to say they work outside the mode) since it affords them the opportunity 
to create something new more often. The problem is it doesn’t always work. Or it isn’t 
respected by the “experts” in jazz.  Indeed, well respected jazz critic Whitney Balliett 
(1959) has argued that “... Most experimental jazz has been governed by a queer 
dilettantism of newness for newness’ sake, and much of it has been little more than an 
agglomeration of classical technique pasted onto standard jazz content...” (p. 82).  More 
often than not new musical forms are misinterpreted or simply unappreciated.  For 
example, when Louis Armstrong first heard Bebop, the new revolutionary noise in the 
late 1940s, he likened it to “Chinese music.” In other words Armstrong was most 
definitely not impressed with the new sound.   Ironically, those who first heard Louis 
Armstrong's music in the late 1920s and early 1930s (when Armstrong was bringing 
together for the first time seemingly disparate elements of music, creating his gumbo, so 
to speak)  felt the same way about his music when compared, for example, to the classical 
canon so familiar to the Creole community of New Orleans.  Marsalis’ allegiance to 
Bebop is therefore doubly ironic since he is acutely aware of the transition from the type 
of music played by Louis Armstrong to that played by its inventors, Charlie Parker, 
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Dizzy Gillespie and Thelonious Monk. The same process that created Louis Armstrong's 
music and Bebop music is behind free jazz. But Attali (1999) argues (although I partially 
disagree with his assessment) that jazz had become colonized and that free jazz 
represented “...the first attempt to express in economic terms the refusal of the cultural 
alienation inherent in repetition, to use music to build a new culture” (p. 138).  I would 
argue that Armstrong and those Bebop innovators like Monk did exactly the same thing 
that Attali’s free jazz musicians did when they created their distinct forms of music. I 
would further argue that free jazz has been misinterpreted as a musical style without form 
because the form it has is so different from that which came before.   Attali would 
disagree with Balliett about the musical merits of some free jazz but ultimately conclude 
that free jazz failed since some of its adherents became part of the problem when their 
small record labels were bought out by the major labels. Many who write on jazz 
improvisation acknowledge Attali’s insight yet disagree with his pronouncement of the 
death of free jazz. Indeed, journals like “Critical Studies in Improvisation,” have churned 
out hundreds of scholarly articles inspired by Attali’s book. However, the majority of 
these, as well as books by prominent jazz writers like Corbett (1994), refutes his claim 
that free jazz has lost its ability to free humankind.   
     I’ve encountered many examples of the liberating effects of free jazz by 
reading interviews of jazz musicians who are part of the free jazz movement. One 
common theme seems to be the incorporation of different musical genres- a pastiche, to 
borrow a term from Jameson - into ideomatic jazz structures in an attempt to construct 
the plane of immanence referred to by Deleuze and Guattari.  Moreover, their discussion 
of the plane of immanence would seem to negate the idea of the musical genius who 
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spontaneously creates fantastic music out of nowhere. In other words it isn’t magic or 
divine intervention that creates an athletic or musical genius. These people are made, not 
born...my apologies to all the athletes and musicians who interpret their talent as a God 
given gift! And yet with all this hard work there is still no guarantee the free jazz 
musician will create something of value let alone one that is unencumbered by the 
hegemonic demands of the culture (and tainted by that culture) in which it occurs. Indeed, 
the British free jazz musician Evan Parker (1994) states: 
Sometimes...it’s as predictable as addition, you get exactly what you expect, 
other times it’s entirely unpredictable. For example, if...you have two basic 
rhythm patterns happening across the two hands-and then superimpose a related 
but different pattern of articulation from the tongue, you get a final result that is 
very hard to predict-because there’s a three-layer process of filtering that might 
throw up patterns of accented notes which you couldn’t think up (p. 83).  
  The free jazz musician is a believer in autonomous art that in the end can never be 
autonomous. Perhaps this is the lie the musician tells herself in order to play.  I would 
argue that since its inception jazz has been a semi-autonomous art that must believe in an 
autonomy that in reality can never be achieved. Given this necessary paradox, one must 
acknowledge the contributions made by people like Adorno (1978) (2002), and some of 
the other critical theorists described by Martin Jay (1973), as they attempted to 
understand art and hegemony. In reference to the Frankfurt school in general and 
Adorno’s concept of culture in particular, Benzer (2011) has written that “...Culture could 
not be understood, as Adorno put it, ‘in terms of itself’...” (p. 80).   Adorno saw popular 
music (and for him jazz was part of popular music) as serving the needs of the culture 
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industry. Their needs can range from promoting a specific political agenda to making a 
profit to helping the masses find relief through distraction. While Adorno correctly 
interpreted that some of the music had become colonized, and in some cases sanitized, for 
white audiences (creating the sacred without the profane) or simply had become 
derivative, he missed what had been created by improvisation that was truly great. 
Adorno (1978) wrote that  
The ideological function of jazz when it first asserted itself as the upper bourgeois 
form of contemporary vulgar music was to conceal the commodity character and 
alienated manner of production of this music; it was to be offered under the 
trademark of ‘quality goods.’ Jazz was to evoke the appearance of improvisational 
freedom and immediacy in the sphere of light music (p. 162).  
 Adorno’s claim (2011) was that “Improvisations became ‘normalized’ the boys can only 
swing it in a narrow framework” (p. 101). To be sure, when Armstrong codified jazz 
music the other musicians who tried to play like him perhaps did create music that only 
appeared improvisational, as Adorno claims.  I would suggest that the improvisational 
freedom Adorno found lacking in jazz music, specifically its ability to move beyond the 
commodity character, can be found in some of Armstrong’s 1920’s recordings like 
“Potato Head Blues,” or “West End Blues.” Armstrong’s brilliant obbligato at the 
beginning of this latter piece was his critique on music that only serves as an opiate for 
the masses. Moreover, this obbligato is an important example of one of the ways an artist 
can overcome Adorno’s “commodity character” and dwell in what De Certeau (1984) 
argues as “…the art of being in between…” (p. 30). De Certeau is referring to the skill of 
a North African immigrant in Paris to survive and possibly thrive despite the obstacles of 
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the constraining order. Indeed, as a poor Black youth in the roughest neighborhood of 
“Jim Crow” New Orleans, Armstrong surely honed his skills in figuring out how to 
“make do.” I have no doubt these skills in improvisation of place transferred to 
Armstrong’s music, especially his early work, given his oeuvre. These skills are perhaps 
the reason he was able to as De Certeau (1984) writes, “…find ways of using the 
constraining order of place where he has no choice but to live and which lays down its 
law for him, he establishes within it a degree of plurality and creativity. By an art of 
being in between, he draws unexpected results from his situation” (p. 30).  I would argue 
that Armstrong’s music is as serious as the music Adorno holds in high praise, such as 
that created by Schoenberg or Hindemith. Indeed, Armstrong’s improvised obbligato, 
combining elements of Western and non-Western music such as African and Caribbean, 
represents not only a “degree of plurality and creativity” but a rupture of the musical 
fabric which contributed to the vitality of all popular twentieth century music.   
Adorno’s claim regarding jazz rings mostly true as jazz music became more 
mainstream. In some cases this meant white musicians playing, for the most part, poor 
facsimiles of jazz music. It didn’t swing and it had been depleted of all its sexual energy 
and anger. It lacked a foreshadowing of tension. For example, just listen to any recording 
by either the Paul Whiteman orchestra (except for the solos of Jack Teagarden or Bix 
Beiderbecke) or Bob Crosby’s (brother to Bing) group. In fact Bob Crosby was so square 
that musicians, that is to say jazz musicians, would say “Bob Crosby’s in the house,” if 
they were holding marijuana and a cop walked by. Similarly, Pat Boone was the 
“answer” to record companies in the 1950’s who wanted the money of the baby boomers 
but didn’t want to incur the wrath of their parents. And Black musicians during the 
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1930’s and 1940’s had their music suffer when they paid attention to the financial needs 
of the recording industry. Adorno (1978) and Attali (1999) rightly criticized the impact of 
commodity concerns yet even within these constraints I would suggest that some of the 
better musicians were able to break free and play what they wanted. In fact when records 
were able to record twenty minutes of music per side rather than the two to three minutes 
of the 78 era, musicians were better able to expand their musical vocabulary and make 
more serious, complex music. These records would influence scores of later musicians- 
Benjamin’s criticism of mechanical reproduction, or Adorno’s criticism of commodity 
constraints, notwithstanding. Indeed, in Martin Jay’s (1993) study of Horkheimer he 
writes,  
One might still call for a deliberately engaged political act of the kind that Brecht 
or Hans Eisler advocated, but the meager impact of attempts to apply their ideas 
in the 1960’s suggests the limits of this approach... The culture industry may well 
be not as totalitarian as Horkheimer and Adorno assumed in their bleaker 
moments. But whether it allows more than pockets of what one commentator has 
called ‘artificial negativity’ remains to be seen (p. 380).   
The issue is whether or not these pockets of protest are enough. Given the output of the 
jazz community I would say perhaps. But it is sobering to reflect on the fact that jazz is 
no longer mainstream. What kind of impact can it have it if only serves a small 
percentage of the population? Perhaps this is why Gumbrecht explores popular sports. If 
we were to find harbingers of a utopian society to come, or an avenue that lets us be more 
fully human, it probably makes more sense to examine an aspect of popular culture that 
resonates for more people. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IMPROVISATION AND THE DESIRE FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE 
It's not easy to improvise. It's the most difficult thing to do. Even when one 
improvises in front of a camera or a microphone, one ventriloquizes or leaves 
another to speak in ones place...the schema and languages that are already there. 
There are already a great number of prescriptions that are prescribed in our 
memory and in our culture. All the names are already pre-programmed. It's 
already the names that inhibit our ability to ever really improvise. One can't say 
whatever one wants. One is obliged more or less to re-produce the stereotypical 
discourse. And so I believe in improvisation. And I fight for improvisation, but 
always with the belief that it's impossible. And there where there is improvisation 
I am not able to see myself. I am blind to myself. And it's what I will see...no...I 
won't see it. It's for others to see. The one who is improvised here, no I won't ever 
see him.  (Derrida, unpublished interview, 1982) 
  For personal and professional reasons, Derrida’s thoughts on improvisation 
intrigue me. His pronouncement regarding the impossibility of improvisation would seem 
strange to a participant or “player” who found themselves caught up in the popularity of 
improvisational theatre during the last half century, although Derrida would probably 
applaud their continued efforts. And yet his understanding of the impossibility of 
improvisation should find resonance in those who write about improvisation as it is 
practiced in the theatre, and by musicians who perform jazz music – an arena where 
others use improvisation as a way to create. For many, practice in improvisation has the 
potential to enable us to respond more creatively and individually to an ever changing 
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present and help us create more accurate meanings either about ourselves as individuals 
or society at large- instead of uncritically accepting those values from the past as if they 
had the power of universal applicability.  Unfortunately, more often than not, it fails to 
accomplish this task and those who either perform through improvisation, write about it, 
or both, often get caught up in the obstacles (and there are many) in achieving true 
improvisation, and eventually dispose of it. But this is a mistake. These practitioners 
disregard an important way to see things in a new way. They play it safe and simply 
repeat what has worked in the past. “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it!” Indeed. More 
unfortunate is the fact that institutions that claim to cultivate knowledge do not encourage 
their students or teachers to engage in activities that are similar to what jazz artists and 
improvisation players do, instead they hide behind those activities which are safe and 
more appropriate to a classroom setting.  For now, I would like to explore some of the 
obstacles to improvisation as it relates to Derrida’s idea of impossibility. 
 To quote one of my favorite characters, “Omar Little,” from an extremely well 
written show produced for HBO, The Wire, “Those Greek myths are deep.” I’ll examine 
why The Wire is important in chapter 3 as I discuss Constance Penley’s (1997) 
NASA/TREK. For now, I would like to let Omar’s profound observation regarding Greek 
Myths return us to the impossibility of improvisation.  Indeed, for somewhere in the 
nexus between Echo and Narcissus is where Art (in its mimetic sense) and spontaneity (in 
its Romantic sense) exists. In this space lie the source and products of improvisation and 
its goal - the recovery of the Self, which I will explore in my last chapter.  Often the 
inspiration to improvise can be structural or referential. For jazz musicians the structure 
can be as simple as verse-chorus-verse, a thirty two bar blues, or more often, rhythm: the 
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steady beat of drums and bass that frame a tune and the shifts in rhythm that inspire, 
perhaps by forcing, soloists to create within many constraints, such as the thirty two bars 
which constitute the song. The reference is often a popular song or part of one. In 
improvisational theatre the “structure” can be one of hundreds of games all designed to 
allow the players a chance to play and create; and the reference is typically extracted 
from popular culture or everyday speech- a  culture by the way that has insinuated itself 
into the marrow of our thoughts. This is one of the things Derrida is referring to when he 
argues that improvisation is impossible. For him far too many of the ingredients of an 
attempt at spontaneity had been created before and by someone else. In this sense they 
prevent the individual from autonomous improvisation because the product and process 
of that creation lacks complete originality. Perhaps the lack of complete originality is 
okay? In an interview (1997) with free jazz legend, Ornette Coleman in July of 1997 
before and during a three concert series by Coleman, Derrida writes that,  
Perhaps you will agree with me on the fact that the very concept of improvisation 
verges upon reading, since what we often understand by improvisation is the 
creation of something new, yet something which doesn’t exclude the pre-written 
framework that makes it possible…there is repetition, in the work, that is intrinsic 
to the initial creation-that which compromises or complicates the concept of 
improvisation. Repetition is already in improvisation: thus when people want to 
trap you between improvisation and the pre-written, they are wrong (p. 322-323).  
 It would appear from the above statement that Derrida is agreeing with Berliner (1994), 
who writes, “In the final analysis, the spontaneous and arranged elements of jazz 
presentations continually cross-fertilize and revitalize one another...” (p. 35), and Bailey 
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(1993) as they, and the countless musicians interviewed, proclaim improvisational music 
as the combination of something new with something old, without the Derridean 
problematic of the need for its impossibility. Sara Ramshaw, (2008) in Time Out of Time: 
Derrida, Cixous, Improvisation, helps explain the Derridean paradox of impossibility in 
this manner: “Improvisation takes place. One time alone. Out of time. And yet absolutely 
of the time, in tune with time. Creating its own time…Derrida reads improvisation as an 
impossibility that is only ever possible as the impossible…” (p. 162).  Ramshaw’s 
reasoning is that the improvised piece is appreciated after the fact, and in the moment of 
creation, by using “…pre-existing or prevailing laws of language, music and 
temporality…” (p. 163), yet importantly, the very thing that is appreciated in time is 
something that can only exist and be created out of time. Indeed, Ramshaw further writes 
and quotes Derrida, “…Impossibility is thus not the opposite of possibility; instead it is 
‘the condition or chance of the possible’. In Derridean terms, ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ 
say the same thing” (p. 163).    Thus, like Derrida I fight for the impossibility of 
improvisation for to give in and focus on the non-Derridean possible would limit the 
results. I agree in the impossibility of complete originality but I would argue that the 
attempt to produce something original is worthwhile in and of itself and occasionally the 
product might be something really special.  The use of pre-conceived structures and the 
incorporation, for example, of an aspect of popular culture need not negate the 
improvisational moment as defined by Derrida. Indeed, this spontaneous and conscious 
effort should be consistently promoted because of the possibility of achieving that truly 
creative moment or breakthrough, and because of the growth potential it affords the 
individual. 
64 
 
 
 
   At times, “... the very predicaments brought on by a limited field of play, or by 
frustrating circumstances, often ignite the essential surprises that we later look back on as 
creativity” (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p. 86).  Indeed, improvisational jazz music was the 
aesthetic product of an oppressed people who were forced to improvise to survive as 
involuntary participants in the colonization of the New World.  In contrast, 
improvisational theater was in large part a white, male, middle class, intellectual jab at 
the conformity and bourgeois culture of the 1950s.  Thus, we have two different art forms 
born from frustrating circumstances albeit the former saw more actual suffering than the 
latter. Yet, despite, or perhaps because of those struggles and lack of struggles, each 
group created an aesthetic that helped define who they were and where they wanted to go. 
  So what happened? Why do actors produce scenes that are stale or filled with 
stereotypes that constrain rather than uplift; and why are musicians either incapable or 
unwilling to find their own voice? Why do they rely on clichés? And why do actors 
reproduce the status quo? In her study of improvisational comedy, Amy Seham (2001) 
writes that “Because popular culture is the source of most improvisers’ references, these 
stereotypes are repeated and revalidated by audience laughter and recognition” (p. 103).  
I would argue that it isn’t the reference to popular culture or the use of clichés per se that 
is the problem. Instead, it is the way in which those clichés or popular culture references 
are used by the actors. An un-appropriated reference can reify the status quo unless the 
actor is adept at interrogation and a kind of dramatic inversion occurs that makes it very 
clear that the stereotypes are being critiqued, and not supported.  At times, it is the 
conscious or perhaps unconscious decision of the musician or actor -when faced with the 
dilemma of coming up with something wonderful right away- to please an audience that 
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is easily pleased- repeats something that has worked in the past while not adding anything 
new to it. In some cases it is artistic peer pressure, and the consumer instincts of the 
audience as consumer which constrain the improviser and prevent her from creating 
something new.  In this case it is an overreliance on Echo and a denial of the individual 
self. Echo is the accepted canon. It is what has been approved by the gatekeepers. The 
self is never completely free of the canon but does have the ability to alter that canon 
either in rearrangement of the vocabulary or the rare occurrence when a revolutionary 
discovery has been made. Or the reverse can occur and the scene or musical event can 
devolve into overt displays of narcissism in which case the player or performer becomes 
blind to all that is around him. This is unfortunate but at times the audience will accept 
technical skill alone as enough despite the fact that communication between the group 
and the individual performer stops. The self is not enriched despite its vigorous 
appearance. 
 As I read Seham (2001) I partially agree with her as she and I lament bad 
audiences, their reliance on tainted popular culture and the impact that has on 
improvisational actors. And yet, Rancière forces me to reconsider a position which posits 
enlightened performers and bad audiences, for example His insight requires a different 
definition of “aesthetics” and the “politics of aesthetics” (p. 59). Rancière differentiates 
his version from that of the modernist, postmodernist and the “aesthetic of the sublime” 
(p. 61) as he explains why an “aesthetic break” occurred that created a gap between 
performer and spectator. He begins with his definition of mimesis and his admonishment 
to us for believing “…the photography of some atrocity will mobilize us against 
injustice…” (p. 61), as he writes of mimesis:  
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the concordance between the complex of sensory signs through which the process 
of poiesis is displayed and the complex of the forms of perception and emotion 
through which it is felt and understood…there was a language of natural signs, 
there was a continuity between the intrinsic consistency…of the play and its 
capacity to produce ethical effects in the minds of the spectators…The stage, the 
audience and the world were comprised in one and the same continuum (p. 60-
61). 
In other words Rancière (2009) might suggest to Seham (2001) that she is placing too 
much faith in improvisational theatre to change the audience for the better simply by 
virtue of what is represented in the art. Indeed, as Rancière (2009) writes in The 
Emancipated Spectator,  he might remind Seham (2001) to read Rousseau’s Letter to 
D’Alembert on the Theatre, so she can learn how he, “…questioned the supposedly direct 
line from the performance of the actors on the stage to its effects on the minds of the 
spectators to their behavior outside the theatre…” (p. 61). In fact what happened on those 
improvisational stages bolsters Rousseau’s and Rancière’s claim regarding the inaccuracy 
of mimesis because when the actors tried to enlighten their audiences they failed. And at 
times, realizing that failure, failed again when they started sensing what the audience 
“liked,” through their off the cuff suggestions, and their reactions to the scenes. 
Consequently, they geared the scenes to give the audience what they seemed to want and 
in the end blamed the audience for the catastrophe. I, too, as an improvisational actor on 
countless “stages” blamed them as well. Much of what Seham hoped improvisation 
would highlight and fix (racism, misogyny, and homophobia, for example) was 
reproduced and the age old problem that Rancière describes rears its ugly ahead once 
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again. In his essay, Tropological Curriculum   studies: Puppets and Statues of 
Curriculum   Quagmires, Peter Appelbaum (2013) applies a largely Rancièrian view, 
along with his own and Žižek’s, in his cogent analysis of curriculum   studies as he 
describes, “…a traumatic experience. We act on our theology, which includes a faith in 
the enabling and emancipating potential of education, only to find social reproduction as 
the accompanying catastrophe. Schooling as enabling is at once probable and 
impossible…” (p. 83). Regarding the improvisational stages Seham (2001) and I 
essentially played the part of the schoolmaster hoping to educate the ignorant masses and 
when that didn’t happen we blamed the audience. Applying his position to curriculum   
studies Appelbaum (2013) complexifies our simple analysis as he re-conceives the 
Reconceptualization: 
Curriculum   theorizing carries with it the legacy of Renaissance teaching of 
rhetoric, which emphasized tactics of metaphor over metonymy and other 
rhetorical moves; this led to both a narrowed epistemology mutually generative of 
racist and colonial practices and the accompanying presumption that language 
itself is a neutral technology, separable from oppressive forms of social practice 
(p. 96).  
In other words, as Appelbaum (2013) interprets Rancière (2009), those of us who think 
the arts can serve as an automatic way out of the moribund are sadly and frustratingly 
mistaken, “…condemned to melancholic nostalgia for those moments in our early 
professional development when theories promised ways out of hell into nirvana” (p. 97).  
But all is not gloom and doom. In his application of Žižek to curriculum studies 
Appelbaum (2013) suggests the following: 
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Rather than manipulate our models, metaphors, and designs for educational 
encounters, we might find more rewarding the notion that our models, metaphors 
and designs are names for the chasm they themselves construct, between our 
imagination and those externalized fetishes we call systems of reproduction and 
regimes of truth (p. 98).  
In an earlier essay Appelbaum (2012) offers another possible way out of the “quagmire.” 
He writes in Mathematical Practice as Sculpture of Utopia: Models, Ignorance, and the 
Emancipated Spectator that if one wants to avoid a “…pedagogical stance that structures 
the audience as passive spectators…” (p. 14), one should consider the models of 
American sculptor, Josiah McElheny and those whose work is similar such as Isamu 
Noguchi. Appelbaum (2012) argues that these artists, “…use models to create new 
worlds, imaginary spaces of learning outside of time and space. The models become 
‘proposals’-invitations to come and play and explore ideas…” (p. 16). Appelbaum is 
careful to differentiate these models from those which would, “…drag us down into 
realms of accuracy, correctness, and explanation…” (p. 16). I like this idea despite 
Appelbaum’s own admission that it might seem “grandiose,” (p. 18) to apply “…theories 
of social change for school mathematics” (p. 18).  Appelbaum’s description of Noguchi’s 
model for a UN playground reminds me of the improv game I talk about in chapter 6, 
known as the “Harold.”  If done carefully, this improv game creates not so much a scene, 
but a spark, for both audience and player, to think about and possibly reimagine what a 
scene could be. In my experience playing this game it was the worst received by player 
and audience. I’ll take up Appelbaum’s (2012) insights regarding Noguchi’s model and 
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its further connections to the “Harold” in chapter 6 but for now I’d like to continue with 
some obstacles to improvisation. 
 I have no recipe for eliminating those chasms referred to by Appelbaum (2013). 
Clearly there are many obstacles to improvisation. And as I have described they come 
from within and without. In writing about the high culture of Berlin during the 1920s, J. 
Moreno (1947) has stated that, “Conditions of high cultural and technological 
organization coincide alarmingly with increased immobility of thought and action” (p. 
40). Moreno sees the modern state as unhealthy to the human condition since it is in the 
interest of the plutocrats to decrease humankind’s mobility of thought and action.  He 
places high hopes on a ‘theatre of spontaneity’ to counter the poison of the industrial age. 
In Moreno’s theatre the actor and audience are both integral to the performance. When its 
utopian ideal is achieved both are enriched by an experience which can only be 
momentary. Thus, the spontaneous theatre is an on-going process.  Moreno anticipated 
some of the problems that can derail his utopian dream but did not live long enough to 
see the most egregious:  the appropriation of talent by the culture industry working at the 
behest of market forces and the willingness of the audience to allow this to happen. 
Some of the obstacles to improvisation are reactions to time constraints.  We see 
this fairly regularly in jazz musicians and improvisational actors. Ekkehard Jost (1981), a 
professor of musicology and a musician at the University of Giessen, in Germany states:  
If we think of improvisation as both a spontaneous and a conscious (i.e., 
controlled) translation of musical ideas into motor action... it will be clear that this 
procedure demands a certain amount of time... the musician... may find himself, 
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forced to reduce his ‘reaction time’; thus he will not think out musical ideas, but 
will fall back on ideas he has worked out at one time... he plays what ‘live under 
his fingers’ (p. 137).      
In other words when jazz musicians are having their conversation-especially one that is 
“up-tempo” - they often feel compelled to react and respond musically as quickly as their 
fellow musicians passed the musical message to them. While the best players figure out a 
way to respond well by trusting their intuition with something that makes musical sense 
and is original, more often than not the skilled musician will respond quickly with 
something that’s musically appropriate but un-original.  In a sense he is playing from 
memory.  But it is not solely an aural memory.  It is also a physical memory somewhat 
analogous to the actions of a baseball player when he is attempting to pick up a ground 
ball he has picked up a thousand times before and throw the runner out at first base.  The 
ballplayer is relying on the physical memory that lives under his hands, arms, and legs; 
all of which are used in response to the many variables of the game including the present 
moment.  Similarly, the musician is using what lies under his fingers or in other words his 
technique to hopefully respond to the musical needs of the ensemble. In like manner the 
improv player might resort to a physical gesture, mimicry, or inject a phrase he has used 
before because he knows that this type of response has worked before and hopes that it 
will work again. At times it does, especially with passive audiences that have been 
nurtured in and expect an environment where risk is something always to be avoided.  
And like the ballplayer, the musician's or improv actor’s gestalt is multisensory. The 
better players, that is to say the ones who seemingly have unlimited things to say, have 
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the complex kind of consciousness, which I call extended consciousness and of 
which there are many levels and grades, provide the organism with an elaborate 
sense of self—an identity and a person, you or me, no less—and places that 
person at a point in individual historical time, richly aware of the lived past and of 
the anticipated future, and keenly cognizant of the world beside it (Damasio, 
1999, p. 16).  
 Importantly, not all improvisational players have that “extended consciousness” that 
Damasio is referring to.  In fact most do not. When pressed, the less experienced or least 
accomplished musician or actor will draw from a Rolodex file of riffs, phrases, and 
various musical or theatrical gestures that have been done many times before, mostly 
with success.  Is it simply that the musician or actor is so concerned with creating a 
“finished product” that he is willing to forgo the spontaneous moment in exchange for 
what he thinks is a sure fire crowd pleaser? If this is true then it must be asked why the 
audience is so easily amused? What would improvisers create if there was no audience 
other than each other?  The short answer is it depends on the company one keeps. 
Beginning improvisers mistake all instant responses, like laughter, as a sign that they are 
on the right track; likewise jazz musicians who are technically proficient but without 
original ideas tend to encourage the proliferation of those very same ideas. In contrast, 
improvisers in theatre or jazz who are willing to trust their intuition and take a risk 
always have the potential to create something wonderful and unique because it is a 
response to the shared and  unique present, not a past that was someone else’s experience. 
Everyone must be trained in creativity, but not through or with a method.  Instead, they 
must have a history of experiencing first-hand the difficulty yet ultimate joy of 
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responding creatively to a problem or idea. Although it might seem a paradox it is only 
after rigorous training that a jazz musician can create something truly unique. In their 
study of musical improvisation Csikszentmihalyi and Rich (1997) arrived at an 
interesting conclusion following the interview of dozens of accomplished jazz musicians. 
They argue that “...Only after they internalize a musical idiom, and learn the relevant 
performance skills, can musicians perform spontaneous variations that can be 
appreciated, evaluated, and if they are truly exceptional, selected for inclusion in the 
cannon of performance...” (p. 63). In other words before the spontaneous production of 
creativity can begin (and this holds true for jazz musicians and improvisational theatre 
performers) the musician or actor must be so well versed in the vocabulary of either 
genre that they can access it when necessary and in the process attempt to create 
something  unique and creative. This training is arduous, time consuming, and for many 
frustrating. Both the actor and musician must develop a critical relationship with the 
traditions of their fields: the canon must be revered and when appropriate reviled. This is 
why Derrida argues for the impossibility of improvisation. Yet he fights for it because it 
is the only way to free a discipline from hegemony and find freedom within hegemony. 
Ingrid Monson (1996) studies creativity and suggests that the hegemony Derrida fears is 
perhaps overblown. “I am suggesting that to reject the deconstructionist perspective on 
speech, voice ...sound is to reject the idea of subjects so overdetermined by hegemonic 
ideologies that they are unable to speak or take action on their behalf...”  (p. 106).  She 
argues that an adequate response to hegemony can be found within the text: Since jazz 
music is performed the musicians are able to take advantage of the subtle and not so 
subtle nuances of tone, timbre, volume, and time. These nuances are impossible to fully 
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notate on the page (read text) and thus creates pockets of freedom for the talented 
musician. The sounds at their disposal are seemingly infinite and the talented musician 
makes judicious use of them. Of course who determines if the product is creative? “It is 
impossible to separate creativity from persuasion...” (p. 46).  In other words all creations 
musical and otherwise must pass the test of a fellow performer or audience. Both groups 
are steeped to some degree in the tradition and both groups have varying levels of 
attachment to that tradition. Perhaps what we call style is the ability of the improviser to 
convince an audience or fellow performer of the rightness of their choice.  At this point I 
would like to examine the process and products of improvisation in jazz and 
improvisational theatre.  
The Process 
The player who improvises works in the moment and yet draws from an arsenal of 
either learned licks and dominant structures or cultural references that are either verbal or 
physical. At times they are Echo, repeating the generally accepted truths. Other times 
they are Narcissus, seemingly so wrapped up in their own head that they see no one and 
thus, speak to no one. Yet both serve a function for a commodity driven society and this 
is why this type of production thrives in the industry called entertainment. But it isn’t true 
improvisation and it didn’t have to be this way. Indeed, improv as we know it started out 
as a way for children to make better use of their time by first creating and then inhabiting 
that spontaneous moment, creating vibrant theatre, and learning about themselves as 
children living in Chicago during the Depression. Viola Spolin (1986) worked with these 
children and is important to improvisational theatre, intuition, and creativity because she 
created a collection of “games” that enabled the player to improvise more freely. Hers’ 
was an attempt to create an organic process that would enable the participant to discover 
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their self; Spolin created a space where the children could fully communicate with each 
other and create what was for her legitimate theatre.  “Through spontaneity we are re-
formed into ourselves” (p. 4), is a maxim that was central to her work. Spolin saw first-
hand the harmful effects of the Depression and the alienation inherent in the industrial 
age. Her improv games were an effort to counter their harmful effects and her hopes were 
that the recovered self would more closely resemble the perfection (although I am 
uncomfortable with that word) that exists in Nature or God. Spolin and others like her 
think that there is this perfect structure-some call it Nature others call it God- that is 
waiting to be tapped into. When an actor or musician is in touch with this structure they 
have created true art since their creation resembles, or more likely is informed by, the 
perfection that is Nature or God.  
This idea of drawing from the perfection that is God or nature is a holdover from 
the Enlightenment and has since been challenged by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt 
School (1973), John Dewey (2005), and post -modern philosophers such as Jacques 
Derrida (2008), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1994), Jacques Rancière (2009) and John 
Caputo (2000). They reject metanarrative whatever its origin. At most they admit to a 
quasi-structure (2000); however there appears to be considerable disagreement regarding 
the transcendent qualities of this quasi-structure. French philosopher/amateur musician, 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) argues against the effort to recover the self as part of a 
continuing effort to connect with a transcendent quasi structure. Instead, he suggests a 
mimetic process of constructing art that proposes an eradication of the self and he defines 
mimesis as an, “...absolute vicariousness, carried to the limit...something like an infinity 
of substitution and circulation...the very lapse ‘itself’ of essence” ( p. 116).  Lacoue-
75 
 
 
 
Labarthe’s ideas of “an infinity of substitution and circulation” are very much in line 
with most jazz musicians. Most tend to argue against a definitive version of a particular 
song and place more emphasis on the process of creation described by Lacoue-Labarthe, 
always thinking about the song to come, yet paradoxically knowing this could never 
happen. Jazz pianist Thelonious Monk perhaps said it best in the film Straight No Chaser 
(1988) when he lashes out at his producer Teo Macero during the recording of an album: 
“Every time you play you rehearse,” he yells.  It is impossible and perhaps unwise to 
create a definitive version of a song and yet the artist seems to always try to do just that. 
This is the paradox of jazz performance and all musical production for that matter. And 
this idea does seem to bolster Derrida’s idea of impossibility or the impossible possible 
discussed earlier.  
 In Musica Ficta, Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) explores the impact of Wagner’s music 
on four artists while further developing the ideas he put forth in his book on Mimesis. He 
elaborates on the paradox of the production of something new when to most the definitive 
version is already there and   writes, “...that Wagner’s work left to his 
posterity[Adorno’s] a task every bit impossible as the one left in philosophy by German 
idealism (Hegel) to its great successors: to continue to pursue what is completed...” (p. 
118).   Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida recoil from the notion that an idea, artistic creation, 
political thought, etc., could be definitive. This is because eventually these “exemplars” 
become constraining and prevent the democracy to come which is of vital importance to 
philosophers who interpret art in its connection to politics. In his writing about Derrida, 
Caputo (2000) writes: 
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The democracy to come will be marked by justice beyond the law, by equality 
and freedom beyond fraternity, by an infinite dissymmetry beyond equality, by a 
friendship beyond the paternalism of the canonical concept of friendship that has 
contracted democracy to something less than it is, by a friendship which can only 
be measured by the measurelessness of its gift (p. 63).  
 Of course, even if we could agree that a definitive version of something can exist, 
the question regarding its components in and out of time still remains. Indeed, this 
paradox which surrounds the creation of art as a finished product is the reason why those 
in improvisational theatre and jazz who pursue creativity seem to place a greater 
emphasis on the process and not the product. Nachmanovitch (1990) refers to the German 
word funktionslust, and uses its meaning-the pleasure of doing- to bolster his notion of 
creativity: “...Creativity exists in the searching even more than the finding or being 
found...” (p. 45).  Moreover, despite coming from a different theoretical framework 
Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) would seem to agree as he writes that, “... the essence of 
mimesis is not imitation, but production ‘in its broadest sense’...” (p. 80).  But production 
does not occur in a vacuum, and this is why the improv performer or jazz player often 
finds himself in the guise of Echo, repeating musical phrases or verbal catch-phrases, 
imitating caricatures, or attempting to embody another personae. These are the 
‘prescriptions’ and ‘stereotypical discourse’ spoken of earlier by Derrida. It is why 
improvisation in its purest sense is impossible. I would argue, however, that 
improvisation can still be created despite the fact that the materials at our disposal are 
often the hand-me-downs of those who came before. Great jazz music and brilliant 
improvisational scenes have been created by using the ingredients of a dominant 
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discourse (as Armstrong did with his brilliant obbligato to West End Blues) and more 
often than not these occur because of the tasteful application and reappropriation of the 
ingredients of that discourse. Of course the problem is who decides what is tasteful or 
appropriate for the moment. In the translator’s preface to Musica Ficta (1994), Felicia 
McCarren tells an anecdote of a time when Lacoue-Labarthe attended one of the last 
concerts given by the jazz trumpeter, Miles Davis in Paris.  Miles had stopped mid-phrase 
to utter an expletive. While most of the audience interpreted the expletive as non-musical 
and an interruption to the concert, Lacoue-Labarthe offered a different explanation: “He 
was working,” (p. xiv) explained Lacoue-Labarthe. For Lacoue-Labarthe, Davis was 
attempting to continue his creation and the fact that he looked outside the accepted 
musical lexicon shows the extreme effort Davis puts in his work (while also serving as a 
demonstration of how Lacoue-Labarthe understands language and the reading of words 
and musical notes as text). It is possible that Lacoue-Labarthe would be less forthcoming 
with praise had a lesser musician without the reputation or technique of Davis attempted 
the same thing. Indeed, there can be no pleasure in doing if the technique isn’t there to 
some degree. Give an untrained artist the materials to create and you will get a 
cacophonous mess. 
“To create, we need both technique and freedom from technique...we practice 
until our skills become unconscious” (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p. 73).  One of the 
fundamental tenets of improv is that you have to learn the rules before you can break 
them. Once again you have to behave like Echo for a while at least until you can begin to 
discover your own voice. For most this process of discovery comes easier within the 
practice halls of a theatrical improv class. At some point everyone can speak and attempt 
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to create a spontaneous conversation. Not surprisingly, most scenes by beginning improv 
players attempt to recreate the dialogue and action from popular culture but eventually 
become cacophonous. At this point the inexperienced player panics and seeks a quick exit 
or end to this type of scene.  Experienced players fear cacophony less and the best use it 
to create some truly wonderful scenes. In contrast inexperienced players view cacophony 
as something to be avoided so they use more of the bits and pieces that they have 
observed in the past which have worked. Those attempting to create music, however, face 
an additional challenge since the inner workings of the instrument must be learned before 
an echo of a  voice let alone an original voice can emerge, and thus entails more practice 
before a technique can become second nature let alone be discarded. Once technique 
becomes second nature the player is able to practice improvisation. This improvisation 
can take many forms: “...Improvising jazz solos does not consist mainly in inventing new 
licks, but in stringing together learned licks and references in new and appropriate 
combinations...”(Belgrad, 1998, p. 180).  The inventiveness of the artist comes out in the 
overall gestalt. At times the creation of a new riff is aided by the intentional or 
unintentional use of a “mistake”: a wrong note played and later “justified” is central to 
spontaneous jazz collaboration. In improvisational theatre, “...Players say that the best 
scenes often result from unexpected slips that are inventively justified” (Seham, 2001, p. 
52).  These “mistakes” come from a variety of places but I would argue are crucial to the 
creation of improvisation. 
 One of the risks of course in pursuing mistakes is the well-founded fear that the 
player will be unable to justify it and make it fit as if it was intentional. When the process 
is viewed solely as a means to a finished product players of both genres are less likely to 
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take risks. They remain Echo, safe and secure, producing nothing new. Bebop jazz of the 
1940s was a conscious decision by the musicians to re-appropriate their music from white 
bands performing for white audiences. These musicians were willing to forget about the 
finished product so they could partake in the funktionslust that might lead to new things. 
“...In bebop the spontaneous articulation of new musical ideas was valued above 
precision or accuracy...” (Belgrad, 1998, p. 187). Ironically, by the mid-1950s, bebop 
became codified as the norm for jazz music, yet fortunately most of the major players 
refused to rest and continued to make new music-sometimes to the chagrin of some 
critics, musicians, or the public who- once they figure out what they like- want more of 
the same. The public didn’t understand that their gluttony would eventually lead to the 
stultification of the music they love. Fortunately, musicians like Ornette Coleman were 
willing to endure the criticism of the critics, public, and even some fellow musicians. 
Coleman’s critics saw in his music a repudiation of all that had come before except for 
those who saw in the new music the same spirit that initially filled early be-bop. 
“Coleman is consistent in eliminating the bonds of functional harmony and divisions into 
bar –patterns. But he holds fast to what could be called the traditional superstructure: the 
schematic order of theme, solo improvisation and theme, with the tempo remaining 
constant” (Jost, 1981, p. 139).  Coleman’s decision to retain some of the Echo suggests 
that creativity can exist even while using the ingredients of a previous thing. True, it’s not 
improvisation in the sense that Derrida hopes for, but perhaps it’s the best we can do. 
Coleman had to play the music the way he heard it. Or to put it another way he could 
only be honest about the music he was creating if he was honest and accurate in his 
musical description of himself, the self, fighting for a place to insert his own voice. But 
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what is this self? “It is, as we habitually, and lazily say, a matter of influence! But stated 
more rigorously, mimesis is the effect of the typo-graphy and... of the fundamental 
‘insemination’ which at bottom defines the essence of the paideia ... and by which we 
call the ‘subject’...”(Lacoue-Labarthe, 1994, p. 127). Lacoue-Labarthe seems to imply 
that Coleman must be more than simply the embodiment of everything that has 
influenced him musical or non-musical since at every point in Coleman’s creation of 
music he has a choice. And what makes Coleman special is the fact that he can use his 
music to give voice to this phenomenon, that is to say, to communicate all that he is. It is 
also apparent that when another musician tries to play like Coleman he inevitably fails or 
at best give a superficial rendering, since he are not being true to his self. Since we all 
change, the self must too and this is why music and theatre, if it is attempting to speak for 
the moment- somewhere between Echo and Narcissus- must continually change too. The 
alternative is being a victim of cultural hegemony instead of a player who can fight his 
way out of it and as De Certeau (1984) says “make do.” 
Product 
 Ultimately all who aspire to produce art, let alone great art, must wrestle 
with the dilemma of their relationship to tradition and the process by which they produce 
that art.  Some like Nachmanovitch (1990) see spontaneous production as better able to 
respond to that tradition while simultaneously producing something new and wonderful. 
They privilege spontaneity as better able to produce or uncover a greater truth. As it turns 
out this is not the case.  Part of the problem is that true spontaneity, often contains a 
mixture of the new and the old. An additional problem occurs when the individual self 
attempts to respond to tradition: the self is either ignored and tradition continues; or the 
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self is privileged to the point where tradition is ignored. For example, in her study of 
improvisational theater over the past half-century Amy Seham (2001) poses one central 
question: “... The question must be asked: when the group works as one mind, whose 
mind is it?  How does the seeming rightness, inevitability, and spontaneity of improv 
mask the unmarked power of hegemony” (p. 65)?  Specifically, she wonders why gender 
stereotypes were promoted by improvisation rather than challenged by it. Seham is 
disappointed that the promise of improvisation as it was understood informally by its 
players as a greater path to truth went unfulfilled as improvisation became popular and 
therefore a marketable commodity in the 1980s. Earlier in this work I offered an 
explanation to Seham’s question through the work of Jacques Rancière (2009) and Peter 
Appelbaum (2013).  A different explanation to her question can be found within one of 
the rules of improvisation itself-never deny.  A player should never deny the reality of the 
scene.  Instead, they are taught to take whatever has been created before and add 
something to it.  It is always “yes and” not “yes but.” Those two phrases represent one of 
the central tenets of improvisation and also reveal one of its major weaknesses, since 
denial was understood as not refuting what came before. In actuality, as a player I was 
often part of heated discussions revolving around the definition of denial. Some of the 
other players and I preferred another definition of denial. We saw it as a denying of the 
reality of the scene. And yet, given the different gazes by the players on that nascent 
scene it should have been expected that there would be different interpretations of that 
reality.  Accordingly, this definition created contention, but not actual denial.   Still, 
perhaps the more important reason that improvisational theater nurtured rather than 
challenged gender stereotypes, or race relations, for example, is that the improv player is 
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tapping into tainted reserves.  In effect, they are drinking from a bad well.  Seham (2001) 
writes that, “... most improv-comedy practice demonstrates that spontaneous group 
creation usually taps into reserves of shared references, received truth, and common 
knowledge...” (p. xxi).  It would seem that the proper relationship to tradition is to 
interrogate it and evaluate it and try to figure out what to keep and what to throw out.  
But how does one decide what to keep and what to throw out? In a sense this question is 
an epistemological problem. Csikszentmihalyi and Rich (1997) write that, “…it is 
impossible to separate creativity from persuasion…” (p. 46). To be sure the power to 
persuade is a complex phenomenon. But I would argue that the ability of an actor or 
musician to persuade an audience or fellow player to accept a new idea is directly related 
to that player’s style. Style deals with tradition and the new delicately in the same way a 
chef uses ingredients. Just the right amount and you have the perfect dish of gumbo. But 
make even the slightest error and the sublime is gone. Style is measured and extreme. But 
the practitioners who have style know when the time is right for one or the other. Jackson 
Pollack had style. Sandy Koufax had style. Charlie Parker had style. George Carlin had 
style.  Style understands tradition and knows the present. It lives in the moment and 
beyond the moment.  Style has an encyclopedic memory and an astute insight into the 
present. And those who are paying attention know style when they see it. This is the point 
when they can be persuaded to accept something new and thus change the traditions they 
keep with them. But of course not everyone is paying attention. Some audiences and 
performers are too deeply connected to a canon they view as immutable. And once that 
issue is settled will the performers have the fortitude to withstand the criticisms and 
hostility when they challenge that canon? Lenny Bruce had style and was able to 
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persuade many to follow him. But not everyone was persuaded. “…what we call 
creativity is a phenomenon that is constructed through an interaction between producer 
and audience. Creativity is not the product of single individuals, but of social systems 
making judgments’ about individuals’ products” (Csikszentmihalyi and Rich, 1997, p. 
45-46).  Ultimately, his critics killed him, albeit indirectly. 
  Far too often and out of necessity most improv players use the audience as a 
barometer of what is good or what is bad.  Thus, when they laugh or seem to like what's 
going on in the scene -regardless of whether or not that scene is promoting gender 
stereotypes or racial prejudice- more than likely the improv players will continue doing 
whatever has pleased the audience up to that point. Moreover, when a majority of 
reference points is bad popular culture that is accepted at face value, in a literal sense, the 
only product that can be produced, the only communication that could take place between 
player and audience, is a perpetuation of the hegemony that lurks within those reference 
points. 
Bad ingredients produce bad results. Sometimes the ingredients are an un-
interrogated popular culture; sometimes it is a repudiation of the Self. In his discussion 
on the impact of Mahler on the French poet Mallarme Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) writes,”... 
thus defined it implies the ‘elocutionary disappearance of the poet.’ It is a work without 
subject...” (p. 76).  Lacoue-Labarthe is concerned of course with the battle between the 
spoken words of the poet and the impact of music, each vying for communicative 
supremacy.  But he is also concerned with an interesting definition of true art.  Lacoue- 
Labarthe seems to argue that for true art to appear the artist must in effect disappear in 
some type of structure or in Heidegger's (2001) case a national aesthetic so overpowering 
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and saturated that any addition of the self would seem superfluous.  Paradoxically, one is 
always striving to create the definitive version of art.  But Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) warns 
us of the danger that can occur when an artist challenges what is taken for definitive.  For 
example, he writes in his book on mimesis that, "... the choice of a representative of 
mimesis... as being at once everything-and nothing.  The phamarkos, individual or 
collective, is always a monster..." (p. 116). In this sense Lacoue-Labarthe and Rancière 
appear to disagree.  Providing some insight, Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) writes that mimesis, 
"…can only be (that is, 'be') declination, instability, 'disinstallation'"(p. 82).  In his 
description of mimesis, Lacoue-Labarthe refers to it as a type of "infinite malleability"(p. 
115), which Rancière might declare as infinitely problematic.  Some good examples of 
this type of malleability lies in the initial bebop music of the 1940s; the free jazz 
movement that began in the 1950s; the experiments in improvisation that came out of the 
University of Chicago in the 1950s, and some current improvisation that works to both 
stay on the margins and comment on mainstream improvisation-to create the “ironic 
distance” Caputo (2000) speaks of in his request for a more radical hermeneutics. One of 
the more interesting groups is called Improv Everywhere and as their name implies 
they've taken what they do improvisationally outside of the traditional indoor venue to 
the outdoor stage. They work in and around the New York City area and perform what 
they term as "pranks," although what they do is much more than that.  Their mission is to 
add fun to what they see as a somewhat drab reality and they encourage the general 
public, unwittingly of course, to participate in their pranks.  One of their pranks was 
called "The Best Gig Ever." They found a somewhat talented but unpopular band called 
Ghosts of Pasha from Vermont, and found out where they were performing, and sent 
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about 50 of their players whom they call "agents" to the concert. These agents responded 
enthusiastically to all the songs and even memorized most of the lyrics, sang along, even 
made requests.  Had they not attended this concert at best the audience would've 
numbered perhaps two or three people.  While their intention was to provide the band 
with the best concert experience they have ever had things took an unexpected turn when 
the band found out that the whole thing was contrived. They were angered rather than 
pleased and saw what Improv Everywhere did as a continuation of the marginalization 
that was so much of the band members' childhood and indicative of the bands present 
problems. In a sense pretending to be fans of the band only highlighted the fact that the 
band lacked a large fan base. Improv Everywhere became that annoying kid from high 
school, who exists to make fun of the weak, open and sensitive. And in some way Improv 
Everywhere became analogous to the well-intentioned curriculum   theorist, who in the 
end reproduced the very thing he was fighting against.   Not all of Improv Everywhere's 
pranks turned out this way but what happened with the Ghosts of Pasha is clearly a 
cautionary tale of what can happen when risk and the pursuit of infinite malleability, 
despite the best of intentions, collide.     
The reason that some jazz music is so good at promoting a seemingly less harmful 
form of infinite malleability is because jazz music is only indirectly confrontational 
unlike the previously mentioned efforts by Improv Everywhere. It is also because of what 
lies within the raison d'être of jazz itself: never repeat what's already been done.  This 
ethos prevents humankind’s inclination toward definitive versions of art in any form.  
Jazz always attempts to be about what's coming next, not what's happened before.  Yet, it 
is able to at times achieve this without completely renouncing tradition. In this manner 
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the jazz tradition specifically and improvisation in general appear close to Derrida’s 
version of improvisation as a possible impossibility.  Improvisational jazz dwells 
somewhere between Echo and Narcissus. Between traditions, as it has been defined by 
the gatekeepers and something unique- a uniqueness that can’t exist because in reality 
tradition’s hold is never completely relinquished.   Perhaps jazz is to be applauded for 
how it balances its relationship between the present and the past and also the way in 
which it is able to find the sacred within the profane within the context of a secular 
world?  Indeed, in his writings on black culture Michael Eric Dyson (2004) makes an 
important point: "... with black creative cultures, it's always about the great next... the 
secular telos that pulls black America forward, even as we reappropriate what has been 
appropriated and generate the next form of creativity..."(p. 206). For example, in the 
1950s, jazz tenor saxophonist Sonny Rollins grew increasingly dissatisfied with himself 
and the state of jazz in general. He dropped out of the music scene, cleaned up his 
addiction to heroin, and worked as a janitor.  He only got back into the music scene when 
he felt he had something new to say.  Another interpretation of this event is that Rollins 
figured out a way to balance his own voice against jazz tradition-to find that ironic 
distance.  In this regard Jost (1981) writes: "Rollins takes the opposite path [of Ornette 
Coleman].  While the inner structures of his music, their melodic and harmonic content, 
are largely in line with the laws of Fifties' jazz, the overall form of his pieces is 
permanently open to spontaneous alteration"(p. 139).    
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CHAPTER 4 
YOU SHOULDN’T NEED A WEATHERMAN TO KNOW WHICH WAY THE WIND 
BLOWS: POPULAR CULTURE AND IMPROVISATION 
 
 During the Middle Ages as both feudalism and theocracy waned, and played less 
of a part in most people's lives, local folk traditions began to blossom. As Bakhtin (1984) 
describes these folk traditions he writes, “… The cultural folk humor that had been 
shaped during many centuries and that had defended the people's creativity in non-
official forms, in verbal expression or spectacle, could now rise to the high level of 
literature and ideology and fertilize it…”(p. 72).  The richness and rawness of these folk 
traditions would ignite and provide the material for the “high art” most closely associated 
with the Renaissance; however this is not the only reason for their importance. For 
Bakhtin, these folk traditions entertained, nurtured individual and group identity, and 
perhaps, even provided an outlet for political and other types of authoritarian discontent. 
Yet this creative outlet was changed by the industrial and post-industrial revolution. Art 
and play in their many forms became commodified and discontent became, at times 
constrained within the grooves of a pop song. The industrial revolution created an 
epistemology of certainty, while temporarily taking the creative process out of the hands 
of the very people who needed to participate in that creative process. Unfortunately, this 
certainty also promoted the rigid distinctions between “high art” and “low art”, “experts” 
and “amateurs” keeping them separate and thus robbing each of their ability to influence 
the other. Moreover, as Lyotard (1984) has written in his essay on the postmodern 
condition: “…the central question is becoming who will have access to the information 
these machines must have in storage to guarantee that the right decisions are made. 
Access to data is…the prerogative of experts of all stripes. The ruling class is and will 
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continue to be the class of decision makers…” (p. 14).   Keeping the “experts” at bay, 
placing them in their ivory towers, and forcing them to be financially accountable to the 
major corporations is as destructive to them as it is to the people who lack not only the 
access these experts possess but the means to become an “expert”. I would suggest that a 
lack of access to information in the post-industrial age prevents a critical analysis of the 
processes and products of the postmodern era while also maintaining that epistemology 
of certainty mentioned earlier.  
 To be sure it is problematic to describe art as “high” or “low”. Art as both product 
and process is fluid and it is difficult to pinpoint where elements that were once 
considered “low” first began to influence art considered “high” and vice versa. For now, I 
will continue to explore two aesthetic experiences, jazz music and improvisational 
comedy, in an attempt to flesh out their connection to popular culture, and their ability to 
serve as a model for praxis. As I have mentioned, my reasons for this choice are personal 
and academic. For years I performed improvisational comedy in the evening while 
teaching history at a public high school during the day. At my day job I am part of a rigid 
hierarchy, a worker on an assembly line. My job is to dispense information –certified by 
“experts at the top”- to students who are only differentiated in their ability to soak in that 
information. At night I was part of an alleged ensemble of comedic performers. Our 
primary task was to make the audience laugh. The latitude in which we went about this 
task and the necessary interaction that took place between the players and the audience 
created an aesthetic experience very different from my day job.  Instead of suffering from 
the literalness associated with education in the public schools, the players and audience 
were part of a collective with the potential to gain experience in and the expectation of 
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evaluation, interpretation, and ironic distance. And for better and worse much of our 
fodder for play came from popular culture. What is important in the relationship between 
popular culture, the players, and audience? When we were at our best the players and 
audience were able to transform even the most insipid elements from popular culture. At 
our worst we simply recreated the banality that comprises most popular culture. We as 
consumers of popular culture became consumed by it. In contrast to a place such as 
Disneyland, an icon of popular culture, where “…amusement is the commodified 
negation of play” (Kuenz, J., Willis, S., Waldrep, S., & Fish, S. 1995, p.185), when we 
were at our best, the players and audience at those improvisational performances were, 
engaged in play in its fullest sense, creating our own amusement, and at times, 
transforming the banal to entertainment of the highest order, but in reality what we 
created went beyond mere entertainment. Indeed, this type of play-a serious play- is very 
different form the type usually associated with toys or amusements such as Disneyland, 
for these represent a false type of play. In this sense, Roland Barthes (1972) writes, “… 
Faced with this world of faithful and complicated objects, the child can only identify 
himself as owner, as user, never as creator; he does not invent the world, he uses it: there 
are, prepared for him, actions without adventure, without wonder, without joy”(p 53-54).   
 I bring up Barthes’ condemnation of toys and others and my condemnation of 
amusements such as Disneyland in order to suggest that what we need are not 
amusements or toys ready made for us that limit our interaction and thus our ability to be 
part of the world. Instead, we need to overcome the alienation that comes with our 
commodified culture. To do that we need an aesthetic experience that can help us become 
part of the world; an experience that will enable us to move beyond that Cartesian split 
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between mind and body; an experience that will make us present; not present as in the 
response to a roll call, but present in the world. This type of presence will help us 
challenge the notion of “expert” and create a knowledge base that is fluid, and open-
ended. It will help us cultivate an attitude that gives us the freedom to deviate, fluidity, 
and innovation.  
 I would argue that a site for us to gain this presence is in the realm of popular 
culture, while keeping in mind that popular culture is not homogeneous; its products exist 
at the margins and the mainstream. Yet, it is important that we keep an eye and an ear on 
both for as cultural scholar Stuart Hall (1996) has reminded us, “…It is for this reason 
that what is socially peripheral is so frequently symbolically central…” (p. 471).  When 
jazz music began, for example, its creators were clearly on the periphery of American 
society, yet what they proposed was critical for the development of our nation.  Many 
writers on jazz music have commented how this original music, composed of an amalgam 
of cultural influences, created an aesthetic that enabled those who made and listened to 
this music, to understand and at times challenge their place in American society. For 
those in the mainstream who would listen could be found an important critique.  Indeed, 
it is not a coincidence that when jazz music first became codified in the 1920’s Jim Crow 
and Klan membership were at their height. 
  It would seem paradoxical that a culture industry, tainted by unequal power 
relationships, sexism, racism, consumerism, homophobia, etc., could serve as a site for 
praxis. Indeed, much has been written by critics of the culture industry, Adorno (2002) 
and more recently Jacques Attali (1999), which link the aforementioned problems within 
that culture industry. Still, in his study of the Frankfurt School, Martin Jay (1973) 
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informs us that unlike Adorno and Horkheimer who dismissed popular culture, 
“…Kracauer was optimistic about the disruptive, oppositional potential in film, whose 
realistic capacities he particularly praised. As an avant-gardest in Burger’s sense, he was 
highly sympathetic to the threat this new mass medium posed to the aesthetic hierarchies 
of traditional culture…” (p. 373).  And of course there is Walter Benjamin (2007), who in 
his famous essay on Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction argued that some of the 
art of the modern era had the ability to destroy the “aura” surrounding “high” art and thus 
challenge the destructive hegemony previously noted. It is well known of Adorno’s 
disdain for popular culture, preferring the “high art” of Berg, Schoenberg, or Hindemith.   
I would argue, however, that the type of praxis Adorno finds in the compositions by 
Berg, for example and the kind of praxis Attali sought but did not find in free jazz can be 
found in some of our popular culture and the way in which some jazz musicians and 
improvisational theatre players incorporate that material. The important point to note here 
is that in order to achieve this praxis one must exert effort. There are no nuggets of 
universal truth waiting to be scooped up and applied like a balm without the necessary 
interpretation and mediation.   This is why much of the vitality of jazz music is due in 
part to the musician’s willingness to incorporate elements from popular culture and her 
ability to take full advantage of the moment in which that music is created, but more on 
that later.  
 What are the advantages of popular culture as a site for praxis? Jason Earle (2000) 
has written that for one thing, “…Popular culture texts provide the dominant means of 
communicating knowledge to the general public in a postmodern society…” (p. 121).   
The issue of course is how these texts are received and/or incorporated into new aesthetic 
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products. In other words, are they taken uncritically, within a non-aporetic stance thereby 
perpetuating the very problems mentioned at the top of this essay or are they processed 
with an ironic distance?  Are they merely a diversion from the struggles of daily life or a 
site where those problems can be critically assessed?  In their introduction to a collection 
of essays that find value in popular culture yet acknowledge its ambiguities, Toby Daspit 
and John Weaver (2000) have written, “…We view all popular culture texts as inscribed 
within a history and culture that is shaped by capitalism, consumerism, choice ideologies, 
white supremacy, sexism, and homophobia…”(p. xxvii). In other words, all cultural texts 
are in part artifacts from a society where power is unevenly held. That is except for the 
ones touted as free of those maladies by Adorno. Assuming he is correct about his highly 
praised art, Adorno would prefer to spend time with cultural artifacts that contain within 
them a dialectic that mediates society’s ills. Instead, popular culture requires the 
participant to engage with that text and provide the critique from outside of that popular 
text. As the great jazz bassist and composer Charles Mingus has stated, “You have to 
improvise on something.” Thus, why not improvise on a text that reaches more people 
and leaves open room for iteration?   Instead of the wholesale denunciation of popular 
culture by the Frankfurt School and those who maintain a curatorial aspect of culture, 
instead of a narrow-minded academic elite that rigidly adheres to an established canon, I 
propose that we interrogate popular culture as an addition to the established canon, with 
the hope of eventually tweaking that canon and in some cases blowing it up. I further 
suggest that improvisational comedy, as created and performed in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, and jazz music, from its inception at the beginning of the twentieth 
century through free jazz, are two aesthetic models that can demonstrate the advantages 
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of interacting with popular culture, while simultaneously serving as a product of popular 
culture, both at the margins and at the mainstream. The salient feature of improvisational 
comedy and jazz music is the mandate within each not to repeat what has gone before. In 
this way jazz music and improvisational comedy avoids the risk of maintaining an 
established canon (despite the fact that there are museum curators within each) and thus 
create an epistemology that promotes one way of doing things. 
 Jason Earle (2000) points out another advantage of interrogating popular culture 
instead of texts that promote only an empirical approach when he writes: 
Instructional research texts seek to embody an instrumental rationality that is 
oriented towards focusing on the means rather than a discussion of valued future 
ends…a key feature of the entertainment-oriented texts of popular culture are that 
they offer ‘the image of something better to escape into, or something that we 
want deeply that our day to day lives [doesn’t] provide’ (p. 127).  
The instrumental rationality Earle speaks of is certainly desirable to those who view 
educators as neutral dispensers of objective information that is timeless in its quality and 
truth quotient. Like many in Curriculum   studies, Earle is frustrated with a pedagogy that 
takes it for granted that we all want the same objectives and all we really need is a tried 
and true method to get us there.  Is it possible for us to engage with these “entertainment 
oriented texts” and avoid becoming “technologically enframed” (Heidegger 1977, p. 144) 
as Heidegger has previously warned? In regards to a critical musicality that would 
promote the kind of criticality this essay is partially focused on, Heidegger (1977) seems 
to imply the possibility as long as those who engage with the music “engage with 
‘decisive confrontation’ in its reflection upon technology” (p. 144). Heidegger's notion of 
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decisive confrontation as a means of escaping from the pitfalls of instrumentalism can be 
realized within some of the best of popular culture as we examine the way in which that 
popular culture had been created and also because of what popular culture represents: at 
its best popular culture can promote a collective intelligence. This collective intelligence 
is a consequence of several aspects of popular culture: the first is its ability to shock. The 
shock could be the result of vulgarity, or it could be the result of what Bakhtin (1984) has 
described as the grotesque. Prominent British theater director Peter Brook (2008) has 
described one of the primary advantages of shocking both the actor and the spectator. He 
argues that it creates within the actor and the spectator a greater awareness of the instant 
as he writes, “… As shocks and surprises make a dent in the spectator's reflections, so 
that he is suddenly more open, more alert, more awake, the possibility and the 
responsibility arise from onlooker and performer alike. The instant must be used, but 
how, what for” (p 56)? It would seem that Brook is using what Rancière (2009) refers to 
as an “intricate dramaturgy of sin and redemption” (p. 7). Rancière is chiding the 
producer of this type of theatre and likens it to the attempt made by the “schoolmaster” 
who uses a similar approach to reduce the distance between himself, the enlightened one, 
and the “ignoramus.” Indeed, Rancière is concerned with the collective intelligence of the 
spectators, however he disagrees with the theatrical producer or writer, for example, who 
would argue that they can change the level of that collective intelligence by simply 
exposing the ignorant audience to an enlightened play. He writes, “…The distance the 
ignoramus has to cover is not the gulf between her ignorance and the schoolmaster’s 
knowledge. It is simply the path from what she already knows to what she does not yet 
know, but which she can learn just as she has learnt the rest…” (Rancière, 2009, p. 10-
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11). Taking Rancière’s argument seriously the instant is perhaps best attended to by an 
improvisational approach, because at that moment all who are active bring forth their 
knowledge, life experiences, and their individual take on the situation, without the 
mediation of the “schoolmaster.” But patience is required. And for those who claim a 
moral imperative, patience is at times in short supply.  Indeed, to continue the Rancièrian 
metaphor he writes further that the schoolmaster, “…does not teach his pupils his 
knowledge, but orders them to venture into the forest of things and signs, to say what 
they have seen and what they think of what they have seen… (2009, p. 11)  For in that 
moment, when they are at their best, are small versions of the utopias sought by the 
previously mentioned members of the Frankfurt School, and Bakhtin for example. To be 
sure the moment is often squandered or not completely perceived and used. Perhaps the 
best we can hope for is a brief respite from the alienation of a commodified culture?  
Daspit and Weaver (2000) remind us of an important point made by Dick Hebdige: “… 
As Hebdige reveals counter cultures or subcultures form ‘up in the space between 
surveillance and the evasion of surveillance’ and are neither simply affirmation or 
refusal, neither ‘commercial exploitation nor genuine revolt’” (p xxi). Indeed, in this 
sense, we need to reevaluate the thought that marginalized or dominant groups are 
homogeneous and separate. And we must reexamine the taken for granted notion that 
subversion only exists in the margins, and the more important likelihood that it doesn’t 
exist at all. For example De Certeau (1984) writes that 
Marginality is today no longer limited to minority groups, but is rather massive 
and pervasive; this cultural activity of the non-producers of culture, an activity 
that is unsigned, unreadable, and unsymbolized, remains the only one possible for 
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all those who nevertheless buy and pay for the showy products through which a 
productivist economy articulates itself. Marginality is becoming universal. A 
marginal group has now become the silent majority (p. xvii). 
The Creative Moment 
 
Since I am concerned with the possibility of the purely spontaneous moment 
within the nascent creative moment, it might be of some value to examine a sub-genre in 
jazz that many who play and write about it claim to find the most spontaneity. In my 
research I’ve encountered many examples of the seemingly liberating characteristics of 
free jazz by reading interviews of jazz musicians who are part of the free jazz movement 
(1993). One common theme seems to be the incorporation of different musical genres- a 
pastiche, to borrow a term from Frederic Jameson- into ideomatic jazz structures ( the 
jazz canon) that seem to be an attempt to construct the “plane of immanence” referred to 
by Deleuze and Guattari (1994) . And as I read about some of the best aspects of popular 
culture and improvisational theatre, I find a similarity in the way the players construct 
their “plane of immanence” to take advantage of the moment discovered even as parts of 
that moment seem to escape them as the players attempt to grab on. Perhaps this immense 
difficulty partially explains a fairly well known profane comment from Lou Donaldson, 
an alto sax player of the bebop variety who said in the film, Blue Note- A Story of 
Modern Jazz (1997), “This shit is hard to play.” And yet with all this hard work there is 
still no guarantee the free jazz musician, for example, will create something of value let 
alone one that is unencumbered by the boundaries of the culture in which it occurs. 
Indeed, the British free jazz musician Evan Parker states in Bailey (1994): 
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We were looking to extend the range of timbres available and to balance the 
overt virtuosity that was central to our instrumental approach at the time with 
another type of playing approach. We wanted some sounds which weren't 
associated with instrumental improvisation. (p. 94).  
 Parker is unique among musicians in that he understands the dilemma posed by a variety 
of theorists who study creative moments within an aesthetic practice. Most free jazz 
musicians and those in the theatre seem to view art as autonomous. I would argue that 
since its inception jazz and theatre, even those that profess to be improvised, are a semi-
autonomous art.  
Indeed, it’s certainly encouraging to read curriculum   scholars like Ted Aoki 
(2005) , for example, who found in improvisation a way to “…move beyond the hold of 
instrumentalism of curriculum   implementation” (p. 370). For Aoki the benefits of 
improvisation became apparent during the course of a visit from the jazz trumpeter 
Bobby Shew. Upon reflecting on that visit Aoki writes, 
And why improvisation? I told him that in education, and in curriculum   
particularly, under the hold of technological rationality, we have become so 
production oriented that the ends – means paradigm a way to do, has become the 
way to do, indifferent to differences in the lived world of teachers and students. 
Could improvisation be a way to create spaces to allow differences to show 
through (p. 368)? 
As curriculum scholars like Marla Morris (2009) have commented there needs to 
be more analysis of music as part of an arts based inquiry. In her book On Not Being Able 
to Play Morris has written, “As against Nietzsche, I suggest that music is not immediate. 
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Like other forms of expression, it is a form of mediation that must be processed through 
the ear and thought. For some people this processing fails and they suffer from tone 
deafness...” (p. 232). What is interesting to me is the different ways in which musicians 
and actors experience this mediation. At times it’s a genuine struggle, a race against the 
clock because both your fellow players and audience are waiting for you to play the right 
note at the right time, right now (and of course variations exist on what that looks or 
sounds like). Or say or do something on the stage of improvisational theatre, that if not 
capable of justifying the entire scene, is at least capable of making what came before 
make sense. In order to hit that note or add just the right thing to that scene requires a lot: 
One must be able to tap into the tradition of jazz or theatre, understanding that as a player 
you are part of a continuum. While mastery of many of the tenets of that tradition is 
required, mastery is not enough. At some point you have to say something new. This is 
that rupture in time that Derrida has written about.  One must add to the ongoing 
conversation, with a statement of sorts that seems to incorporate the past, anticipate the 
future, and perhaps briefly occupy a space beyond linear time. In other words there must 
be innovation. But if innovation occurs one must be open to the possibility of breaking 
with a good bit of that tradition. This is hard. The audience will at times fight you since 
some of them are there to hear the same thing that touched them on your record or the last 
time they saw you live. Improv players who develop characters, especially those with 
signature lines the audience remembers,  are thus encouraged to perform those characters, 
saying those lines, again and again. This is not to say that there can’t be good work done 
with characters that have appeared on the stage before. There can. But for this to happen 
there must be continual reassessment and hopefully revelation. And for this to occur (and 
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remember you can’t force it) the moment must be understood and realized by players and 
audience. This creates a space for revelation, not a guarantee that it will happen. Most of 
the time the best one can hope for is a reasonable attempt at getting the craft right. In 
almost two decades on the improvisational stage as a player I can remember only a 
handful of revelations. They came and went so quickly if you blinked you probably 
missed it. The first time one of those wonderful moments happened to me I was still a 
relatively new player. I had maybe a year or two of stage work behind me. We were 
performing a relatively easy game called “expert panel.” I was one of three “experts”. 
The “subjects” of our expertise were given to us by the audience. Another player served 
as the host of the show, fielding questions from the audience and guiding the discussion 
on stage. While I can’t recall the questions asked or the answers I gave I distinctly 
remember feeling completely relaxed. Secure in my character and in my ensemble. We 
had each other’s backs!  Inexplicably, one of the answers I gave resonated with the 
audience and seemed to come out of nowhere. And it was at that moment that I 
understood one of the attractions to improvisation- that is the creative moment that seems 
to come not from a place of struggle, but rather from a place of calm. It just seems to 
flow from you without any effort.  Despite this brief revelation my personal struggles on 
the improv stage have been frequent. In twenty years of working either directly or 
indirectly with improvisational theatre I can only recall a handful of times when the right 
words and bodily actions came to me right away. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not suggesting 
that the only advantage of improvisation is when it seems to happen with little effort. I 
certainly understand, however, the desire by many to be able to create without appearing 
to exert so much effort. Perhaps when those things do happen we should think of them as 
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happy accidents. And who knows maybe the reason they appear to occur so easily is 
because of the struggles that had taken place at an earlier time: A time where the real 
work begins.  
Krazy Kat 
 I learned about this comic strip from Gilbert Seldes (1957) who describes it in his 
book, The 7 Lively Arts. Seldes has written about popular culture around the same time as 
some members of the Frankfurt School were alerting us to the insidious hegemony 
contained within that culture. Remarkably, Seldes was able to select an assortment of 
“entertainment of a high order” from places not typically associated with art. Moreover, 
his selections seem to defy the warnings of the Frankfurt School who prefer only the right 
art and tend to find it in the usual places-theatre, painting, opera, and symphonies. George 
Herriman conceived Krazy Kat, the comic strip. He was a Creole from New Orleans 
whose family left the area shortly after the white authorities declared Creoles to be black 
and no longer white. And not wanting to test out the separate but unequal facilities of the 
Jim Crow South the Herriman family split to California. Seldes has written that, 
“…Krazy Kat, the daily comic strip of George Herriman is, to me, the most amusing and 
fantastic and satisfactory work of art produced in America to-day…” (p. 207). I might be 
biased but I take Seldes’ suggestions regarding popular culture seriously. His 
pronouncements and analysis seems to be right on the mark. But don’t take my word. ee 
cummings, Walt Disney, and Bill Watterson who created Calvin and Hobbes cite Krazy 
Kat as a major influence on them. I find it interesting that the creator of this comic was an 
insider who became an outsider because of the convoluted logic of whites who responded 
to modernity through the nostalgia of a racist past.  I also find it interesting that this 
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masterpiece of a comic was created seemingly by accident. Herriman was working on a 
comic called The Family Upstairs (1957) and had some empty space in the panels. Rather 
than leave them blank he started drawing some of the characters that would eventually 
become the ones in Krazy Kat in the blank spaces of the Family Upstairs. Importantly, 
these new characters were not merely there to fill up space. They were a commentary on 
the goings on in the Family Upstairs that eventually became so profound they 
commanded a strip of their own. I should point out that the Simpsons started in much the 
same way: as an ironic commentary to the Tracey Ulman Show. I would suggest that 
Herriman, in his creation of Krazy Kat, was doing the same thing great jazz and improv 
players do when they play with their material: first they reevaluate then they reveal. 
Seldes writes: “The theme is greater than the plot. John Alden Carpenter has pointed out 
in the brilliant little forward to his ballet, that Krazy Kat is a combination of Parsifal and 
Don Quixote, the perfect fool and the perfect knight. Ignatz is Sancho Panza and, I should 
say, Lucifer…” (p. 210-211). And he also states, “…It happens that in America irony and 
fantasy are practiced in the major arts by only one or two men, producing high-class 
trash; and Mr. Herriman, working in a despised medium, without an atom of 
pretentiousness, is day after day producing something essentially fine…” (p. 207).  
It is to Herriman’s credit that he was able to produce art of a high order within a 
despised medium and it is to Seldes’ (1957) credit that his discerning eye can spot high 
art in lowly places like the comic strip and slapstick film: Seldes is careful to differentiate 
the slapstick of Buster Keaton, Harold Lloyd, and Charlie Chaplin, the latter of whom he 
holds in the highest regard, with slapstick that only bore a superficial resemblance to the 
aforementioned artists. In his analysis of Chaplin, Seldes importantly points out that 
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when Chaplin began as a player in the Keystone Comedies his talent quickly surpassed 
that of his fellow players. Indeed, Seldes (1957) writes, 
It was there that he first detached himself from life and began to live in another 
world, with a specific rhythm of his own, as if the pulse-beat in him changed and 
was twice or half as fast as those who surrounded him. He created then that 
trajectory across the screen which is absolutely his own line of movement (p. 36-
37).  
Like the previously mentioned Louis Armstrong, Chaplin honed his many skills through 
the kind of careful observation that can only occur because he was able to create a 
temporary distance from the goings on around him. Chaplin’s comedic genius, at times 
conceived through improvisation, manifested itself as “…the world intruded with all its 
natural crassness upon his detached existence…” (Seldes 1957, p. 38). Seldes writes 
about Chaplin’s improvisational prowess in one of his earlier films entitled, His Night 
Out (p. 38). In one scene, Chaplin and another actor, Ben Turpin, are playing drunk and 
expectedly stumbling down the street. Turpin’s character starts acting as policeman and 
grabs Chaplin by the collar, yet with no clear destination in sight. At one point, as 
Chaplin is still being dragged by Turpin, Chaplin falls flat on the ground. While being 
dragged in this position Chaplin reaches out and grabs a daisy and as Seldes writes: 
The function of that gesture was to make everything that went before, and 
everything that came after, seem funnier; and it succeeded by creating another, 
incongruous image out of the picture before our eyes. The entire world, a moment 
earlier, had been aslant and distorted and wholly male; it righted itself suddenly 
and created a soft idyll of tenderness. Nearly everything of Charlie is in that 
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moment, and I know no better way to express its elusive quality than to say that as 
I sat watching the film a second time, about two hours later, the repetition of the 
gesture came with all the effect of surprise, although I had been wondering 
whether he could do it so perfectly again (p. 396). 
Seldes argues that Chaplin’s gesture made everything that came before and after funnier. 
While I agree, I would also argue that Chaplin’s gesture made everything that came 
before seem right and everything after possible. In that one improvisational gesture, 
Chaplin became the equivalent of that great jazz musician(s), theatrical improviser(s), 
student(s) engaged in the process of creating, or classroom teacher(s), who has listened 
and incorporated and understood everything that has come before and accurately 
responded to it as the perfect ensemble player, aware of and part of that nascent moment 
of creation. In this way Chaplin’s gesture validates everything that has been done in the 
film up to that point, even the “mistakes,” and sets up the rest of the film’s successful 
drama to come. 
 Perhaps it is possible to avoid the complicated elitism of Adorno or for a more 
recent example, the narrow-minded elitism of Wynton Marsalis, the director of the 
Lincoln Center Jazz Orchestra, when it comes to expanding the scope of a particular 
artistic medium. No one working in the early twentieth century could have imagined that 
“entertainment of the highest order” could have emerged from the lowly comic strip or 
the Keystone Comedies. Like much of popular culture most of it is at best mildly 
entertaining preferring instead to reaffirm and thus reify traditional notions of gender 
relations, heteronormativity, and white reign, for example. When I first became aware of 
improvisational theatre I had high hopes. We were part of a talented ensemble and we 
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had an audience that was willing to pay to see us three nights a week. Admittedly most of 
the players overlooked the political aspect of their work and instead focused on 
improving as a comedic player. And that meant for many jockeying for position on the 
stage to see who could get to the funny first and most often. In other words the audience 
was there to see comedic improv and the players would try their best not to disappoint.  
For whatever reason, perhaps my background in history, or a smattering of political 
protests, I became aware that we could also use our performances as a platform to make a 
point. For example, at times any scene was automatically funny because it contained a 
flamboyant gay male character. We were laughing at him as the audience seemed to 
enjoy their reaffirmation of heteronormativity. But occasionally, the player on stage and 
probably the audience as well were able to interrogate that notion so the gay character 
was no longer the punch line of the joke. Unfortunately, those occasions were rare. Why 
is this so? In her book, whose improv is it anyway? beyond second city, (2001) Amy 
Seham studied the last half-century worth of improv to discover why something with the 
potential to be so liberating became so oppressive.  She was especially concerned that the 
few women who were able to garner stage time more often than not wound up reifying 
traditional gender roles rather than shattering them as she though they would. 
More often than not female improvisers create scenes that reinforce traditional 
gender stereotypes. For those who challenge this position it… is considered 
inappropriate to the agreement based work at improv Olympic and is certainly 
seen as an inhibitor to the collective achievements and organic truths of the zone. 
Yet any real challenge to society and status quo requires conscious thought and 
the deconstruction of normative values (p.68).  
105 
 
 
 
 
In other words if a female player wishes to challenge traditional gender 
stereotypes, for example, she would not only have to go against an audience that 
seemingly approves of the stereotypes but against her fellow players on stage. She would 
have to deny the intentions of the group. This of course cannot happen since the primary 
rule of improvisation is to never deny. In other words, the female improviser was coerced 
by consensus as to how to mold a character that adheres to accepted norms.  A second 
reason Seham found for the reinforcement of traditional gender roles came when she 
investigated the common source of knowledge for players and audience: “… Because 
popular culture is the source of most improviser’s references, these stereotypes are 
repeated and revalidated by audience laughter and recognition…” (p. 103). For most 
improvisers laughter is the ultimate goal. And to reference Heidegger, the source of that 
laughter has been kept in stored reserve waiting to be unleashed at the right moment. Part 
of the problem is the audience and player’s limited knowledge base. This is why in all my 
time on stage our best show was in front of a Mensa convention. My least favorite show 
was performed in front of five hundred drunken Shriners and their stripper dates. But in 
each case where nothing wonderful happens in front of a general audience, both the 
players and the audience were either unwilling or unable to move beyond the classic 
cultural touchstones. Unlike Gilbert Seldes, they were unable to choose wisely because 
they were too willing to allow others to choose for them.  
Flawed Mythologies: The Spectator and the Public Sphere 
 
 Contemporary mythologies have let us down and we are partially to blame. 
Instead of accepting, working with, or creating the modern equivalents of ancient 
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mythologies or medieval festivals- with their complex ambiguities and paradoxical 
contradictions- contemporary society has mostly squandered their opportunity to 
understand their experience and shape their society for the better.   To be sure there are 
many forces at work that have created this condition. Much of the blame can be placed in 
the sphere of corporate America and the unholy alliance they have forged with the mass 
media. Yet, part of the blame rests with us. Our fears and desires foreground some 
mythologies or parts of mythologies, at the expense of others and cause us to confuse the 
literal with the symbolic. In turn, our rigid adherence to these flawed mythologies 
nurtures irrationality and stupidity at the expense of reason and fact.  For example in his 
examination of creationism, intelligent design, and evolution, Kenneth Miller (1999) 
writes: “Membership in any number of creationist organizations required the applicants 
to sign a statement attesting to the literal, historical truth of Scripture.  A large chunk of 
their time and effort was devoted to defending the biblical account of creation, and even 
today creationists lead boat trips down the Grand Canyon of the Colorado...” (p. 40).   
And while we are willing to participate and accept symbolic mythologies as the literal 
truth most of us are unwilling to participate in and form the mythologies that make up our 
everyday experiences.   
 For now I will discuss the role of the mythic. I will also discuss the mythic 
component of cult phenomenon The Rocky Horror Picture Show and briefly discuss the 
phenomenon of fan culture. These topics certainly merit individual attention. I lump them 
together because they represent an attempt-albeit flawed- by people to mold their own 
mythologies rather than accept the ones that have been mass produced for them. 
Unfortunately, these sparse attempts at liberation will fail to unseat traditional norms or 
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offer a better alternative. Perhaps this is why Grossberg asks, during his discussion with 
philosopher Stuart Hall (1996), “...how is it that the very freedom of civil and cultural 
institutions from direct political intervention results in the rearticulation of the already 
dominant structures of meaning and power” (p. 161)?  Hall’s theory of popular culture is 
positioned somewhere between orthodox Marxism and Structuralism (Post). Indeed, his 
theories provide a reasonable explanation as to how the spectator winds up relinquishing 
his dialogic responsibilities so that he may fulfill the needs of industrial and post- 
industrial corporate culture. 
 It wasn’t always like this. Prior to the industrial revolution and the bourgeois 
culture that followed, people participated in the creation, distribution, and reception of 
their own stories and public festivals. “Human beings used to be influenced primarily by 
the stories of our particular tribe or community, not by the stories that are mass produced 
and market driven...”(Kilbourne, 2002, p. 56).  These stories and festivals had a direct 
connection to the needs, fears, and uncertainties of a tribe or community. While they 
offered no guarantee of a solution to a variety of problems, or an easy explanation of their 
experience, the complexity and inherent contradictions of these stories and festivals had 
the potential to disturb the status quo (generally a good thing) and create the conditions 
for a better alternative. For example in Europe, during the waning years of the Middle 
Ages feudalism lost its authority to politically organize society in favor of monarchism 
(granted, it is debatable whether or not monarchism was an improvement), the political 
status quo was disrupted by the public and unofficial festival, and the conditions were 
produced for the emergence of the Renaissance and the de-legitimation of feudalism. 
“...The marketplace feast opposed the protective, timeless stability, the unchanging 
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established order and ideology, and stressed the element of change and renewal” 
(Bakhtin, 1984, p. 81).  Unfortunately, the market place feast was unable to satisfy the 
needs and fears of Medieval Europe. Death from war or plague informed their needs of 
survival in the here and now and the afterlife. These needs were ultimately filled by the 
Church and Monarchy. Clearly, disrupting the status quo and providing a reasonable 
alternative are two very different things.  
 Still, the marketplace feast and the carnivalesque atmosphere that ensued was an 
important part of medieval society because for better or worse it was the honest 
expression of people living in medieval society. Gilbert Seldes (1957), while writing 
about the arts of the early 20th century, also stressed the honest expression of people and 
in fact was concerned that, “...the ‘intellectual's’ appreciation of the popular artist might 
make him, in turn try to win the favor of the intellectuals and fatally deprive him of the 
common touch...” (p. 93).  Indeed, for Bakhtin (1984): 
The carnivalesque crowd in the marketplace or in the streets is not merely a 
crowd. It is the people as a whole, but organized in their own way, the way of the 
people. It is outside of and contrary to all existing forms of the coercive 
socioeconomic and political organization, which is suspended for the time of the 
festivity (p. 255). 
The festival was a way to briefly experience life unfettered, apart from the rules of 
society. It combined elements of the sacred and the profane. And yes it wasn’t always 
pretty. Thus an official response to the ugly side of life was to ignore it, repress it and try 
to contain it, re-direct its energies, or chalk it up to the work of the Devil. Clearly a more 
sophisticated analysis is needed since “...The essence of the grotesque is precisely to 
109 
 
 
 
present a contradictory and double-faced fullness of life...” Bakhtin, 1984, p. 62).   How 
are we to truly understand who and what we really are if we refuse to acknowledge all 
that we are capable of, both good and bad?  
 As the modern era ushered in new forms of mechanical reproduction through two 
different yet similar mediums-film and television- the potential to create more complex 
mythologies increased.  Ideally, these mythologies would forge a powerful partnership 
between “spectator” and “story.” The modern myth brings to the table unique visual and 
aural components, each with the ability to seduce, alter time, transmit, and inspire an 
assortment of values and ideas. Cultural theorists like Benjamin (2007) and Williams 
(1989), who wrote about film and television respectively, were hopeful that these 
mediums would aid humankind in creating a better society. Indeed, Williams saw 
television as one of “...the contemporary tools of the long revolution towards an educated 
and participatory democracy...” (p. 151).  Television and film would serve the public by 
informing, entertaining, and most importantly, forcing a “viewing” that is active. A new 
type of public sphere would be created in which the spectator (in our case the television 
watcher and filmgoer) and the image (film and television as contemporary mediums for 
myths) would inform each other. In other words it was never preordained that television 
and film would become the tools and the grease of corporate America. In reference to 
television Williams writes, “...the technology of transmission and reception developed 
before the content...” (p. 29) Television was a blank slate. It had the potential to do all of 
the things referred to by Williams and helps create the stories that are similar to the ones 
produced during an earlier time period, yet this time with the added benefit of increased 
distribution and more complex content. Likewise film had the potential to mindfully 
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entertain, educate, and transform an American public who for the most part were engaged 
in the complimentary activities of the progressive era during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. Admittedly there remains a lack of consensus regarding the nature and 
purpose of the progressive movement. Still, most historians would agree that more 
democracy was a goal of the general public at all levels of government. And that 
democracy would be had only when government changed the nature of its relationship 
with big business. This relationship did change during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. Yet by the beginning of the 1920’s corporate America was poised to 
produce and hopefully sell a lot of product. The public relations expertise that was 
perfected by George Creel during World War I to disseminate propaganda and limit free 
speech would be applied to the relationship between the consumer and producer. Indeed, 
the idealism that existed prior to and during the progressive era would be either crushed 
by the war experience or coopted by the newly formed, but experienced and large, 
advertising machine.  This is perhaps why film was ultimately unable to rekindle the 
idealism of that earlier period. Writing on the films of that era Miriam Hansen (1991) 
maintains that “...the scopophilic transgression of boundaries enacts a practical critique of 
historical demarcations of public and private-the possibility of bringing hitherto 
unrepresented discourse of experience into the view of a radically inclusive, heterosocial 
public sphere” (p. 41).  As millions of immigrants poured in from Eastern and Southern 
Europe and as hundreds of thousands of African Americans moved from the rural south 
to the urban and industrializing north an increasingly heterogeneous public could only 
benefit from films that forced them to reconsider racial, ethnic, and gender norms. 
Instead, sophisticated and yet to be famous filmmaker D.W. Griffith succumbed to the 
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fears and prejudices of white society; he played into the American public’s reluctance to 
embrace the ontology of German historiography as a paradigm of Truth; and hid behind 
the first amendment with his release of Birth of a Nation and promotion of Intolerance 
(1991). In effect, Griffith’s approach to film structure was regressive since he borrowed 
from the narrative form of the bourgeois novel of the nineteenth century and established 
this form as the dominant model for film. In her study of Griffith and that era Hansen 
writes, “...Besides establishing Griffith’s reputation as the artistic ‘genius’ of the industry, 
the film marks a point of no return both in economic terms and in terms of public 
discourse on the cinema” (p. 163).  Films were big business to be sure but more 
importantly Hansen argues that the acceptance of Birth as a paradigm of Truth reflected 
America’s odd relationship with empiricism and nurtured the types of myths that would 
occupy the public realm while serving as an arbiter of Truth. Part of the problem rests on 
the acceptance of one position over the other. I would argue that despite the irrationality 
of mythical stories (and the widespread acceptance of films like Birth) at their core myths 
contain real issues, obscured by a symbolic referent, which people are trying to grapple 
with. Unfortunately, the scientists, intellectuals, and general public were unsuccessful in 
dealing with the issue of race at the time of the release of Birth because of flawed 
science. For example, the dominant science of that era concluded that intelligence was a 
function of race. This is one example of many why those who embrace a rational, 
empirical approach should try to “see” through the irrational (people are often reluctant to 
confront the real issues directly) part of the mythic if only to re-visit the taken-for-granted 
“Truth” which emerged from bad science.  
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 It is a shame that the potential Benjamin and Hansen discovered in early film 
rarely lived up to their expectations and hopes. For Hansen the films of the silent era and 
the theatres in which they were shown “shaped a mode of reception,” and often 
“emphasized the presentness” (p. 43) in which the typical filmgoer found herself.  How 
far might humankind have progressed if this activity was allowed to continue? Similarly, 
Benjamin saw the opportunity for human growth through the medium of film since in 
film, “...a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye-if only 
because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously 
explored by man...”(Benjamin, 2007, p. 236-237).  Film, thus, had the potential to create 
a vibrant, albeit ambiguous mythical experience similar to those that existed during the 
time of the ancient Greeks or during the medieval period referenced by Bakhtin, but now 
augmented by mechanical reproduction. For Bakhtin it was the very tension of those 
ambiguities that lay the epistemological groundwork which helped usher in the 
Renaissance. True, the film destroyed auras. But as Hansen and Kluge (1991) have 
argued, it produced new auratic experiences (Hansen). Unfortunately these experiences 
have been tempered or completely coopted by the needs of corporate America.  
 In spite of the grip held by corporate America on the media occasionally a work is 
produced that retains the invigorating elements of ancient myth, the thoughts and 
concerns of the common people,  and the rejuvenating effects of grotesque realism 
previously described by Bakhtin. It can be found in what has been termed the cult film. 
Paradoxically existing on the margins yet also displaying both financial and critical 
success, the cult film is exactly the type of film experience seemingly referred to and 
hoped for by Benjamin and Hansen. Indeed, commenting on Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s 
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position that the film spectator saw the film with her mind and body, Sobchack (1996) 
has argued that the power of film was based on “...the medium’s essential ability to 
stimulate us physiologically and sensually...” (p. 55).  Released in England in 1973 and 
brought to the United States in 1975 The Rocky Horror Picture Show was and still is a 
film that draws its participants (I use this term over audience on purpose) because of the 
strength of its presentation, its effective use of a variety of mythic elements, and its 
ability to stimulate its audience “physiologically and sensually.” Perhaps this is why 
Stuart Hall (1996), when commenting on popular culture in general, argued that, “the 
arena where we find who we really are...is an arena that is profoundly mythic” (p.479).  
Of course figuring out who we really are and accepting what we find are two very 
different things. The carnivalesque sensuality of Rocky Horror postulated an ambiguous 
sexual orientation at odds with the way the majority of Americans viewed their sexuality 
in the 1970’s. The discomfort many Americans felt and still feel toward homosexuality, 
for example, practically assured Rocky Horror its marginal status and midnight showing. 
While those in the mainstream might relegate the appeal of Rocky Horror to the 
eccentricities of youth I would argue that the appeal of this film lay elsewhere. At its core 
the film is critical of the institution of marriage and heterosexuality as the written-in-
stone standard of sexual relationships. Importantly, the film is able to overcome the 
resistance of the audience to different forms of sexual expression not by didactic text but 
by exploiting the sensual aspect of the medium, transvestism, and resurrecting Dionysus. 
These are the elements that form the attraction.  The lead character Dr. Frank N Furter 
(played by the actor Tim Curry) doesn’t persuade the lost couple to try alternative 
sexuality (Brad and Janet played by Barry Bostwick and Susan Sarandon, respectively) 
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through conventional, rational, dialogue. Rather, it is a filmic seduction made all the 
more powerful through the Dionysian connection. And as the participant’s proxy Brad 
and Janet allow the viewer/ participant to be seduced as well. The Rocky Horror Picture 
Show employs a pastiche of mythical and carnivalesque elements that help explain the 
success of the film, seduce its audience, and challenge conventional notions of gender 
and sexuality. 
 Indeed, in reference to Bakhtin, Hall (1996) argues that “The carnivalesque is not 
simply an upturning of two things which remain locked within their oppositional 
frameworks; it is also cross-cut by what Bakhtin calls the dialogic” (p. 470).    In this way 
Rocky Horror works as an act of resistance and creates an alternative public space for the 
filmmaker and filmgoer to work out their sexual ambiguities in the safe environment of a 
mythical, late night, non-judgmental “feature show.”  Certainly part of the allure of Rocky 
Horror is the in your face sexuality, camp and kitsch that make up so much of the film. 
But of course for some, “Being in ‘bad taste’ can be, as Pierre Bourdieu points out in 
Inside the Mouse, “an act of resistance...” (p. 3).  Released only three years after the 
Stonewall Uprising, Rocky Horror speaks to the discontent and anger felt by many in the 
gay community. The filmmakers might be criticized for taking an indirect approach in 
expressing their anger and for creating a film in bad taste. For example there is an act of 
cannibalism in the film. Perhaps a literal example of bad taste, but that criticism misses 
the point. There is always a place for rational dialogue. But rational arguments formed 
within specific political, social, and economic contexts can only get you so far. The many 
scientists, for example, who argued for the legitimation of eugenics as a means to justify 
the racial status quo of the early twentieth century, were rational men of science. The 
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psychiatrists who concluded that homosexuality was a psychological disorder up into the 
early 1970’s were rational men and women of science. And the pharmaceutical industry 
perpetuates and empirically justifies addiction for millions all in the name of rational 
science!  
Every so often empiricism needs to be stirred up. People can and should demand 
better science. But most people however are not going to get the chance to work within 
science to make these demands. But they might get the opportunity to critique science 
specifically and empiricism in general by exposure to or participation with the arts. Of 
course there is the claim that the arts can manipulate? Consider Rousseau’s (1968) 
argument toward the arts. While channeling Plato he warned: “The harm for which the 
theatre is reproached is not precisely that of inspiring criminal passions but of disposing 
the soul to feelings which are too tender and which are later satisfied at the expense of 
virtue...” (p. 51).  In the end Rousseau and Plato did not trust the public to weave their 
way through the miasma of myth and reality. I certainly understand their trepidation. 
Griffith’s Birth stoked the flames of white supremacy and legitimated the institution of 
Jim Crow rather than begin the dialogue and hard work called for by intellectuals like 
DuBois.  The problem isn’t so much the film as it is the reception of the film. Griffith 
wanted to be a filmmaker to a large audience. “... While it is true that commercial art is 
always in danger of ending up as a prostitute, it is equally true that noncommercial art is 
always in danger of ending up as an old maid...”(Panofsky, 1995, p.120).   Instead of 
interpreting the film as an excuse to begin a dialogue on race the strength of its narrative 
structure seemed to make all future discussion unnecessary.  Myth and reality became 
fused and the truth about race relations and race lay buried. On more than one occasion I 
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have felt frustrated by the masses inability to differentiate myth from reality. But is it 
right to place all of the blame on the myth? Should Leni Riefenstahl have been tried at 
Nuremburg for crimes against humanity because of her film, Triumph of the Will? 
 Humankind’s ability to answer the difficult questions concerning who we are and 
what is our place in the world will not be enhanced by avoiding the mythic. The mythic 
must be directly confronted but then rationally analyzed. “...The adherents of the cult of 
the Rocky Horror Picture Show transform themselves into the characters, and especially 
into Frank, by singing the songs and especially by donning his mask” (Aviram, 2004, p. 
185). Thus, at times it is not enough to simply discuss the issues. How could my college 
roommate refute the criticism of his parents toward his sexual orientation when they 
bolstered their argument with psychiatric proof? He couldn’t. But what he can do is hope 
that one day the certainty his parents have in science might be lessened. Not to dismiss 
science outright, but to demand better science. The strength of the mythic is not in its 
ability to offer easy solutions to complex problems. Rather, its strength is the result of the 
contradictory nature of the well-constructed myth and the questions it would raise 
because of those tensions. Rocky is a modern day myth and as Aviram (2004) argues 
Frank is Dionysus. “The adherent suffers the effects of Dionysus paradoxically as both a 
liberation and an enslavement to the lovely but tyrannical god...” (p. 184).    It was 
liberating to dress up as a transvestite, challenge gender norms, and sexual orientation. 
Yet, there is no guarantee that the participant in this bacchanal would be able to liberate 
himself from the constraints of gender and sexual norms while also negotiating the 
tyranny of pleasure. The audiences of the mid 1970’s could not anticipate the AIDS crisis 
of the 1980’s. With penicillin in hand to combat the STD’s of the 1970’s they and the 
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filmmakers focused on the pleasure aspect of Dionysus while ignoring the political and 
social ramifications that were part of the myth as well. But the myth is not to blame. The 
problem is in the misinterpretation of the myth that was a result of the mythmaking being 
coopted by corporate America who are experts at manipulating fears and redirecting 
dissent. Consequently, the masses were prone to foreground some aspects of the myth at 
the expense of others, confuse the symbolic with the literal, and ignore or de-emphasize 
the rational.   
From the time of Valentino and Gish, film helped humankind dispense with the 
need for rational discussion; it exploited their voyeuristic tendencies, and stroked their 
heightened pleasure receptors. Rocky’s liberal use of transvestism strongly challenged 
gender norms and importantly positioned ambiguity into gender constructs that most 
people accepted as scientific fact: “...This dualistic desire is characteristic of the 
ambiguity at work in male drag performance: at once the female impersonator submits to 
the cinematic representation of woman by donning her image; however, given the 
ultimate power held by the male performer, he is also able to take control of women’s 
image through the drag performance” (Robbins, Myrick, 2010, p. 271).  Liberation from 
stultifying gender and sexual norms is achieved for those who fully take part in the Rocky 
Horror ritual. This liberation, however, is limited since man maintains his control of 
woman’s image. Tim Curry is simply Faye Wray dressed in an outfit by Fredericks of 
Hollywood. The message is clear: Women can expand the realm of their sexuality as long 
as they are wearing fishnets and a bustier! This is one of the flaws of the Rocky Horror 
myth. The other more important flaw is the introduction of Apollo to the story in the 
guise of Riff-Raff, Frank-N-Furter’s henchman. In his essay on Rocky Horror Aviram 
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(2004) writes, “And Apollo, of course, is placed both by Greek tradition and especially 
Friedrich Nietzsche as the antithesis of Dionysus. Hence it is he and his sister who restore 
to the audience the distinction between Transylvania and earthling and bring about the 
end of the drama” (p. 189).  Rather than sustain the myth the filmmakers chose a device 
to end the plot and the myth which in turn eliminated all ambiguities. Why this occurred 
is unclear. Perhaps they didn’t trust the audience to create their own distinction between 
myth and reality.  Or to look at the problem inverted, Rancière (2009) might argue 
There is the distance between artist and spectator, but there is also the distance 
inherent in the performance itself, in so far as it subsists, as a spectacle, an 
autonomous thing, between the idea of the artist and the sensation or 
comprehension of the spectator…In the logic of emancipation…there is always a 
third thing…that is owned by no one, whose meaning is owned by no one, but 
which subsists between them (p. 14-15). 
In other words, even if the filmmakers eliminated the “flaws” pointed out by Aviram 
(2004) that “third thing” might rear its head and produce an unwanted result.  
Perhaps they needed a simple plot device, one especially that had already been 
accepted by movie audiences.  Are Rousseau, Plato, and Bloom therefore correct? Did 
the filmmakers consider themselves the experts whose job it is to interpret and make 
sense of experience? I don’t know. The one thing I can say is that the filmmakers were 
confidant in their contention that traditional heterosexual marriage and sexual relations 
within that institution need to be reexamined as the only standard by which men and 
women interact with each other. Also, it is to the filmmakers’ credit that they were able to 
recognize the at times destructive male gaze that informed the sexual escapades of the 
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film. But as Robbins and Myrick (2010) have pointed out, “This penetrative control is 
ultimately manifested as the RKO broadcasting tower which acts as the center of 
meaning for the film, a sadistic impulse the film recognized as a potential danger, but 
beyond which the film cannot move...” (p. 274).  Apollo destroyed the source of Frank –
N- Furter’s phallic strength when he toppled the RKO tower. Unfortunately, the 
filmmakers were unable to offer an alternative view and unwilling to let the Dionysian 
myth play itself out or remain in ambiguity. Perhaps the problem lies in the possibility 
that mythmakers who exist on the margin simply never had the experience to mold and 
shape the public sphere. 
Indeed, the creation of autonomous art and its distribution has been problematic 
for quite some time.  In his analysis of culture Grossberg (2010) writes, “... culture is 
never merely a set of practices, technologies or messages, objects whose meaning and 
identity can be guaranteed by their origin or their intrinsic essences...” (p. 157).  
Potentially liberating ideas are frequently co-opted by those with power, motivation, and 
the means to do so.  For example, some historians who examined early television of the 
1950s refer to that time period as the golden age of television. Serious plays by the likes 
of Paddy Chayefsky, Horton Foote, and Rod Serling, were broadcast. But so were 
programs with far less serious pretensions. And it was that type of programming which 
won out.  As Williams (1989) points out television has been handicapped from the very 
beginning. He writes, “... within the broadcasting model there was this deep 
contradiction, of centralized transmission and privatized reception...” (p. 30).  Learning 
from their experience with radio, corporate America exploited television’s technical and 
financial need for centralized transmission, exploited the new mediums incorporation of 
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imagery with sound to manipulate their audiences to purchase their products.  This is why 
serious programs soon gave way to banal amusements, “the commodified negation of 
play” (Inside the Mouse,1995,  p. 185): corrupt quiz shows, the Mickey Mouse Club, 
Howdy Doody, Bonanza (a father, three sons, each from a different mother, and a male 
Chinese housekeeper) and Gunsmoke! Williams (1989) reminds us that, “... broadcasting 
was developed not only within a capitalist society but specifically by the capitalist 
manufacturers of the technological apparatus” (p. 34).  The genius of the “capitalist 
manufacturers” was to get the American public to purchase an “apparatus” that in turn 
would manipulate them to purchase more things. The American public was being 
groomed to be consumers, not producers of their own mythologies.    
Despite commodification, banality and the sheer stupidity of television there will 
always be programs, like The Wire for example, that deserve our attention: Programs 
such as this one legitimate television because they complexify competing and 
coincidental forces, and thus require the viewer to interact in order to make meaning. 
Indeed, the viewer is compelled to make meaning of her own rather than receive one 
which was pre-packaged. In this way the viewer’s gaze is altered from passive to active. 
A similar level of activity may occur in response to a heavily commodified program or 
even one which reifies a societal wrong; however that aesthetic stance would have had to 
be already present in the viewer.    Of course if the American public is to improve its 
mythmaking and myth interpreting ability; if it is going to fight against a commodified 
culture it thinks it wants but does not need, then it is going to have to take matters into its 
own hands.   This does happen, but it is rare.  For example, in her book NASA/TREK 
Constance Penley (1997) describes how tens of thousands of fans of the television series 
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Star Trek use the show as inspiration to produce unique, imaginative, and at times 
pornographic fiction to help them better understand their experiences. Similarly, fans of 
Bruce Springsteen like to share stories about Bruce because they, “... order and to find 
friends personal experiences according to socially derived categories and must enable 
fans to understand their experiences as shared” (Cavicchi, 1998, p. 168).   Penley’s 
NASA/TREK (1997) concerns the people who write fictions inspired by Star Trek. She 
tells us these people are called “slashers.” Penley writes, 
Although the slashers are writing for much smaller audiences – in fact, largely 
for themselves – their work nonetheless embodies the same impulse as the female 
nineteenth –century popular novelists: to transform the public sphere by 
imaginatively demonstrating how it could be improved through making it more 
answerable to women’s interests (p. 134).  
The shared experience of Springsteen fans and the activity of Penley’s “slashers” are 
similar in that they both represent informal, collective movements. These movements 
attempt to understand and possibly change the public sphere. Indeed, while Springsteen 
fans try to figure out ways to reconcile hard work, low play and bleak prospects, Penley’s 
“slashers” hope to change a sphere that is either uninterested in women’s issues or 
patriarchal. Slasher fiction is perhaps more effective at illustrating the complex issues 
which surround and contribute to  ill constructed gender norms than traditional academic 
studies. The impact is immediate! In a similar way, HBO’s “fictional” The Wire, showed 
the range of forces, the gestalt, that combine to limit opportunities for the working poor 
of Baltimore. In both Penley’s (1997) analysis of “slasher” fiction and The Wire are two 
attempts to improve the public sphere, even though the former is a fantasy response and 
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the latter seems more realistic. Rocky Horror, NASA/TREK, and The Wire, for example, 
demonstrate how the science fiction genre, fan fiction, and good fiction lend itself to the 
construction of new mythologies that have the potential to transform the public sphere.  
Because these mythologies are set in a future yet to come, or a dystopian present they are 
more likely to help those who watch them extricate themselves from the types of cultural 
constraints and limited meanings referred to earlier by Grossberg (2010).  (Ironically 
when Gene Roddenberry pitched the series to NBC executives he called it a western set 
in space).  Penley’s slashers use the Star Trek universe to better understand the sexual 
and emotional needs of women by sometimes focusing on a homoerotic relationship 
between two of its lead characters. Also, the Star Trek theme works to challenge gender 
norms as it pertains to science. As Penley describes, women were better able to withstand 
the rigors of space travel and had logged more flight time but it was the men who were 
chosen to be pilots in the space race.   It should come as no surprise that when a 
patriarchal society went looking for “the right stuff” it found it only in male test pilots. 
Penley’s slashers and the fiction they produce are an important example of an act of 
resistance. So is the activity of the fans of Bruce Springsteen.  To be sure it is a fantasy 
response. Fan culture and some television shows are fantasy responses, but so is much of 
mythic culture. Rocky Horror was a fantasy response and an important act of resistance 
too since it attempted to force a reassessment of gender and sexuality norms. But because 
of its flaws Rocky Horror did not create an alternative public sphere.  Their attempts were 
marginal at best. Could new media help us create new mythologies? In writing about the 
current digital age Mark Hansen (2000) writes that, “... the digital image explodes the 
frame...” (p. 35), but he also maintains “... yet so long as it is tied to the image frame of 
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the cinema, this polymorphous potential will remain entirely untapped” (p. 35). I’m 
afraid Mark Hanson is right. He is of course referring to the spectator’s role during the 
pre-cinematic period and the demands that aesthetic medium had on the participant. 
Indeed, as filmmakers like Peter Jackson and studios like Pixar become more adept at 
creating images that allow the spectator to leave the image at the “frame of the cinema” 
and simply sit back and enjoy the show not only will the potential of digital cinema not 
be tapped but the ability of the participant to assume an active role in the creation of 
helpful mythologies will remain untapped as well.    
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CHAPTER 5 
PLAYWRITING AS SOLO IMPROVISATION: AN ORIGINAL PLAY 
 
Setting: The time is the near future. The place is a private, for profit, high school. In fact, 
all of the public schools that were once a feature of America have been replaced by 
privately run, for profit high schools (The Charter School movement of the early 21st 
century served, in part, as an effective transition to complete and open privatization, after 
underfunding and over testing unfairly caused a lack of confidence, among the general 
population, in public schools).  One company, Koch Industries, controls and owns ninety-
five percent of the schools in America. This same company also controls the energy, 
pharmaceutical, media, prison, timber, paper, fructose, hydrogenated oil, fertilizer, seed, 
and law enforcement industries. Monopolies like this one were once a problem, but all 
anti-trust legislation had been repealed in the Santorum Bill of 2036. A small component 
of anti-trust legislation remains but only because it can be used as a weapon against labor 
unions, although few unions still exist. 
 
The schools of the near future have taken on a completely new character from what they 
once were: Administrators that were once human are now cyborgs, part human, and part 
machine. This serves their employer well since they are now rendered incapable of free 
thought or critical thinking of any sort. They are in charge of ensuring that the teachers 
adhere to the mandated curriculum   that was created by Patriot Perspective, a 
conservative think tank, funded by Koch Industries. Koch Industries had attempted to 
replace all of the teachers with “teaching drones,” but a loophole discovered by Senator 
Ben Sanders, (great, great, great, grandson of the late senator , Bernie Sanders) requires a 
small percentage of teachers to be fully human.  
 
Despite the loophole, the assault on teachers, (as witnessed by the addition of “teaching 
drones,” the elimination of unions and teacher’s pensions, the elimination of medical 
insurance, and low salaries), has created a shortage of human teachers, except for a small 
segment of Christians that see teaching the mandated curriculum   as the path to salvation 
or a way to bring about the End Times (they can never seem to figure that one out). 
Filling out the human teachers are a small cadre of idealists, who view good teaching as 
transformative, however they cannot be open about their belief in liberating pedagogy or 
they will face arrest.  
 
All theists are fundamentalists, and all religions have ended any activities connected to 
social justice. Consequently, the Social Gospel was repudiated at the Southern Baptist 
Convention in 2027.  Speaking for all faiths they affirmed that Jesus, Muhammad, 
Abraham, Buddha, Joseph Smith, the Reverend Jim Jones, L. Ron Hubbard, and Jenny 
McCarthy (who became the patron saint of the anti-vaccine movement) wants them to be 
wealthy. (It was at this point in the development of Christianity and its relationship with 
federal and state governments, that it became the established religion of America). 
 
 Much of the world’s populations spend most of their time working long hours, while 
being severely underpaid: Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, and 
Iceland are the only countries that have a middle class majority. A very small percentage 
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of the world’s population is wealthy. Still, in the United States, the majority of white 
Christians, and whites of other faiths, support a political and economic system that 
nurtures and idolizes these small, wealthy, ruling elites. Inexplicably, these majority 
groups consistently vote against their interests, although in actuality voting does very 
little to effect any significant change, in part a consequence of gerrymandering, Citizens 
United, no campaign finance laws, and the power of lobbyists. Still, Blacks, Hispanics, 
Asians, Jews, Atheists and all members of the LGBT community can no longer vote, 
unless any of the latter group has participated in Christian conversion therapy, or the 
former pay an exorbitant poll tax. (In fact, the LGBT community was stripped of all civil 
rights as stipulated in the Cheney Bill, which eventually became the 34th amendment to 
the Constitution).   
 
The average age of the human staff at Koch High 3476.9 (outside of Philadelphia) is 
sixty-five, although there are a few young teachers in their early twenties. They were 
selected for their affable manner, team spirit, obedience to authority, and obvious love of 
their Christian faith.  They score high on the battery of standardized tests and observation 
instruments that evaluate their ability to teach the Curriculum   as designed by Patriot 
Perspective. This Curriculum   is touted as “values based:” It promotes the “seven core 
values:” obedience, patriarchy, un-regulated capitalism, white-supremacy, 
Fundamentalist Christianity, American exceptionalism and heteronormativity. Everyone 
at the high school, with the exception of the janitors, cooks, bus drivers, maintenance 
men, human security staff, students permanently in “in school suspension” and lawn 
maintenance staff, is white. 
 
Main Characters: (The Quintet) 
 
Eugene:  fully human, male, early sixties, teacher.  
 
Mark: a male student in his junior year. 
 
Jack: a male student in his junior year. 
 
Hannah: a female student in her junior year 
 
Zoe: a female student in her junior year. 
 
Additional Players: 
 
J. P. Altgeld: prison inmate, arrested and convicted of improper use of his office for his 
role in pardoning the criminals of the Haymarket Square Riot and a host of other charges. 
 
Mary Harris Jones: prison nurse, arrested and sentenced by a military tribunal for 
conspiring to murder in the Paint Creek Mine War of West Virginia. 
 
Alex Berkman: prison inmate. Arrested and imprisoned for the attempted murder of 
Henry Frick. 
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Galileo: Prison Inmate. Formerly under house arrest, now incarcerated for stealing his 
middle finger from a display in the Museo Galileo in Florence Italy. 
 
Martin Luther King Jr.: Prison inmate. Convicted of violating an Alabama law from 1921 
that made it a crime to boycott a business. 
 
Lenny Bruce: Prison Inmate. Convicted of talking about Eleanor Roosevelt’s tits. 
 
Dalton Trumbo: Prison Inmate. Convicted of failing to testify before the HUAC. 
 
H.J. Rosenthal: Prison Inmate. Convicted of selling cocaine to fund the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua. 
 
They are often surrounded by an assortment of students, administrators, human teachers 
and drones, most of whom best remain anonymous.  
 
Scene One: Personalized Learning  
 
(Interior of a classroom. The students are seated and leashed to their desks. There are 
forty two students in class. They are arranged in six straight rows, seven deep. A 
“smartboard” is at the front of the class. The walls are bare, with the exception of six 
portraits: Charles and David Koch, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Pat Robertson and 
the Olsen Twins-who are considered the greatest actors that ever lived (Their television 
show from the 1980’s, “Full House,” is played continuously on screens that teachers can 
access as a “treat” for students when they are finished with their work.). The bookcases 
and shelves are filled with trophies (there are no books) won by the school for excellence 
in education. Electronic advertisements selling products and services by Koch Industries, 
and “PSA’s” promoting the seven core values, frequently “support” the lessons taught by 
the teachers. A small camera surrounded by an equally small bullet proof glass dome 
hangs from the ceiling. No one knows if it records or not, or who is entitled to view the 
captured images and sound. There are no windows. All of the lighting is fluorescent)   
 
Eugene: (He is standing at the front of the classroom, unenthusiastically delivering the 
tail end of a lecture on the Founding Fathers he has delivered more times than he cares to 
remember. The teachers have been “rewarded” by the administrators with a “jeans day,” 
so he is wearing blue jeans. It’s Friday, 28th period, the last class of the day, and week for 
that matter. The number of periods per day was increased as an administrative response 
to the dwindling attention span of students. ) 
 
And so, as we all can see, once America rid itself of British tyranny we established the 
world’s best country. 
 
Hannah: Mr. Debs? 
 
Eugene: Yes, Hannah. 
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Hannah: (She is somewhat nervous, and pauses before speaking) I think I read 
somewhere that the American freedom fighters had to maintain the institution of slavery 
so they wouldn’t lose the support of the Southern colonies prior to the Revolutionary 
War? 
 
Student 1 (in a monotone voice) America improved the lives of Africans by rescuing 
them and paying for their passage to our great country. 
 
Student 2 (in a monotone voice) Hannah, did you read that treasonous liberal pabulum in 
a book? 
 
Students 1-38 (chanting)) Treasonous liberal pabulum, Treasonous liberal pabulum, 
(repeats and eventually fades out). 
 
Hannah: (nervous, but steadfast) Yes 
 
Student 2: (Still, using a monotone voice) Was it on the list of approved reading? 
 
Hannah: (attempting to conceal a lie) Of course! 
 
Zoe: (friends with Hannah, and trying to show support) Yes, it was on the list. 
 
Students 1-38 (In unison and in a monotone) Godless African savages thanked America 
for rescuing them from the jungle, paying for their passage, and delivering them to 
patriotic, god-fearing Americans, who always had their best interest in mind. 
 
(At that moment one of the cyborg assistant principals enters the classroom. All of the 
cyborgs look alike and are gender neutral. The students and teachers are required to 
address all cyborgs as “Mr. Charles” or “Mr. David.” The cyborgs do not care which of 
those two names are used.) 
 
Mr. Charles: (speaking like a large dog given the power of speech for the first time) Nice 
work students! Mr. Debs! You have embraced the standards! 
 
Eugene: (repeating a phrase he has said to Mr. Charles more times than he cares to 
remember, while concealing his disgust at what he is about to say) Yes Sir! I strive to 
ensure the success of all of my students as I deliver to them personalized learning!  
 
(As Mr. Charles exits the classroom, the bell sounds, signaling the end of the school day. 
The students are un-leashed and leave.  Eugene walks to his desk, sits down in his chair, 
and attempts to muffle a sigh, yet he can do nothing to temper his facial expression.)  
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Scene Two: Woodshedding 
 
(It is two days later, Sunday morning. As required by law, everyone in the community is 
attending a Christian church where people hear the word of god as interpreted by Pat 
Robertson, considered the most important theologian of all time. The quintet, taking a big 
risk, is instead inside the back of an abandoned warehouse, (which was once a lawn and 
garden center before climate change made that activity impossible, except for the 
wealthy), on the outskirts of the city. Zoe had called everyone the night before, and had 
asked them to come today because she had a surprise for them. An assortment of unused 
lawn and garden tools are scattered within the structure. There are three wooden chairs, 
one armchair, a sofa, a bookcase filled with an assortment of books and a crate turned 
into a makeshift coffee table, in a back corner of the warehouse. Discarded and reclaimed 
lamps provide lighting. A small space heater takes the edge off the cold in the winter. 
Electricity is provided by a small solar collector hidden from sight.  Eugene occupies the 
armchair. Mark and Jack are seated on the sofa. Hannah is straddling one of the wooden 
chairs, with her forearms leaning against its back.  Zoe enters with excitement. She is 
holding a heavy box which she quickly puts on the crate that is downstage center) 
 
Zoe: Hey!  Look at what I scored from the Goodwill last night! 
 
(They gather around a small but sturdy cardboard box while grabbing at its contents) 
 
Mark: Books! 
 
Jack: Old books. 
 
Hannah: (Grabbing a handful) Nietzsche, Dewey, Foucault, Vonnegut, Twain, holy shit 
Kafka… here’s one about Einstein and Picasso! Nice haul my love! 
 
Eugene: (To Zoe) I thought Goodwill stopped selling books years ago, since no one ever 
bought them? 
 
Zoe: They did. I found these bitches in a gym bag, near a bunch of old exercise 
equipment. 
 
Eugene: I suppose we should be thankful that most people have given up on either a 
sound mind or a sound body. I can’t believe you were able to buy these. 
 
Zoe: I didn’t buy them. They gave them to me! 
 
Eugene: (somewhat incredulous) They gave them to you? 
 
Zoe: Yep, the cashier didn’t know how to price them and when she asked the manager he 
called corporate, but couldn’t get a hold of anybody. So, he hung up on them and told me 
to take them. 
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Jack: (Highfiving Mark) Yeah man, that’s good for us! 
 
Zoe: Gene, what’s wrong? 
 
Eugene: (looking serious) Hannah, on Friday you brought up a viewpoint on American 
slavery that isn’t supported by the standards. 
 
Hannah: (defensive and annoyed) I asked a question Gene. 
 
Eugene: Hannah, I don’t want to see you get in trouble. 
 
Hannah: (annoyed) Gene, it was a question. The school code states that if we state an 
unauthorized topic within a question we aren’t guilty of breaking the law. 
 
Eugene: Hannah, you know what I mean. All the Borgs need is one excuse to zap us and 
they’ll take it 
 
Zoe: (concerned) Gene, we know you’re frustrated too. 
 
Eugene: True 
 
Hannah: Would you prefer we challenge the standards like we’ve done in the past…non-
verbally? 
 
Eugene: No, I’m tired of that approach too… but Hannah, what you did the other day… 
don’t you think you might have gone too far? 
 
Hannah: Maybe a little. I don’t know Gene I’m so fucking tired of pretending! 
 
Eugene: I’m tired of pretending too. I’d like to be a real teacher again. 
 
Zoe: But they’ll arrest you and you’ll lose your job. 
 
Jack: Gene, don’t do that to us. You’re the only teacher at the school who’s not 
completely full of shit. 
 
Eugene: So, keep pretending to (mockingly) embrace the standards?!  
 
Hannah: (Attempting to change the conversation by reading from a book) Hey guys, 
check out what Dewey writes, “Writer, composer of music, sculptor, or painter can 
retrace, during the process of production, what they have previously done. When it is not 
satisfactory in the undergoing or perceptual phase of experience, they can to some degree 
start afresh. This retracing is not readily accomplished in the case of architecture—which 
is perhaps one reason why there are so many ugly buildings.” 
 
Jack: (Chuckling) Well, that explains our school.  
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Zoe: Inside and out. And that goes for their so called (in a mocking tone) educational 
program of personalized learning that ensures success for every student. 
 
Mark: I’d like to see our educational program (making air quotes) retraced. 
 
Jack: I’d like to see it flushed down the toilet, but fat chance of that happening. 
 
Eugene: (his mood improving) As long as we’re here… 
 
Hannah: (To Eugene) I’m right there with you brother!  It’s my turn to lead our 
discussion. 
 
Eugene: Go for it! 
 
Zoe: Hold on a second! (She darts offstage and quickly returns with a box of donuts) 
 
Hannah: Alright, I would like to revisit (she sees the donuts at this point, grabs one, 
lustily bites into it and turns to Zoe) Thanks baby! (Turns to the group, with a mouthful 
of donut) the New Deal’s effect on the building of the welfare state. 
 
Mark: (Without missing a beat makes fun of Hannah talking with her mouth full by 
speaking as if his mouth is full) FDR didn’t go far enough! 
 
Zoe:  (Ignoring Mark’s joke and focusing the discussion) What makes you say that? 
 
Mark: (Getting serious) Remember that time he closed the banks during the Bank 
Holiday? When they reopened they were only slightly improved. So much of what made 
them prone to failure still remained. Roosevelt should have nationalized the banks! 
 
Hannah: There’s no way the business interests in Congress would have allowed that. No 
way! 
 
Jack: FDR said it himself. He was saving capitalism from itself so it could continue. Not 
paving the way for a socialist economy, despite what Father Coughlin was saying on the 
radio. 
 
Zoe: Fucking anti-Semite! 
 
Mark and Jack (Simultaneously) He was anti-Semitic? 
 
Zoe: (getting angry at Jack and Mark) Of course he was anti-Semitic; you know he was… 
we’ve had this discussion before…just like that motherfucker Ford. Don’t you remember, 
he bought that newspaper, the Dearborn Gazette for the sole purpose of spreading his 
bullshit!? 
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Eugene: (Bemused) Americans loved Henry Ford. 
 
Zoe:  (angry) Most Americans couldn’t find their own assholes with a GPS and a 
flashlight! 
 
Hannah: (determined) Americans can exhibit real intelligence if they want to. Have you 
ever read the commentaries on a sports article? It’s filled with nuance and complexity as 
well as a deep historical knowledge of the subject. It’s goddamn analysis! But as soon as 
the topic turns to politics or religion, or art, or anything with an intellectual bent, 
Americans are ignorant… and proud of their ignorance. Like that anti-Semite Henry 
Ford. 
 
Jack: (To Zoe) Well if he was an anti-Semite, (interrupting himself) wait a minute I 
thought you were an atheist? And I’m not saying he wasn’t, it didn’t matter to most folks. 
All they cared about was getting a car that they could afford. (To Hannah) I thought you 
wanted to talk about the welfare state! 
 
Mark: (To Zoe) Independent. 
 
Hannah: I do want to talk about the welfare state. It’s Zoe’s fault. (Hannah playfully 
sticks out her tongue at Zoe) She sidetracked us with all that anti-Semite stuff. 
 
Zoe: Sorry guys. I didn’t mean to (in a mocking tone) get us off task. Oh, (To Jack) and 
fuckwad, I can be an atheist and Jewish! 
 
Jack: (Sardonically) And a lesbian! Don’t forget that part! 
 
Mark: (To Zoe) Independent. 
 
Zoe: (To Jack) I’m not even going to respond to that. (Addressing the group) But what if 
I’m not off task? 
 
Mark: (To Zoe) Independent. 
 
Zoe:  Isn’t it conceivable that those in power exploit ethnic or religious conflict, or intra-
class conflict, as a diversion (emphasis on the word diversion) from any discussions on 
class conflict and their underlying causes? 
 
Jack: Don’t forget sexual orientation! (Zoe is glaring at Jack and then turns to Mark) 
 
Mark: (To Zoe)  Independent. 
 
Zoe: (furious at Mark) What are you going on about?! 
 
Mark: It’s the Dearborn Independent. You called it the Gazette. 
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Zoe: (sardonically) I stand corrected comrade. 
 
Mark: (To Zoe) Nice… it doesn’t take you long to reference Marx. 
 
Zoe: (her anger subsides)  I think he was right! Don’t you think people would be more 
receptive to a discussion on class if they weren’t so preoccupied with so called 
differences over race or religion?  (Zoe glares at Jack waiting for him to say sexual 
orientation one more time stopping him just as he was about to say it) And also if they 
weren’t so fucking stupid! 
 
(Hannah looks at Zoe in a way that implies that Zoe really doesn’t mean what she just 
said. Zoe looks at Hannah in a way that suggests that she does. Over the years Eugene 
and the other members of the quintet have mastered the ability to communicate non-
verbally) 
 
Eugene: (Calmly, but also chuckling) Do you think the Left could have gotten further 
during the mid-twentieth century…I mean, do you think they could have made some real 
progress toward a socialist state, if Americans had overcome their racial or religious 
differences…or religious allegiances? 
 
Mark: I think, if they could, (pause for three beats) maybe FDR could have nationalized 
the banks? Maybe he could have convinced them…all those fireside chats! That it was in 
their best interests. You know…long term economic health and all of that.  But 
still…FDR was no socialist. 
 
Hannah: (coming around) I see what you guys are saying. But look! All those white men 
in power have always been adept at controlling the masses by manipulating the racial 
tensions within classes, or between ethnic groups or those with different religious beliefs. 
 
Zoe: (speaking at the same time Hannah says the word beliefs) Like the motherfucking 
rich did to the non-slaveholding majority in the antebellum South. How else could they 
have convinced a poor white majority to support a small group of wealthy elites unless 
they used racial conflict and feelings of white supremacy as a goddamn smokescreen 
against recognition of class conflict!? 
 
Jack: (relentless) Or sexual orientation. 
 
Zoe: (subtle eye roll) 
 
Hannah (continuing) …FDR never could have convinced them to accept the 
nationalization of the banks because he never wanted the nationalization of the banks. 
Don’t you remember how he treated Upton Sinclair when he ran for office in California? 
And! And! And! … the people were too preoccupied with racial tensions as Blacks, and 
other minority groups, were starting to step up their efforts as they fought for their civil 
rights.  
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Jack: (Finally getting serious) Zoe, Hannah, I hear what you’re saying, but I also think 
that people are afraid. Afraid of not having what they need… (Realizing something) oh 
and insecure about not getting what they think they need (emphasis on the word 
insecure), you know, the basics, because they have no faith that anyone other than 
themselves is going to go to bat for them…to help them, and that’s (lingers on the word 
that’s) why they get greedy and place their hopes on a system that promises them riches! 
It’s greed and all the stuff that makes people greedy, in addition to what you’ve been 
saying about race and religion (turns to Zoe and Hannah) and sexual orientation … that 
explains why people are willing to support a small ruling elite. They stupidly think that 
one day they could be rich too. They have no idea the game is rigged against them. 
 
Zoe: Maybe… Jack you may have something there but I also think it’s far more 
complicated than greed. 
 
Mark: Horatio Alger is alive and well… Cool…. Hey, we better get going, church is 
letting out. 
 
Eugene: Okay, I’ll see you guys tomorrow.  
 
(Eugene exits. The rest of the Quintet follow suit) 
 
Scene Three: L’inquiétude  
  
(Monday afternoon. It’s the last period of the day. Eugene is at the front of the classroom. 
Class has been in session for six minutes.  Six minutes, thirty seconds remain) 
 
Student 3: Mr. Debs? 
 
Eugene: Yes, Ronald. 
 
Student 3: I have a question about standard 34.6a regarding the spread of American 
civilization during the Spanish American War.  
 
Eugene: Of course. 
 
Student 3: What flaws were in the Philippine people? 
 
Eugene: Flaws? What do you mean? 
 
Student 3: The Philippine terrorists fought against the brave American soldiers for almost 
three years. 
 
Eugene: Yes, that’s right. 
 
Student 3: What was wrong with them? 
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Eugene: (Raising an eyebrow that is only noticed by the other members of the quintet) 
Well, I suppose that some of them lacked a decent education. 
 
Student 3: Because their school system lacked the proper moral certainties. 
 
Eugene: No, I don’t think we could truly say that. 
 
Student 4: They lacked the rugged individualism that so many brave Americans 
possessed, especially the politicians who supported the war and the soldiers who fought 
so bravely. 
 
Student 5: Were they suffering because they hadn’t fully embraced free market 
capitalism?  
 
Student 8: Did they not understand all the benefits that would come their way when they 
received the extension of democracy from America? 
 
Student 9: Maybe they didn’t understand manifest destiny? 
 
Student 10: We helped them capture the terrorist, Emilio Ackwinalo, led by the brave 
American, General Funston. 
 
Eugene: (trying to stay calm) Aguinaldo. 
 
Student 10: (confused) what? 
 
Eugene: His name is Emilio A-gui-nal-do. 
 
Student 10: Yes, the terrorist. 
 
Eugene: (Displaying some anger, but speaking softly) He wasn’t a terrorist and there 
wasn’t anything wrong with them…  
 
Student 7:  (Interrupting on the word them) But Mr. Debs why would the Filipino people 
fight against us…we were trying to help them? 
 
Eugene: (remembering to frame his position within a question) Is it conceivable that 
some of what we were doing was not helpful? 
 
Students 1-38 (unison monotone) That’s impossible. Everything the United States of 
America does or has ever done is helpful to others. 
 
Eugene: Everything? 
 
 
135 
 
 
 
(Zoe and Hannah look at Eugene and their message is clear. They want him to stop his 
line of reasoning immediately) 
 
Eugene: (pauses and stares at the portraits of the Koch brothers, Ronald Reagan, Richard 
Nixon, Pat Robertson and the Olsen Twins. His mood becomes determined) ….After 
centuries of being colonized by the Spanish, the Filipino people were unwilling to let 
another strong military power dictate to them! And moreover, it’s inaccurate to call their 
leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, a terrorist. He was willing to die to help his people break free 
of colonial rule…any (emphasis on the word any) colonial rule! 
 
Student 3: (Confused yet without emotion)) Mr. Debs are you sure you’re right? None of 
what you said is in our textbook or contained in any of the standards. 
 
(Mark, Hannah, Jack and Zoe are scared. They have yet to hear Eugene explain what 
really happened to the rest of the class and fear what might happen to him) 
 
 Students 1, 2, 4-38: (In unison and without emotion) Mr. Debs, our book states that the 
childlike people of the Philippines welcomed American civilization because America 
possessed the finest technology, military, economic system, political system and religion. 
A few criminals fought against America’s military but were quickly subdued by a 
superior and righteous force.  Christian nations have always fought on the right side of 
history. 
 
Zoe: No they haven’t. 
 
Eugene: (To Zoe) Don’t… 
 
Students 1-38 (In unison) I don’t understand. 
 
Zoe: Christian nations haven’t always fought on the right side of history.  
 
Eugene: (pleading) Please Zoe!  
 
Zoe: During the Crusades, Christian warriors from Europe killed virtually everyone they 
encountered in their so called quest (emphasis on the word quest) to reclaim the Holy 
land from the Muslims… even other Christians.  
 
Hannah: She’s right. In the wake of the Protestant Reformation, thousands of hatchet 
wielding French Catholics, Christians, (emphasis on the word Christians) killed almost 
ten thousand Protestants simply because they viewed their take on Christianity as 
blasphemous. 
 
Jack: You can’t tell me that their murderous activities placed them on the right side of 
history. 
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Mark: Don’t even get me started on the Inquisitions, or forcing Galileo to recant his 
scientific discoveries that proved that the sun, not the earth, is the center of the solar 
system….and putting him under house arrest! 
 
Hannah: Or that Republican congressional nonsense of the early twenty-first century that 
ignored science because of pure greed, their worship of the wealthy, and their blind 
adherence to a corrupted and distorted interpretation of an ancient faith.  Our hostile 
climate is a direct consequence of their willful ignorance!  
 
Zoe: (Determined and sarcastic) Or Operation American Freedom, when the United 
States preemptively (emphasis on preemptively) used nuclear weapons- neutron bombs- 
because god told them to do it, killing all of the people of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Jordan, 
Nigeria, Venezuela, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, but leaving the oil refineries intact. 
 
(The other students in the class are confused regarding the information they are hearing 
from the quintet. At that moment three cyborg assistant principals and two security 
drones burst into the classroom) 
 
Mr. Charles 1: (Barking) Mr. Debs, you have lost control of the classroom environment!!  
 
Mr. Charles 2: (Barking) You have broken the morality clause!! 
 
Mr. Charles 3: (Barking) Your lack of professionalism will hurt your weekly formative 
evaluation! Your daily summative evaluation! Your hourly comprehensive evaluation, 
your quarterly TKES evaluation. Your mid-term summative eval….. 
 
Eugene: (Interrupting Mr. Charles 3) Will you please just shut the fuck up!!! 
 
Mr. Charles 1-3 (In unison) You are guilty of moral turpitude! 
 
Drones 1 and 2: (robotic) Students 39, 40, 41, 42 (Zoe, Hannah, Mark and Jack) Put your 
hands behind your head and get on the ground! Now! 
 
Zoe: I can’t get on the ground, you fucking moron…patriotic… perspective… produced 
…piece of shit! We’re still leashed! 
 
(Drone1 pushes a button on his belt that releases Zoe, Jack, Hannah and Mark from their 
leashes. All of them place their hands behind their heads and get to their knees. The 
security drones then taser them until they pass out.) 
 
(Mr. Charles 1-3 taser Eugene as he is about to charge the security drones to protect his 
students. As he falls to the ground restraints are placed on his hands and ankles. The 
cyborgs then proceed to beat him with clubs despite the fact that he is already 
unconscious. The other students show no emotion as Eugene, Mark, Hannah, Jack and 
Zoe are tasered, and Eugene is beaten.) 
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Mr. Charles 1: (barking) Students, there are three minutes left in class. Take out your 
school supplied bibles and read Psalm 137:9, or 1 Timothy 2:12, or  Jeremiah 19:9,  or 1 
Peter 2:18, or Kings 2:23-24, or Leviticus 18:22. (The remaining students instantly 
comply)  
 
Scene Four: Life is But a Dream…Shboom 
 
(Eugene awakens in a privately run for profit prison in the infirmary, in what was once 
the federal penitentiary in Ashland, Kentucky. There are forty seven other 
patients/prisoners in the room, many of whom are in pain or discomfit, since pain 
medication, or daily attention from the doctors and nurses, is not an option in this facility 
(designed to house no more than twenty patients). As a result of his injuries he drifts in 
and out of consciousness, and while this occurs he dreams of events both real and 
imagined…sometimes the two are mixed and it is hard to distinguish one from the other. 
The audience experiences these dreams in a series of flashbacks) 
 
(First flashback, Eugene is in the first year of his teaching career. He is seated in an office 
in front of an administrator’s desk.  She is explaining the results of Eugene’s 
observation.) 
 
Administrator: (cheerful yet without empathy) As you can see I had to cite you for lack of 
proficiency at the beginning of your lesson because you failed to frame your learning 
objective within an essential question on your lesson plans. 
 
Eugene: But with all due respect, wasn’t it clear from my opening that the focus of that 
lesson was the transcendentalists and their connection to nineteenth century utopian 
movements? 
 
Administrator: No. It was not clear. 
 
Eugene: It was not clear? 
 
Administrator: It was not clear. 
 
Eugene: Did you see the quotation projected on the board by Emerson in reference to his 
views on slavery? 
 
Administrator:  I saw the quotation. 
 
Eugene: And the primary source packet that I handed out, containing works by Thoreau, 
Emerson, Whitman, Melville, Poe, and Hawthorne?   
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Administrator: I saw the primary source packet. But I could not give you credit for using 
that in your lesson since you failed to get the Media Specialist’s signature prior to making 
copies of those primary sources.  
 
Eugene: (incredulous) So, even though I helped my students place in proper historical 
context several seemingly unrelated primary sources I get credit for none of that because 
I failed to get a signature on the copyright rules form. 
 
Administrator: (smiling) That’s exactly right. And remember I had no idea what your 
lesson was about because you failed to frame that lesson on your lesson plans within an 
essential question. 
 
Eugene: (Almost at his wits end) Let me understand this. 
 
Administrator: (cheerful) Of course. 
 
Eugene: I failed to meet any of the teaching proficiencies. 
 
Administrator: That’s exactly right. 
 
Eugene: Because I failed to frame my learning objective within an essential question and 
because I neglected to get the Media Specialist to sign off that I turned in a form stating 
that I understood copyright law as it pertains to materials used in the classroom. 
 
Administrator: That’s exactly right.   
 
Eugene: But Dr. Froggybottom, you sat through a fifty seven minute class where my 
students analyzed eight or so primary source documents… analyzed them while 
referencing a ton of outside information…all appropriate… and eventually came to 
correctly conclude that the transcendentalists were a contrarian expression of nineteenth 
century utopianism.  
 
Administrator: Yes, I saw that but I didn’t understand what I saw. 
 
Eugene: But why? 
 
Administrator: (exceedingly cheerful) Because you failed to frame your learning 
objective within an essential question. 
 
(Flashback two: Eugene is seated on a stool at the front of his classroom. The room is 
filled with parents who may sign their child up to take his class in US history. It is still, 
very early in his teaching career.) 
 
Eugene: One of the central focuses of the class is historiography. It’s the study of 
different historical perspectives on a similar topic. 
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Parent one: Mr. Dobs? 
 
Eugene: (politely) Debs 
 
Parent one: What? 
 
Eugene: (politely) My last name is Debs. 
 
Parent one: (insistent) My son said it was Dobs, look he sent me this text just now. 
 
Eugene: The text does say Dobs, but my name is Debs. 
 
Parent one: Are you sure? My son is really good at history. 
 
Eugene: I’m sure he is, but my last name is Debs (attempting a joke) I got it from my 
father. 
 
Parent one: (angry) I never had a father! Are you making fun of me? 
 
Eugene: (attempting to diffuse the situation) No, of course not… 
 
Parent two: (interrupting) I have a question! 
 
Eugene: Yes, what would you like to know? 
 
Parent two: I heard you got divorced. 
 
Eugene: Well, yes, but why don’t we focus on the syllabus and the reading list for this 
class. 
 
Parent three: I heard you got divorced too! 
 
Parent two: See! I’m not crazy! I knew this guy got divorced. Why’d you get divorced? 
 
Parent three: Yeah, I wanna know that too!  
 
Parent one: Is that why you changed your name to Dobs… from the shame of your 
divorce? 
 
Parent four: I want to ask a question about politics? 
 
Eugene: (relieved) Of course, what would you like to know? 
 
Parent four: (serious) What are your personal political beliefs? You know what I mean? 
Are you one of those liberals…one of those gay marriage, abortion promoting, welfare 
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supporting, pre-marital sex loving, civil rights marching, white male hating, Birkenstock 
wearing, Prius driving, tree hugging, guns rights limiting, feminist, liberals? 
 
Eugene: (sensing trouble) I don’t think my personal beliefs are relevant …and in any case 
they have no bearing on the class. My primary job is to give your children a solid 
foundation in US history and experience in different types of historical thinking. 
 
Parent two: Is that why you got divorced? Cause of your (mocking tone) practice of pre-
marital sex? Or is it because you like men? Oh… that’s so disgusting! Just thinking about 
men having sex with other men makes me want to beat the ever living crap out of 
them…praise Jesus! 
 
Parent one: Probably why he changed his name from Dobs. He’s got something to hide. 
 
Parent five: Hey, did you know he’s the only social studies teacher not to coach a sport?   
 
Parents 6-25 (In unison) Why don’t you coach a sport? You got something against 
sports? 
 
Eugene: No, I love sports, although I prefer those with less violent contact…so as to 
reduce the risk for concussions and other serious injury. 
 
Parent one: Is that why you coach the chess club? 
 
Parents 6-25 (In unison) The chess club!? Chess ain’t a sport. You know who plays 
chess? Jews! 
 
Parent two: And atheists! 
 
Parent five: (sincerely confused) I thought Jews are atheists? 
 
Parent three: Jews and atheists…I don’t like the sound of that.  
 
(The third flashback never happened. Eugene is walking toward a school that seems 
familiar, but very different from what he has experienced in his life as a teacher. On his 
way from the parking lot to the school building he passes scores of students engaged in a 
variety of activities: dozens are tending a garden, while others are harvesting vegetables 
or recording information on a tablet. As he continues walking he passes a large group of 
students who appear to be playing a game that combines dance, singing, and throwing a 
Frisbee. Further on he passes a group of students sitting under a tree. They’re talking and 
eating while making reference to passages of a book they hold in their hands. As he 
walks he appears to be gliding over the grounds of the school: Eugene passes well-
manicured gardens, growing herbs, fruits, and vegetables; he glides past a dairy farm, and 
a barn raising, except the builders are not Amish, but a combination of students, teachers, 
and community volunteers.  He continues his glide and enters the main entrance to the 
school. To his left, a small group of students and teachers are playing an assortment of 
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instruments, acoustic and electronic. The music is familiar and strange at the same time. 
To his right is one of the school’s offices (decentralization is the norm). Eugene enters, 
waves and says hi to three secretaries: (all of whom hold doctorates and when they see 
him, greet him with enthusiasm) Wil, Jason, and Debbie. They are busy performing some 
of the logistics of the school’s operation and are discussing an upcoming interview) 
 
Eugene: Hi guys! What’s up? 
 
Debbie: (handing forms to several teachers and responding to Eugene) Hi Gene! We’re 
getting ready to interview a couple of candidates to teach the A.P. Calculus II class. 
 
Eugene: (innocently) Isn’t that kind of thing handled by the administration. 
 
Wil: (bemused, but laughing his comment off as no big deal and handing a teacher a 
package that had recently arrived) Gene… we haven’t had administrators for some 
time…that job is shared between the teachers and us. 
 
Jason: (thinking back and confirming on a laptop an academic meet between this school 
and a rival in a couple of weeks, and handing a student a small plant grown in the 
hydroponic lab) I think it’s been a good twenty years or so since administrators worked in 
schools.  
 
Debbie: (thinking back and handing the cook in charge of this week’s menu a new lemon 
zester he had ordered for a new recipe, while also helping a young child with a difficult 
knot she is practicing for her Eagle Scout Badge, and lastly nodding in approval to a 
student and her novel solution to a physics problem) I can’t remember when it 
happened…but at some point a small group of very smart folk were able to argue that 
administrators at the school –in fact bureaucracy in general at the county, state, and 
federal level- were too concerned with public relations, fundraising or educational issues 
that had become politicized.  Their numbers have been drastically reduced since most of 
their activities had become counterproductive to sound pedagogy. Today, all 
administrators must demonstrate to students, teachers, and parents their educational 
value. Only then can they retain their jobs. 
 
Eugene:  (matter of fact) Makes sense to me. 
 
Wil: (passing a brochure to the German teacher, a calendar of events to parent volunteers, 
and consoling one of the younger students whose pet fish died the night before) Exactly.  
One of the grandchildren of the Italian director Federico Fellini wrote a seminal book on 
curriculum   theory based in part on the film his granddad made called Orchestra 
Rehearsal.  
 
Debbie: (Performing CPR on the overweight pastor of the local church while editing a 
peer reviewed essay for a highly respected curriculum   journal) Great film! The orchestra 
did away with the conductor since they figured he was unnecessary to the creation of 
music.  
142 
 
 
 
 
Wil: (Creating art out of found objects and learning Swahili from a computer program) 
And usually a pain in the ass as well! 
 
(Everyone laughs) 
 
Jason: (Removing a planters wart from the librarian’s foot while demonstrating to the 
biology class the proper way to hold a scalpel) Yeah, I love that film! Anyway, his 
grandson wrote this really convincing book on curriculum   theory that took the message 
of his grandfather’s film to its logical conclusion: it put forth the proposition that skilled 
teachers and students, like skilled musicians who know how and what to play, know what 
needs to be done to truly create an environment where each can learn. So, in the same 
way in which an orchestra can perform well without a conductor, schools can work just 
fine without administration as it was once practiced.   
 
Debbie:  (Putting the finishing touches on an equation that proves cold fusion while 
helping a very young student with his head covering.) Yeah, he wrote that with enough 
experience at ensemble work, the chaos that once plagued collaboration from the bottom 
up could be minimized, if not eliminated. 
 
Wil: (Performing reverse circumcisions on a group of very grateful boys…painlessly 
while demonstrating to a group of fashion minded students the correct way to wear a 
salwar kameez and a sherwani)  Gene, you might recall the curriculum   program on 
creative collaboration from the bottom up that was first piloted in Finland, back in 2026. 
 
Eugene: Ya know I think I do remember that. Didn’t they pick Finland because of the 
way in which their culture privileges intellectual rigor? And the way they treat their 
teachers.  
 
Jason: (Taking a perfect loaf of bread out of an oven, putting a few more strokes of 
acrylic paint on his abstract of the sun, and answering a parent’s question over the phone) 
It definitely wasn’t for their pickled fish! (Gene and Jason laugh) 
 
Wil: (Handing a student a slide rule, and adding to his drawing of a less expensive 
version of a particle accelerator) Yeah that’s right Gene. And as you might remember, 
they chose well. After Finland the movement spread to the other Scandinavian countries, 
Europe, Asia, Canada, Latin America, Africa, Australia and finally the United States. 
 
Debbie: (Tasting what appears to be the perfect dry rub, and solving James Madison’s 
problem of sovereignty, in ways that Madison himself overlooked) The U.S. held out 
because of the lobbying efforts of wealthy corporations and the rest of the one percent 
who feared, and rightly so, that a program that demonstrates the error of top down 
administration would destroy the ethos that essentially justifies the existence of the one 
percent. 
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Jason: (Adjusting the lamp shade so their work area has the perfect amount of light and 
reconciling quantum physics with Einstein’s Theory of Relativity)  Eventually, even the 
people of the United States understood the folly of administration from the top down, 
especially in education. 
 
Debbie: (Solving, with non-toxic chemicals, pest control for the school’s gardens, and 
perfecting her internal combustion engine that runs on hydrogen) Exactly!  
 
Wil: (Completing Schubert’s Unfinished Symphony and handing a tissue to a young boy 
in the first grade) Anyway Gene, as long as you’re hear you might as well grab those 
boxes…the books you ordered last week came in.  
 
Eugene: (excited) Cool! It’s that anthology of what was considered Black radical poetry 
from the 1960’s. Pretty tame stuff for today, but it scared the shit out of white people 
during that time period.  
 
Jason: (Convincing a small group of elderly visitors to the school why the Confederate 
flag is a symbol of hate and making the perfect samosa) Nice Gene, that sounds 
fascinating. If you have any extra copies, I would love to read that poetry! Hey, make 
sure you stop by the culinary arts room….they made a chicken mole for lunch today! 
 
Eugene: Thanks guys! I will. Oh, and I’ll check if there are any extra copies of the poetry 
anthology. (he exits) 
 
Scene Five: Authenticity 
 
(Eugene emerges from his dreams in considerable pain. One of the patient/inmates, in the 
next bed, notices his pain and offers him a couple of pills. He swallows them and within a 
few minutes is feeling a lot better) 
 
Eugene: Thanks. 
 
J.P. Altgeld: You’re welcome. (Looks him straight in the eye and puts out his hand) John. 
 
Eugene: (Gingerly) Gene. Why are you in here, you seem okay? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: I’ve got locomotor ataxia…it means I have trouble keeping my balance. And 
I’m prone to fevers. I usually work in the infirmary… today and probably for the next 
few days I’m a patient. 
 
Eugene: That’s why you had pain pills. But aren’t the authorities strict with their supply? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: Oh they’re strict, but fortunately they can’t count. 
 
Eugene: You can always count on their ineptitude. 
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J.P. Altgeld: Indeed. 
 
Eugene: (hesitant) Can I ask what got you locked up? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: Sure. Let’s see… (as if reading a grocery list) protesting the use of child 
labor, revealing the chemicals used in fracking, disclosing the profits made by privately 
run prisons in the fish farm industry, releasing the internal emails of the coal mining 
industry that proved the work environment unsafe… .Stuff like that..(Pause) I don’t want 
to be in prison for my beliefs and my actions, but I have to. 
 
Eugene: What… they didn’t charge you with kidnapping the Lindbergh baby?! 
 
J. P. Altgeld: (Laughs) You? 
 
Eugene: I was teaching non-standardized U.S. history. 
 
J.P. Altgeld: (as if making a small discovery) So… you’re the teacher. 
 
Eugene: Yes. You know about me? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: (quickly concerned) Hold on a minute (pauses for about 30 seconds while 
subtly gazing in the direction of a small dome attached to the ceiling), Okay, we can talk 
again. 
 
Eugene: (confused) What was that? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: See the camera dome? 
 
Eugene: I see it. I have (corrects himself) had one in what used to be my classroom. 
 
J.P. Altgeld: Its color slightly changes when it turns on and off…When it’s safe and not 
safe to speak. 
    
Eugene: (Eugene thinks back to the dome in his former classroom) Of course. How did 
you know I’m a teacher? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: I’ve made some allies with a couple of the guards and one of the nurses. 
 
Eugene: I was taken in with four of my students. Do you know anything about them? 
 
J. P. Altgeld: The two boys are here… in general population. The girls were taken to the 
women’s prison, about ten miles from here. I don’t know anything about the condition of 
the girls, but the boys are okay. 
 
Eugene: I tried to stop them. 
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J.P. Altgeld: What do you mean? 
 
Eugene: I tried to stop them from speaking the truth about U.S. history. We got so good 
at hiding what we felt…and knew (emphasis on knew). ..I guess we just snapped. 
 
J.P. Altgeld: It happens…don’t be so hard on yourselves. How could anyone with a soul 
and a brain not lose control? 
 
Eugene: I feel terrible…I feel responsible… 
 
J.P. Altgeld: (Interrupting on the word responsible, but with compassion) Stop. You were 
one of the few healthy people in an otherwise broken system. Most folks had been so 
manipulated by hate and fear and deprivation, that they contributed to and were part of a 
grand delusional narrative… (pauses again, this time Gene needs no explanation as to 
why) somehow you and your students were able to rise above that and see things for what 
they really are. 
 
Eugene: (depressed) But look where its gotten us. We’re locked up, and seen as 
criminals! 
 
(At that moment a nurse walks in wheeling a tray of medical supplies. Gene freezes, but 
John looks at him and signals that she’s okay) 
 
Nurse Jones: (calm with assurance) Good afternoon. How are my boys? 
 
Alex: (determined) Feeling strong Mother! 
 
Nurse Jones: Really, the black and blues on your face tell me a different story!? 
 
J. P. Altgeld: (to Gene) That’s Alex, our resident revolutionary. 
 
(Gene and Alex look at each other. Alex is in a bed, on the other side of Gene. Alex puts 
out his hand. Gene takes it) 
 
Alex: Alexander Berkman. 
 
Eugene: Eugene Debs…Gene. 
 
Alex: Good to meet you. You look worried. 
 
Eugene: Well… yeah…my students and I have been Tasered, I’ve been beaten…and now 
we’re locked up. 
 
Alex: Prison isn’t the worst place for a person who thinks. 
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Nurse Jones: (To Gene) Let me take a look at that eye. (She gently examines Gene’s right 
eye) Yeah, boy…the drones and assministrators did a number on you. How’s your 
vision? 
 
Eugene: It’s okay. 
 
Nurse Jones: How many fingers am I holding up? (She holds up three) 
 
Eugene: (Joking) twenty one. 
 
Nurse Jones: Good! 
 
(Nurse Jones turns to Alex) 
 
Nurse Jones: How’s my boychik? For real. 
 
Alex: (smiles) Always ready to (they all pause for about thirty seconds)…..give it to the 
man! 
 
Nurse Jones: (sighs) Looks to me like this time they gave it to you! 
 
Alex: Perhaps. I’ll get them back. 
  
 
(Nurse Jones smiles and wheels her cart to attend to the other inmates/patients. Alex turns 
to Gene) 
 
Alex: (To Gene and pointing to his face) The guards, at least most of them, are on the 
Koch Industry payroll. Occasionally, they use my face as a prison piñata.  
 
Eugene: Why? 
 
Alex: A few years back I tried to kill the number two man for Koch Industries.  
 
Eugene: Why? 
 
Alex: Old school civil disobedience never worked for me. It might’ve worked for Gandhi 
and King, it wasn’t working for me. 
 
Eugene: What’d you do? 
 
Alex: I barged into the office of Henry Frick, with my knife and gun, with the sole 
intention to kill him.  
 
Eugene: I take it things didn’t work out as planned? 
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Alex: No it didn’t. Turns out he’s one tough son of a bitch. And he had guards helping 
him. 
 
Eugene: And what if you were successful? What would you have achieved? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: That’s the question isn’t it? 
 
Alex: Always the political scientist. 
 
J. P. Altgeld: Always the violent revolutionary. 
 
Alex: You think politics is the solution?!  
 
J.P. Altgeld: Long term…yes (they pause) you think the death of the guy you tried to kill 
would have changed anything? Huh?! Somebody else would’ve moved into that guy’s 
job before the corpse grew cold. It’s not enough to kill the top dog. You have to kill the 
ethos that supports the idea of a top dog. 
 
Nurse Jones: (Making her way back towards Gene, John, and Alex) What’s wrong with a 
little bit of both? Huh?  
 
Alex: Politics and violence. Ahhh…I don’t know…maybe? 
 
Eugene: A little rebellion now and then… 
 
Nurse Jones: That’s Jefferson isn’t it? 
 
Eugene: Yes, in a letter to Madison after Shay’s Rebellion. 
 
J. P. Altgeld: I remember that. So Jefferson was an advocate of violence? I thought he 
was a pacifist? 
 
Eugene: I don’t think he ever meant to support the violence. In that letter to Madison he 
condemns the uprising. 
 
Nurse Jones: Then why say a little rebellion now and then? 
 
Eugene: Probably, to temper the response to Shay and the like. Too forceful would have, 
for Jefferson, felt like the heavy handed response of an oppressive monarchy. 
 
Alex: But wasn’t the government unable to muster a forceful response, in the first place? 
Weren’t they still under the Article of Confederation? 
 
Eugene: You remember your U.S. history. 
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Nurse Jones: Then you’ll also remember (everyone pauses) … that an army was raised 
with private funds to put down the rebellions…. To protect the moneyed interests. 
Sounds familiar doesn’t it? 
 
J. P. Altgeld: That it does Mother…that it does. 
 
Alex: It would seem that your country’s claim of a government by the people is a little 
weak. 
 
Nurse Jones: Oh it’s by the people…but only some of the people. 
 
Eugene: True…. (Gene pauses to reflect) this feels good. 
 
Alex: What feels good? 
 
Eugene: Our discussion…it’s honest and everyone’s listening and contributing...it’s 
refreshing. 
 
J.P. Altgeld: Gene…you did that. 
 
Eugene: Did what? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: Asked good questions. Listened…moved the discussion along. 
 
Nurse Jones: Isn’t that what you do? You are a teacher aren’t you? 
 
Eugene: Not for a very long time. 
 
Nurse Jones: You can change that. 
 
Eugene: How? 
 
Nurse Jones: Look around you. You’re in a building with people who have the time to 
listen and a willingness to learn….what really happened…not the bullshit they teach in 
the schools. 
 
J.P. Altgeld: The stuff we need to learn. 
 
Alex: The stuff we have to learn! 
 
Eugene: (Not completely convinced) Okay….. 
 
J.P. Altgeld: You can do what you do here…in the prison classrooms. 
 
Eugene: How’s that? 
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J.P. Altgeld: (matter of fact) The authorities only care about the profits they make by 
exploiting prison labor. They let some of the inmates take or teach classes. You could 
teach history. I can help. 
 
Eugene: With what materials? I don’t have any of my books. 
 
Alex: Smart doesn’t come from books! It comes from making the right decisions right 
now! 
 
Eugene: Yeah…maybe…but an informed person can make better decisions. Books help. 
I cannot live without books (Eugene realizes he just quoted Jefferson without effort. He 
wonders for a moment where that thought came from and returns his focus to the 
discussion). 
  
J.P. Altgeld: (turns to Gene as if offering him a solution to his problem) When the 
schools became standardized, they shipped their books off to the various landfills…but 
get this…they were full, so they dumped them at the prisons figuring most prisoners were 
illiterate so what’s the harm in leaving potentially revolutionary materials in their hands. 
(Pause) 
 
Alex: Except we’re not illiterate…some of the guys on death row are better legal scholars 
than those momzas on the Supreme Fucking Court! 
 
J.P. Altgeld: (to Gene) If I can help you get a class or two to teach, would you do it? 
 
Eugene: (mood brightens) Absolutely. 
 
Scene Six: Anschauung 
 
(A few months have passed since Eugene’s time in the prison infirmary. True to his 
word, J.P. Altgeld was able to get Eugene out of working in the prison fish farm, mostly 
because there were plenty of people for that, since it paid ten cents more per day than any 
of the other prison jobs, and no one likes to teach. Eugene is inside a small prison room 
reallocated as a classroom. The class has been in session for two weeks. It takes place 
daily, Monday through Friday and lasts for approximately two to three hours. Eugene has 
been given permission to extend class for as much as one extra hour, for a total of four 
possible hours of class per day, if extra time is needed.  The classroom is small, but not 
cramped. Light is provided by several lamps placed throughout the room and from the 
window that allows the afternoon sun to shine through, although the bars outside the 
window are a not so subtle reminder of their imprisonment.  There is an old fashioned 
chalkboard on one wall and about fifteen or so student desks that integrate chair and 
writing surface, plus some assorted chairs scattered about.  To his delight the room is 
filled with boxes of books and vinyl records of all sorts, discarded because of their 
perceived lack of value. There is also a record player, tube amplification and speakers. 
Eugene was told he could teach whatever he likes regarding history, although, given his 
knowledge of U.S. history, odds are that the class will largely focus on U.S. history, 
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unless one or more of the students bring up a legitimate request for a shift in focus. If 
that’s the case, all bets are off. He is not required to turn in lesson plans, write essential 
questions on the board, turn in a syllabus, post the standards on the wall, have his 
students take any tests that are not of his or his students’  design,  keep a log of parental 
contact, participate in “professional learning opportunities,” go to faculty meetings, 
attend parent conferences, enforce dress codes, coach a sport, attend open house, pre-
planning, post-planning, collaborative planning-unless the collaboration is between him 
and the students in the class- participate in honors night, graduation ceremonies, or any of 
the other tasks or rituals typically required of teachers. Any inmate that qualifies can 
attend as long as space remains which for this first class is twenty students, and they meet 
the qualifications. There are a few requirements: the student/inmate must agree to stay in 
the class for its length-one semester; the student/inmate must be willing to listen and 
respond honestly to the information being presented in the class and complete all agreed 
upon outside assignments; and the student/inmate must not have engaged in violence, 
unless it was in self-defense.  The prison authorities have not installed a camera in the 
ceiling. Instead, they keep two guards outside of the classroom who spend most of their 
time watching on their tablets the contemporary equivalent of Roman chariot races and 
gladiator games, instead of paying attention to the goings on of a history class. In fact, 
much of what has transpired over the last two weeks has given them little cause to be 
concerned.) 
 
(The following inmates are part of Eugene’s first class) 
 
Galileo 
Martin Luther King Jr. 
Lenny Bruce 
Dalton Trumbo 
H.J. Rosenthal 
 
(Returning characters) 
 
J. P. Altgeld 
Alexander Berkman 
Mark 
Jack 
 
(It is Monday, week three of Eugene’s history class. During the first two weeks of class 
several topics emerged out of the class discussions and assigned readings. On the 
previous Friday, the class agreed to more fully investigate one of them: Is violence 
justifiable to achieve a political goal? Class has already been in session a couple of hours.  
Eugene plays a record. Lenny, Martin, Mark, Jack and Alex are nodding their heads to 
the music. The other students seem unaffected) 
 
Lenny: Hey Gene, that’s some pretty hip shit we’re listening to. These cats swing like a 
motherfucker. Who is that? 
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Eugene: A British group called the Clash. This album is called Sandinista. 
 
Mark: (remembering) Great record! 
 
Galileo: (probing) Gene, why are we listening to this music? What is its connection to our 
study of whether or not violence is justifiable to pursue a political goal? 
 
Eugene: (smiling) Great question. Would anyone care to answer it? 
 
H.J. Rosenthal: The group, The Clash, recorded this triple album in 1980 to highlight the 
cause of the Sandinistas and to point out the continued hypocrisy of the United States’ 
foreign policy, especially during the Cold War years. 
 
Galileo: That is an unsatisfactory response to my question. 
 
H.J. Rosenthal: Hold on. I’m not done. 
 
Galileo: My apologies. Please continue. 
 
H.J. Rosenthal: For years the United States had been backing criminal, corrupt, regimes 
simply because of their anti-Soviet stance. 
 
Mark: That’s right. There was the CIA led coup that helped the Shah of Iran come to 
power in 1954. 
 
Jack: And Pinochet in Chile in 1973. 
 
Mark: And Diem in South Vietnam in the early 1960’s. 
 
H.J. Rosenthal: By 1980, Nicaragua was just one more example of the United States’ 
government either supporting a dictator like Somoza who routinely tortured and 
perpetrated unspeakable crimes against his people, or trying to unseat someone like 
Ortega, who was democratically elected, because of his alliance with the Soviets. 
 
Galileo: You still haven’t adequately addressed our query. 
 
H.J. Rosenthal: (angry) Hold on a minute. I’m not done. 
 
Galileo: Again, my apologies. 
 
H.J. Rosenthal: Anyway…my argument is this: If the Reagan administration can 
exchange arms for hostages and use the proceeds to fund the Contras of Nicaragua, then I 
can sell a shitload of cocaine and use the money to fund the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional.  
 
Alex: I agree. A democratic regime should be allowed to defend itself from tyranny. 
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Dalton Trumbo: From within or without. 
 
Galileo: (Sarcastic) The quiet man speaks! 
 
(Dalton Trumbo slowly flips off Galileo who replies back to him first with his right hand, 
then quickly switches to his left when he realizes the missing finger of his right hand) 
 
Martin Luther King Jr.: But doesn’t violence beget further violence?  
 
Jack: From what I’ve read historically…yes. But what’s a legitimate response…turning 
the other cheek? I don’t think so. 
 
Mark: Consider how many fewer people might have died if the United States responded 
to Hitler in 1937 instead of 1941. 
 
Lenny (to MLK): You gonna tell me with a straight face you never wanted to hit Bull 
Connor? 
 
Martin Luther King Jr.: I didn’t want to hit him. It would not have been a Christian 
response. 
 
Lenny: (sarcastically): But schtupping other women while you were married…that’s a 
Christian response!? 
 
Eugene: Let’s stay focused on the question. 
 
Lenny: (to MLK)  Sorry man. (to H.J.) Hey brother…you still got any blow? 
 
H.J. Rosenthal: Funny. 
 
Eugene: Gentlemen…please. 
 
J.P. Altgeld: What if we look at this from another angle? (everyone listens) What if all 
Nation States made a concerted effort to reduce and eventually remove the underlying 
causes of war? 
 
Mark: I see what you’re getting at. If England and France didn’t demand such absurdly 
huge reparations from Germany following WW I, then perhaps the conditions don’t exist 
for the election of Hitler in 1933. 
 
Jack: Let’s go back even further…before WW I…before Germany’s militarization, 
which, it could be argued, was a legitimate response to Great Britain’s control of 
international trade. 
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Galileo: What if! What if! People are too fickle and unpredictable! I’d rather deal with 
particles and light waves. 
 
Mark: (To Galileo) And too easily manipulated! When I think back to the students in our 
class, just sitting there while Jack, Zoe, Hannah, Gene, and I were getting Tasered and 
beaten…all I’m saying is if anyone, living or droid,  comes at me or my friends in a 
violent way…I’m kicking some ass…sorry Martin. 
 
Martin Luther King Jr.:  That’s okay son. 
 
Lenny: I’m kicking ass too! 
 
Alex: With what… your obscene words (emphasis on obscene words)!? We’re talking 
about real violence…physical (emphasis on the word physical) violence. You think you 
can do that? 
 
Lenny: (unconvincingly) Yes.  
 
Alex: Bullshit! You’ll do what you always do…retreat into sex and narcotics. 
 
Lenny: Hey, don’t knock sex and narcotics…it’s a great way to spend an afternoon...or a 
few days…months… (trails off).  
 
Dalton: Let’s not be so hard on the guy… 
 
Lenny: Thanks Spartacus! 
 
Eugene: Let’s not lose focus on the original question. We’re talking about violence as an 
appropriate response to achieve a political goal…not a street brawl. 
 
Mark: What about the US response to Japan during WW II? Was that violence justified? 
 
Eugene: Good question Mark! 
 
J.P. Altgeld: Perhaps our question should be reframed? 
 
Eugene: How so? 
 
J.P. Altgeld: Perhaps we should concede that for humans pacifism is a pipe dream? It’s 
inherent to our species to be violent…on any scale. 
 
Galileo: That’s logical 
 
J.P. Altgeld: Perhaps the better question should be whether or not violence that is a 
proportional response (emphasis on the word proportional) to an attack is ethically 
justified. 
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Alex: Hey…boychik, the Japanese bombed you first! As far as I’m concerned they don’t 
deserve a proportional response. 
 
Jack: The Japanese military (emphasis on the word military) bombed us. 
 
Mark: And yet we destroyed and killed anywhere from forty to eighty percent of the 
civilian population as we firebombed Japan…and this was before we dropped atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki! 
 
Jack: Proportionality should be the goal if a nation wants to behave ethically. 
 
Martin: I suppose a reduction in violence is preferable to unmitigated violence. But my 
faith in God and my commitment to my church compels me to seek a non-violent 
solution. 
 
Galileo: (mumbling) Commitment to your church?! It must be very different from  my 
church. 
 
Martin: You’re welcome to pray with me. 
 
Galileo: No thanks Martin. 
 
Eugene: Good work everyone. See you tomorrow.  
 
Lenny: Wait. Do we have time to hear the other side of that record? 
 
Eugene: Sure Lenny. Why don’t you flip it over. 
 
(As the music of the Clash plays the lights fade on Eugene and his students, downstage 
left. Downstage right, the lights come up on Hannah and Zoe surrounded by several 
women in a classroom setting.) 
 
Hannah: Whose turn is it to lead the discussion? 
 
Zoe (confidently) Mine. 
 
Emma Goldman: I have a question… 
 
(End scene. The lights fade as the music of the Clash gets louder) 
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“…The past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the 
past.” From “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” by T.S. Elliot  (2007) 
 
 
“You can’t improvise on nothing man; you’ve gotta improvise on something.” Charles 
Mingus 
CHAPTER 6 
Improvisation, Institutions and Standards 
 While it might be convenient to think of an improvisational activity as either 
resisting or re-enforcing the “standards” of an institution like public education or popular 
music, it would be more accurate to state that an improvisational activity is intimately 
tied to that institution, and can neither completely resist or adequately re-enforce the 
standards which make up that institution. Moreover, it is inaccurate to describe an 
improvisational activity as existing “outside” of an institution or institutions. Still, I will 
at times add to the confusion by referring to “that spontaneous act” and the well-learned 
“standard” as if both are autonomous and separate from one another.  All improvisations-
musical, theatrical, and conversational, for example- are composed of the raw material 
that flows to and from (and lies in between and perhaps at times in a metaphysical space) 
the dominant and subordinate culture(s)- the former feeding off the latter in a mostly 
parasitic relationship.  If this improvisational activity is to be transformative of a standard 
or standards (the goal of all who call and /or practice a radical pedagogy) the participants 
must be attentive to the dialogical nature of this activity, but more importantly willing 
and able to make a decision that, at least for a time, resembles a just and perhaps difficult 
choice. And within the field of improvisation all of this must happen “spontaneously” or 
be the result of a “spontaneous” act.   For these things to happen, the people involved 
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must hone a developing relational intelligence since what they are engaged in is a battle 
of sorts. In my use of relational intelligence, I am not referring to this term in a narrow 
sense; for example, in the way a corporate CEO might wish his employees behaved so 
that they maximize profits by working more efficiently. Instead, to borrow a term from 
Curriculum   scholar Marla Morris, I would like to “tease out” additional ways of looking 
at relational intelligence, for it is in this way that I can analyze the interaction between 
improvisation and institutions as well as the nature of improvisational activity, since the 
latter has significant impact on the former. I find the expression to “tease out” so 
appropriate for this discussion since it mirrors a significant part of the activity, which 
occurs between the best improvisers in any field. Indeed, a musician plays a series of 
notes in such a way as to solicit (tease out) a unique response from her fellow players 
(seemingly perfect for that moment) that would not have been played had those initial 
notes never been heard; or a skilled teacher, so attuned to her students and their moment, 
who is able to coax out of her students a response that is both honest and furthers their 
inquiry.   To help me in this task are an assortment of Curriculum   writers/practitioners, 
jazz musicians/ writers, those who write about and/or perform improvisational comedy, 
and some from “traditional” theatre. I am also inspired, and perhaps “inspirited” (thank 
you Ted Aoki (2005)!), to fashion an argument from a wide assortment of sources 
because of my background in improvisational theatre, my time in the classroom, and my 
study of Curriculum.  For now, I will examine the relational intelligence found in the 
classroom, jazz and improvisational theatre and analyze the extent to which 
improvisation influences various institutional standards. At times, I will go beyond the 
confines of improvisation in jazz, education, and theatre and touch upon topics that are 
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important to music, education, and theatre in general. In other words, I will draw upon 
the work of some writers and practitioners of music, education, and theatre because much 
of what is important to their field are also relevant to my discussion of improvisation and 
institutions.   
Relational Intelligence 
 As I have mentioned, the notion of relational intelligence needs to be “teased out” 
so that we can look beyond the limited interactions of students and teachers who are 
shackled within an environment and ontology that is largely performative, in the sense 
that Lyotard (1984) argued.  It is, therefore, useful to consider Buber’s (1958) statement 
that, “All real living is meeting,” from his book, I and Thou (p. 11).  Buber’s notion of 
meeting can be (and should be) interpreted in many ways: one such way is in the meeting 
of two people, perhaps for the first time. Each brings with her a unique set of experiences 
and expectations. And while the meeting is “improvised” it is also scripted.  This script is 
the product of societal norms and the only way that this pre-written script gets changed is 
if both of these folks are willing to drop or alter these norms (read standards) as they 
become aware, respond to, and embrace the differences of the Other, assuming of course 
that there are differences. More often than not a very limited meeting takes place that 
simply reinforces the standards they both share. Sometimes a more expanded meeting 
occurs, the kind that Buber had in mind with his notion of meeting. This was the case 
with Christopher Uhl (2010), a professor of environmental science at Penn State who 
writes about “acknowledging what is real” (p. 105), in the classroom so genuine inquiry 
can take place. Like the best jazz players, teachers, and theatrical improvisers Uhl is in 
pursuit of genuine inquiry, which therefore means he is in pursuit and makes use of 
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surprise -the type of surprise that comes from the cognitive and embodied responses of 
his students in the classroom. For many it is useful to discuss these terms as if they are 
separate and have no impact upon the other. I would suggest that the cognitive and 
embodied are intertwined- each refreshing the other. I would also suggest that the 
cognitive response is rarely ever free from embodied experience in the first place.  While 
there are essays to be read and concepts to be absorbed, professor Uhl’s goals are open-
ended. He understands the pedagogical negligence involved in the narrow minded task of 
“covering the material” as he asks rhetorically, “…What if we gave ourselves permission 
to stay right in the present moment and trust that when our turn comes what we say will 
be compelling because we will speak our present-moment-truth (and not some rehearsed 
script)” (p. 107)? Uhl acknowledges the risks involved in allowing the embodied 
experiences from himself and his students to influence the process of inquiry, yet for him 
the risks are outweighed by the rewards of a more thorough inquiry, or in other words a 
more complete and honest meeting as suggested by Buber. For Uhl, the “present-moment 
truth” also meant honestly confronting his students when they were unprepared for class. 
He shared his displeasure with the students in his freshman seminar who were unprepared 
and required from them a meaningful explanation or a heads up if the weekly assigned 
reading was not to be completed. In this context Uhl writes that, “For the first time in the 
semester, I began to see who has been in the room” (p. 107). Indeed, what is important 
for Uhl is that he and the students in the room honestly confront the collection of essays 
on environmental science with their hopes, fears, prejudices, lack of attentiveness-all of 
it. With his insistence on seeing the students in this fashion Uhl is demonstrating the 
inadequacy of a pedagogy, which views the students as irrelevant to the inquiry process. 
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For him, the material and the study of environmental science are enriched when an honest 
intellectual inquiry occurs by the student’s careful reading of the “material”, their 
responses (cognitive and embodied), and the discussions that follow.  In fact to see the 
students as irrelevant to the learning process is to miss the point entirely. 
 In his study entitled, Influencing Pedagogy Through the Creative Practices of 
Youth, Leif Gustavson (Hill, Vasudevan, 2008,) goes much further than Professor Uhl 
when he argues that an effective pedagogy should come from the creative work students 
do outside of the school. He focuses on one of his students, Gil, who is a turntablist. Gil 
reminds me of what Rancière (2009) refers to as the, “voice of a people to come” (p. 57). 
Indeed, Rancière writes that, “…The artistic voice of the people is the voice of a people 
to come. The people to come is the impossible people which, at one and the same time, 
would be the divided people of protest and the collective harmony of a people in tune 
with the very breath of nature, be it a chaotic or a ‘chaosmatic’ nature” (p. 57).   It’s 
worth noting that Gustavson has an extraordinary relationship with Gil! Employing 
composition, improvisation and many hours of study and play, Gil’s play reminds me of 
the improvisational jazz performer as he samples various sounds from a wide assortment 
of records. Despite their different mediums, both Gil (through sampling) and the jazz 
musician (by quoting, and I am thinking specifically about the album by Sonny Rollins, 
Way Out West, (1957) in which Rollins subverts the notion of the white heroic cowboy. 
He does this in two ways: first, the album cover ironically shows Rollins in 1950’s 
cowboy garb, at a time when Westerns dominated the television and “silver screen.” 
Second, in his masterful transformation of the insipid cowboy tune, I’m an Old 
Cowhand) reach back into a multitude of sounds with specific meanings and through 
160 
 
 
 
their common aesthetic transform those meanings as they play and perform. Indeed, 
Gustavson (2008) writes, 
Later, I asked the two seniors and Gil, “Why are the samples that you pick so 
interesting when you take them out of context?” This came up while Gil spun the 
soundtrack to Raiders of the Lost Ark. While experimenting with various voices 
and sounds on the album, Gil found the sound of the gunshot. Through scratching 
the sound, he transformed the gunshot into something different-a drum beat. 
Through the improvisational freedom of reappropriating this sound, Gil took a 
dominant discourse (gunshot as violent act) and invested it with his own particular 
inflection (gunshot as rhythm) (p. 89). 
 The discovery by professor Uhl of the importance of being attentive to one’s 
students in the classroom as they are thinking and reacting to the class as it happens, and 
Gustavson’s pedagogical insights gleaned by closely working with his students and their 
work are a central feature of William Ayers’ eloquent book, Teaching Toward Freedom 
(2004). In it he writes: 
The teacher takes a step out from behind the desk, away from the lectern, off the 
pedestal, and perhaps off the cliff. There is a feeling of vertigo as the teacher 
looks with new eyes, as the familiar is made strange. There is risk and there is 
fear-hard work, this never ending attentiveness, this improvisation- but there is 
satisfaction as well. She frees herself from the terror of teaching. She no longer 
has to pretend to be a god, all knowing, all powerful, beneficent one minute, 
punishing the next. She can shed the hypocrisy and phoniness of the teacher pose 
and begin to face herself as she really is. She can discover her students as they 
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really are, too, and recognize that there is always more to know in all directions. 
Who in the world are they (p. 43)?  
It is the attentiveness of the teacher to her students, and the attentiveness of the 
students to each other, their material, their teacher, and themselves, that contribute to a 
successful improvisation, and thus, a successful class. The other contributing factors to a 
successful improvisation are the genuine pursuit of surprise and the willingness to accept 
an ontology (even if that ontology remains unnamed and uninterrogated) that goes 
beyond the cognitive and the linear. When all of these elements are in full swing (and I 
am referring to the kind of swing that is in most good jazz) improvisation does have the 
ability to transform standards that need to be discarded, fleshed out, or simply polished. 
Because within the tension of that dialectical improvisational moment is an opportunity 
for what Habermas and Adorno have referred to as pragmatic action. Perhaps the best 
description of this action comes from William Pinar (1994) who writes, “…Pragmatic 
action cannot be frozen into principles and concepts composed before such action, and 
assumed to be legitimated locally and empirically. Pragmatic action is born only in the 
arena of action, and to the extent one enters this arena with static principles of how to 
behave, one deforms the situation…” (p. 118).   Once Professor Uhl realized the 
importance of seeing his students for who they really are at that moment, and move 
beyond the need to cover the material, (and while we’re on the subject, besides the 
hypocrisy inherent in the proclamation that one can “cover the material”, wouldn’t it 
make more sense to lose that expression and un-cover it, expose it, stir it up!?) he was 
better able to engage in the pragmatic action described by Pinar and embrace what Aoki 
(2005) has described as a “curriculum  -as-lived-experience” (p. 160). Uhl was willing to 
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let go of specific goals that in an earlier time would have been non-negotiable, because he 
was willing and able to honestly “meet” his students, moving beyond what Aoki (2005) 
has described as “curriculum -as-plan,” and trust that their present moment of truth, 
composed of a changing continuum of standards and spontaneous creation, would be 
enough to guide his class toward a meaningful inquiry.  
Vox Populi, Vox Dei? 
(The Voice of the People is the Voice of God?) 
 
Improvisation that approaches the pragmatic action referred to by Pinar, and 
demonstrated by Uhl and Gustavson, would seem to be at its best when it can occur 
within an environment that has already decided that it would accept a certain degree of 
playfulness. Still, there isn’t a recipe that would let someone construct such an 
environment. There isn’t a schematic diagram that could show this ideal environment so 
that it may be replicated ad infinitum despite the proclamations of many in and out of 
education that claim to have the winning formula. But for the improv player, and 
improvisation in general, the environment is crucial for a good performance or rehearsal. 
In speaking of environment and rehearsal (and by the way it’s all a rehearsal), British 
theatrical director Peter Brook (1996) has said that: 
The quality of the work done in any rehearsal comes entirely from the creativity 
of the working climate-and creativity cannot be brought into being by 
explanations. The language of rehearsals is like life itself: it uses words, but also 
silences, stimuli, parody, laughter, unhappiness, despair, frankness and 
concealment, activity and slowness, clarity and chaos. Brecht recognized this and 
in his last years he surprised his associates by saying that the theatre must be 
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naïve. With this word he was not reneging his life’s work: he was pointing out 
that the action of putting together a play is always a form of playing, that 
watching a play is playing (p. 77).   
Indeed, good improvisation, akin to the creativity mentioned by Brook (and the 
play desired by Brecht), and as of yet undefined, can and should emerge from an 
environment that allows things to happen. A place that is open to and informed by chance 
and occasionally filled with the pregnant moment. But this moment must be noticed. This 
is a very special place; one cannot simply will this type of place into being. Instead, the 
environment that Brook or anyone for that matter concerned with creative justice is 
referring to comes into being on its own. The best that a creative type can do is simply 
notice when the time is right to take a stand, or make a choice, based on their 
attentiveness to that environment. In other words this environment can’t be forced –it 
must be noticed.  The talent or lack of talent is in the quality of that stand or choice and 
the timing of those decisions. The attentive teacher knows this, as does the talented 
musician or actor.  This is not to say that this is the only way that good improvisation can 
occur-it can also emerge out of a hostile and decidedly un-playful environment, but more 
on that later.  The point I would like to make now is that even when the climate is right, 
or one thinks that the climate is right, good improvisation- the kind that furthers inquiry, 
works against reification, promotes consideration of the Other, interrogates standards, 
and promotes the process of creation- doesn’t happen. For now, I would like to explore 
some of these situations in order to further our analysis of improvisation and its ability to 
transform institutions.  
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 For many who practiced, performed, and trusted improv from its modern 
inception at the University of Chicago in the 1950’s, and especially in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, there was always the belief that this work would uncover a greater truth or a 
series of greater truths. Despite this belief, much of the joy experienced by the players 
and audience was derived from the tension that came from their playing with power 
structures-the have-nots giving it to the haves, so to speak, since few truths were being 
uncovered. But this was a joy without merit, since there was never any intention to 
disrupt those power structures. In reality these improvisations were nothing more than the 
boss showing everyone what a good sport he was by taking a “pie to the face.”  
Boundaries may have been blurred in this play with power structures, but the rules that 
justified those power structures remained intact. Again, I turn to Rancière (2009) who 
writes, “…It often leads to a different form of stultification, which uses the blurring of 
boundaries and the confusion of roles to enhance the effect of the performance without 
questioning its principles” (p. 21). In other words, the power structures could never be 
disrupted since the logic that created them remained. There are many reasons why 
improvisation failed to achieve the type of social justice that should have undermined the 
institutions of patriarchy, racism, sexual oppression, and class conflict, for example, 
called for by many who desired it in the fifties and sixties. Ultimately, professional 
improv’s failure comes down to two things: its commercial success and eventual 
commodification, and ironically its central tenet of trusting the group mind. Never deny.   
Commodification separated the audience and performers by narrowing the audience’s 
role, which only allowed for spectatorship, and the performer’s role, reduced to 
entertainer. The relational intelligence that could have developed between these two 
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groups never happened because it wasn’t given a chance. The group mind that was being 
trusted was in most cases heterosexual, white, bourgeois, and male.  In her well-
researched examination of improvisational theatre from the 1950’s through the rest of the 
century, Amy Seham (2001) was one of those people who hoped that improvisation could 
be both revelatory and revolutionary. She writes: 
…Why not assume that improv would reflect the power dynamics of society as a 
whole? In part, because the powerful rhetoric of improv insists on process, mutual 
support, and individual liberation.  In part, because so many intelligent, passionate, and 
sincere players believe in that rhetoric. In part, because women and people of color have 
historically found a voice through improvisational modes of cultural expression-including 
feminist theatre and jazz- but to the notable exclusion of improv (p. xviii).   
Mainstream improv was unable to serve as a revolutionary force in contrast to 
jazz and feminist theatre, for reasons already mentioned, and also because the good of the 
group was sacrificed for the good of the star. The star was there to score and he did that 
by making people laugh- quickly and often. Importantly, Bakhtin’s love of Rabelais’ 
world and the transformative power of laughter that world possessed was not to be found 
on the stage of Second City, for example, or in its audience. Moreover, the truth that so 
many comedians, and lovers of comedians, see as an integral part of all jokes that work 
was not the truth of marginalized groups. Instead, it was the sentiment of a dominant 
group that felt threatened by something new.  The laughter that was demanded by this 
audience reflected, supported, and nurtured a largely conservative view.  Improv 
squandered its opportunity to speak truth to power by embracing the nostalgic funny. In 
other words, they used humor to reify traditional, norms regarding gender relations, and 
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heteronormativity, for example. Why did this happen?  The reasons are many: Funny 
men got shows on television and some, film careers. And it happened because their 
audience wasn’t necessarily white and male exclusively, but the sentiments that audience 
espoused and expected certainly were. The laughter that was sought and created in this 
environment usually came from a straight white male’s back pocket instead of the Other. 
It lacked spontaneity.  In his book on laughter, Henri Bergson (2005) wrote that it is”… a 
social gesture that singles out and represses a special kind of absentmindedness in men 
and in events” (p.43).  This suggests that laughter was used as a type of check. A way to 
ensure that everyone was on the same page regarding what was funny and what wasn’t 
funny. It was a laughter Brecht would have hated since it repressed the naïve in favor of 
the standard norm of funny. This was no time for innovation. Instead, the group mind of 
the actors and audience were calling the shots. An undeveloped and untapped group 
mind, which was nurtured by a popular culture they were either unwilling or unable to 
interrogate, and a “free market” that turned art into a commodity, chose to play it safe. 
Some might argue they were financially forced, or perhaps seduced, to play it safe.  Still, 
they blew it. All that intense immediacy that was there for the improv artist to consider:  
the desire to play, the entire “there” that is contained in a live event had been squandered. 
We might have appeared hip and knowing (I should know, I was part of that experience) 
but in reality we could have used a more humbling experience. We could have allowed 
for more play, taken more risks, fallen on our faces more often. Perhaps the audience 
could have allowed some experimentation, if only they had experienced some of the joy 
that comes from a successful experiment.  We could have allowed for more naiveté-the 
kind sought by Brecht. But as crowds started to form and cash registers started to ca-
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ching, the audience reverted to their role of consumer and the players turned their craft 
and sporadic art into product. The voice of the people isn’t always wise, yet their 
adoration can be habit forming.  
 As improv evolved, especially during the eighties- when stand-up comedy 
was exploding, as was ticket sales- improv theatres around the country now contained 
their improvisational activities, within a faux competition. There would be teams, judges, 
scoring, timing, winners and losers. A sports minded public (used to their role of 
spectator) easily accepted the format, as did the improv troupes that appreciated the 
income and the minimization of risk: If improv has transformative capabilities, partially 
derived from experimentation, very little of that was in evidence during this time period. 
It was commonly accepted by the players/producers that audiences didn’t want to be 
challenged nor be privy to the process of creation that sometimes appears within a 
spontaneous act. We were told that audiences wanted to be entertained (as if that 
statement alone was enough). Since entertainment is a subjective term, open to many 
different interpretations, it was ironic that the variety of entertainment was being 
decreased rather than increased. The audiences seemed to want to be shortchanged in this 
regard and we delivered! 
Things might have been different. In the beginning of the improv movement in 
the 1950’s an improv piece had been developed known as the “Harold.” It was essentially 
a group scene, which evolved slowly. Some “Harolds” could last for an hour, sometimes 
much longer.  This scene incorporated many diverse and seemingly unrelated elements, 
some of which were suggested spontaneously by the audience while the players 
introduced others. All of these elements had to be justified in some way that was organic 
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to the nascent scene. At times a natural humor emerged from the scenes but the humor 
was never forced or pre-written. One of the challenges of the “Harold” was to make a 
suggestion seem right by working it in to the scene even if the suggestion seemed 
“wrong.” It didn’t matter; you had to make it “right.” The Harold forced you to not write 
the scene in your head before its creation.   This game is the closest we would come to 
improvisation and a prime example of the pragmatic action described earlier by Pinar. 
Moreover, the players and the audience had to really pay attention. When everything 
clicked it was an amazing sight to behold and be a part of. Mediocre television star and 
alumnus of Second City in Chicago Jim Belushi (younger brother of tragic comedian 
John) maintained that he enjoyed a good “Harold” better than sex. Assuming his sex life 
was adequate his statement gives us a glimpse into the improvisational and seemingly 
magical qualities of the Harold.  While it was common for the players and audience to, at 
times, react in awe while the Harold was unfolding, especially if the scene was going 
well, it was more often the case that the scene evolved into chaos and the audience felt 
shortchanged.  When the Harold was working it was in part a result of the highly honed 
improvisational skills of the player’s and the attentiveness they displayed toward their on-
going scene that was also is some ways a suggestion for a scene to come. It is perhaps the 
tensionality between the scene and the scene to come that gave the scene its vibrancy and 
eliminated the “pedagogical stance,” which inculcates passivity in the spectator as it 
paradoxically attempts to do the opposite.  Also, it was a function of the observational 
and participatory skills honed by an audience who let go of their cloak of passive 
spectatorship and fulfilled their dialogical responsibilities as viewer. In this way the 
Harold served the same function as the sculpture of the UN playground I discussed earlier 
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in chapter 3 by Noguchi and described by Appelbaum (2012).    It’s hard to fully know 
why the Harold was perceived as magical. One possible explanation could be that the 
players and audience found themselves having fun as they took part in the joy of creation. 
For example, even when the scenes were not particularly funny, they were immensely 
rewarding to watch and take part in since so much of the joy of the scene was in its 
unfolding. I’ve mentioned this joy in an earlier chapter with my discussion of the German 
term funktionslust.  We thought we had found another path to creation. In reality, we had 
built upon a creative environment similar to the one described earlier by British director 
Peter Brook (2008) and Appelbaum (2012, 2013). We had participated in that dialogical 
encounter I referred to earlier by William Pinar (1994, 2006) and an opportunity to 
possibly create pragmatic action, although in retrospect I think the Harold was less 
pragmatic and more theoretical. Eventually two camps emerged: One that saw the beauty 
in the Harold as it evolved and another that resented the alleged formlessness, length, 
experimentation and sporadic humor. Although there was an audience for the Harold it 
was small in comparison to the growing audiences who wanted to laugh, and laugh often. 
During an era of Cold War, Vietnam, race riots and minority rights, for example, the last 
thing a white Christian public wanted was a pipeline to greater truths (since that issue had 
apparently already been settled). Instead, the ‘silent majority’ got a balm that soothed the 
souls of those who argued for the destruction of the Welfare State, and a mass theology 
that gave permission to personal gain at the expense of one’s neighbor: Adorno’s (1978) 
earlier dismissal of jazz was for similar reasons: He saw jazz not as a dialectical 
encounter, but as a pleasing diversion to the real struggle.   As improv troupes morphed 
into ComedySportz or Improv Olympics, (two large companies who emphasized the 
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competition between teams of players) the creative process and environment (always 
intimately connected) became further constrained. Now, entertainment became the race to 
the punch line. A scene couldn’t go for more than thirty seconds, sometimes less time, 
before the players felt an urgency to get to a punch line, any punch line. Often times this 
need to get to the punch line was at the expense of the group work that at one time was 
Improv’s reason for being.  All of us wanted to be that guy who got to the funny first, 
even if that meant stepping on someone’s toes to get there.  During this time period, when 
the funny promoted gender and ethnic norms (to name but a few standards), a small 
group of players felt the need to rebel. Although they were unable to use improvisation to 
challenge these norms while being working members of these “improvisational sports 
teams” many left and formed their own groups. These new groups looked very different. 
They tended to be all female or all African American. Some formed more specifically 
arranged groups, based on sexual orientation or class. One of the more successful groups 
came out of the Chicago improv scene in the early nineties. They were an all female 
group and called themselves, “Jane.” As part of this group’s performances, 
…actors sometimes began a scene in one gender, only to be endowed in mid-gesture as 
another…The Janes reveled in these moments of incongruity…The key is not to reject 
the seeming error in proper gender performance, but to incorporate it as an integral part 
of the character in process.  These are the moments when improvisation can interrupt the 
constant repetition of gender norms (Seham, 2001, p. 73). 
 
Improv may have been integral to Jane’s successful challenge of gender norms, as 
Seham maintains, or this group’s success at challenging gender norms could be the result 
of Jane’s initial decision to form an all female group in the first place. In other words, 
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since the members of Jane, and their audience, had experienced the group mind of the 
heterosexual, white, male, improv’s alleged ability to challenge these norms might 
instead reflect a decision that had been made earlier, rather than one which emerged as a 
direct result of participating in or viewing an improvisational scene. The issue is whether 
or not Jane and the audience’s laughter and overall enjoyment of Jane’s performances 
were the byproducts of a catharsis of sorts, a validation of pre-existing sentiment, or the 
result of improv’s transformative abilities. One may never know for sure. Seham (2001) 
writes that “…Jane member Jennifer Bills suggests that it is more fun for an audience to 
see a man lower his status to play a woman than to see a woman play a man…”(p. 71).  
An audience that has this kind of fun is an audience that retains an adherence to a 
conservative gender norm -just imagine the audience that enjoyed the “antics” of “Uncle 
Milty” as he donned yet another dress during his reign of television in the 1950’s, or the 
current cross dressing of Adam Sandler and my point will be clear.  I would argue that 
the bulk of the audiences that enjoyed performances by Jane had already made up their 
minds regarding outdated gender norms and what Jane cast members created on stage 
was simply a validation of the audience’s sentiment, not the consequence of their 
transformation as the result of watching or participating in an improv scene.   
The Arena of Action 
 If improvisation isn’t a weapon for justice in a free society, if 
improvisation is unable to transform or undermine some or all of a society’s standards, 
why is it sometimes feared as a threat to authority in one that is mostly closed? This was 
one of the questions examined by anthropologist Laurie Frederik Meer (2007) who 
analyzed and took part in a type of theatre that had developed in Cuba called Playback 
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Theatre. As Meer explains Playback theatre had its roots in the larger Pan-Latin theatre 
developed or informed, in part, by “radical” pedagogues, such as Paulo Freire (2008) and 
Augusto Boal (2000) in the 1960’s and 1970’s: “…it was reminiscent of other types of 
people’s theatre, theatre of social action, or consciousness raising theatre around the 
world…” (Meer, 2007, p.107).  The Cuban authorities had allowed Playback Theatre’s 
creation since it seemed to fit in well with Cuba’s claims of revolutionary art and 
collective action. The actors who participated in Playback Theatre did so because it 
seemed to offer 
… a sense of psychological liberation from a society hyper-saturated with politics and 
political ideology, and in this way the movement is a radical art-radical in its ability to 
transcend society’s orthodoxy. In Cuba, the words and ideas of Marx, Lenin, Castro, and 
more recently, Hugo Chavez and Eva Morales hover in the air like a constant mist, 
absorbed by tired bones and minds aching for some sense of beauty and cultural 
transcendence…” (Meer, 2007, p. 110).  
 
At the heart of Playback Theatre are individual stories, re-told through group 
improvisations. Importantly, the new stories, which emerged from these improvisations, 
had to be submitted to the state for approval before they could be re-told (performed) for 
an audience. All of the actors receive their salaries from the state so they had to abide by 
this rule. Meer writes that, “…Group improvisation is often used during the creative 
process of playwriting and production…improvisations are never seen in public 
(emphasis mine)…” (p. 115).   The improvisations of these Cuban actors were feared 
despite the fact that since the Castro revolution, the general Cuban population, along with 
the intelligentsia, had developed a type of self-censorship that monitored and controlled 
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anti-government speak. But within the state imposed and self-guided censorship the 
clever had found room to maneuver and possibly subvert. At the very least they had 
found a space to linger within an overweening orthodoxy (and an under whelming 
economy), clearly different in content yet similar to the severity of restrictions faced by 
the players in my previous discussion of the American improv scene. In contrast to the 
American improv players who succumbed to commodification, white reign, 
heteronormativity, and ego, the participants of Playback Theatre were able to use 
improvisation, in conjunction with the collective action claimed by the state, to tell 
authentic stories. These stories, as Meer discovered, while seemingly not changing 
Cuba’s political structure, economy, or ethos, did provide a degree of catharsis for many 
of the participants (players and audience). It is likely that many Cubans would have 
gladly traded this catharsis for an improvement in infrastructure, living conditions, 
consumer items and food. It is understandable that the Cuban’s experience in playback 
Theatre was cathartic, yet it is unclear if their experience was only cathartic. Perhaps we 
might gain some insight from a neo-Marxist perspective as it examines culture. In this 
context Henry Giroux (1983)  writes that they, “…demonstrate that the mechanisms of 
social and cultural reproduction are never complete and are always faced with partially 
realized elements of opposition…a dialectical model of domination that offers valuable 
alternatives…” (p. 100).   Perhaps the Cubans were able to engage in the previously 
mentioned dialogical encounter suggested by Pinar when they combined the “partially 
realized” state sanctioned goal of collective action, with the element of surprise which is 
an important component of improvisation, when they created their stories for Playback 
Theatre.  Indeed, the Cuban participants of Playback Theatre benefited from the 
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solidarity, which was partially promoted by state ideology, their own inherent needs, and 
the central tenet of improvisation, when they produced authentic works of theatre that 
incorporated the use of improv. The authenticity of their stories was additionally 
bolstered by an unpredictability, which often comes from good improv.  Ironically, a 
rigid pseudo Marxist environment was less restrictive than the “free” capitalist society 
encountered by the mainstream improv players in America. The latter could not move 
beyond the needs of the marketplace to produce works similar in authenticity to those 
created by Playback Theatre or the previously mentioned “Harold.”  The Cuban players 
had taken part in a dialogical struggle between the legitimate needs of the group and the 
hollow claims of the state. Remarkably, these players were able to satisfy the authorities 
and some of their needs. To be sure, not an easy task!  Poverty, state heavy handedness, 
and the “partially realized elements of opposition” of the state’s mechanisms of control, 
and the Cuban people’s desire for a better life, allowed the Cuban actors to hone their 
skills in creating subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) ways to psychologically and 
politically deceive the state. It was their time walking this tightrope of contradictions in 
conjunction with an incomplete state mechanism that gave the Cubans their cathartic 
experience and a critical perspective that comes from dialectical experience.  In other 
words, while it might be easy for a state censor to remove part or all of an “anti-
revolutionary” word, phrase, or speech from a script, it would be harder to cut out a 
nuanced raised eyebrow; an ironic physical gesture, or carefully placed silence from an 
attentive player or audience member during a performance. Out of necessity some 
Cubans became adept at experimentation and the subtleties of subversion. Importantly, it 
was the expectation of experimentation, which supported their successful improvisations. 
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Improvisation alone was not the cause of the Cuban’s transformations, yet importantly, it 
was the Cuban’s experience in experimentation- a literal fight for survival- that pre-
disposed them to creating actual improvisation, in contrast to the limited type displayed 
on the stages of America’s myriad improv clubs. No such struggle took place on the 
American stage since those players and audiences, for the most part, had accepted the 
capitalist state and its concomitant standards as legitimate, and having no hollow claims. 
It is for all of these reasons, in addition to the one suggested by Giroux, that the 
participants of Playback Theatre were able to create for themselves a place to linger…to 
be more human. If the neo-Marxists are right (and I think they are) and the mechanisms 
of reproduction are incomplete, then, these incomplete mechanisms and the dialogical 
struggle that followed are some of the reasons for the “partially realized” success of 
Playback Theatre to create catharsis and possibly more. It remains to be seen whether or 
not the Cuban’s success of subversion within a theatrical context can foreshadow or 
contribute to subversion within a political or economic context. Ironically, the largely 
white performers of the American improv scene, during the 1950’s through the 1980’s, 
were more artistically constrained by the economic success, or expectation of success, of 
a white middle class, and the norms they embraced. They had less of an incentive to 
explore and subvert the “partially realized” and “realized” elements of a capitalist society 
that were in opposition to what should have been their actual goals. In other words, there 
was seemingly less to struggle against which might explain why players and audiences 
were less willing to experiment, seek and make use of surprise and truly improvise. 
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“Disciplined Fantasy” 
 Like the Cubans of Playback Theatre who were able to use and develop a 
critical perspective partially because of their awareness of the hollow claims of the state, 
Duke Ellington’s status as an outsider because of  racism, pre-disposed him toward 
creating and nurturing an equally potent critical perspective When musicians, actors, 
teachers, and students, for example, have the opportunity to engage in improvisation, 
their improvisations are better if they are pre-disposed in viewing some or all of what is 
being offered to them for consideration with a critical eye. They gain experience and use 
experience to help them develop what Henry Giroux terms a “critical stance.” (1983) 
Such a stance is central to his goal of a “dialectical pedagogy,” (1983) similar to the 
dialogical encounter suggested earlier by Pinar. For Giroux, “…at the heart of the 
dialectic is a human agent who is never merely a passive being removed from the 
historical arena, but instead is an acting subject, who with qualitatively different levels of 
reasoning and action, appropriates and penetrates the reality in which he or she lives…” 
(p. 15).  Improvisation alone is insufficient as a means of challenging a standard or a 
group of standards. This was certainly the case of the comedic improvisation of my 
earlier discussion. To be sure Ellington’s wealth and celebrity status gave him partial 
entry into a dominant white society, yet, as he and his musicians were forced to endure 
Jim Crow, Ellington was continuously reminded of his outsider status. This condition 
gave him both a reason and a vantage point that enabled Ellington to criticize the norms 
of his day. Thus, when he and his fellow musicians would improvise they were more 
willing to interrogate the musical standards that had come before- and infuse them with 
their unique life experiences- than the previously mentioned comedic improvisations of 
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the American scene. In this way their improvisations and compositions were filled with 
more risk taking, and the impact these improvisations had on the musicians and Ellington 
would encourage even further risks in their music. For example, when Duke Ellington’s 
mother died he went into seclusion, removing himself from his hectic schedule of touring 
and writing music, and severely limiting his interaction with his friends. Months later, 
when he emerged from his self-imposed exile, he gave his musicians a new score to 
record. It was called “Reminiscing in Tempo” and was roughly twelve minutes in length-
a long jazz song for its day to record- comprising four sides of the recording medium of 
the time. The writer James Baldwin, upon hearing the recorded piece, called it a 
“disciplined fantasy.” While I’m not completely sure what Baldwin meant I would like to 
think the gifted writer picked up on the dialectical nature of Ellington’s music as well as 
its beauty and rhythm, although I am not suggesting that dialectics and beauty are 
mutually exclusive, far from it!  The band and his score were mournful but not maudlin. 
Ellington’s genius allowed him to acknowledge his grief-which was immense- yet 
compose a score (analytical and embodied) so transcendent as to abstractly suggest a 
musical future yet to come-both ours and his- while turning his present moment truth into 
art and further bolstering Buber’s claim of “meeting.” In other words Ellington’s grief 
(his present moment truth) “met” his musical expertise; His band “met” a new 
challenging score, which also allowed for improvisation. Much of the score’s beauty and 
vitality comes from the improvisations of Ellington’s carefully selected musicians. His 
talent as a composer (although in jazz perhaps group composition would be more 
accurate) was in part due to his ability to choose the right musicians and “tease out” of 
them their best work. He understood the need for rigidity and lack of rigidity. He 
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understood the importance of the creative environment previously mentioned by Brook. 
And it is within Ellington’s musical framework that his musician’s improvisations were 
encouraged, expected, and fully realized. 
 I re-tell this anecdote, fairly well known among jazz lovers, because not 
only is it an example of the pragmatic action sought by Pinar, but because it contains 
much of what has inspired many who find in jazz not only great music but a way out of 
an immutable culture. For example, curriculum   scholar Ted Aoki (2005), in his 
conversations with jazz trumpeter Bobby Shew, was able to extrapolate Shew’s approach 
to his instrument and his music and apply that way of thinking and being to his study and 
practice of Curriculum  . As Aoki sought the additional advice of an ice skater and visual 
artist (Brian Orson and Elysia Drywan), with Shew’s help he had come, “…to better 
understand the generative although ambiguous, ambivalent space between this or that, 
between planned curriculum   and live(d) curriculum  …” (p. 421-422).   Like the 
talented theatrical improv player or teacher who makes the best use of her moment, these 
two men and woman validated for Aoki what he perhaps knew to be true of a live(d) 
curriculum  , even as far back as his classroom experience as a young teacher in the 
1940’s. A “planned curriculum  ” – the currently preferred method for most “experts” in 
the field of education- is a curriculum   that is already dead in the water. In contrast, a 
live(d) curriculum  , is filled with the possibility of a transformative experience for its 
participants and the content they are seriously playing with, since the standards and the 
urgency of creating something wonderful right away (by making use of and being 
impacted by improvisation) often stimulate and fertilize one another.  Through his 
conversations with a visual artist, jazz musician, and ice skater, all of whom incorporate 
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some improvisation in their art, Aoki was able to move beyond the limited educational 
world that strictly adheres to standards, lesson plans, learning objectives and the like. 
Perhaps the practitioners of “educational leadership” would be surprised to learn that 
these standards and practices are not abandoned but potentially improved.  When improv 
works it is because its practitioners have mastered the standards while incorporating some 
of what life has thrown their way-the good and the bad- in order to “meet” the standards, 
interrogate them, and revise according to their present moment truth. In other words, the 
desire to create something new forces one to interrogate a standard or a series of 
standards with a focus and ferocity that improves it without negating a part or whole of a 
standard which works.  Ellington was a well-respected musician, composer, and 
bandleader, making a good living during the nation’s worst depression. He could have 
churned out an endless string of swing numbers (the popular music of his day), no 
different from the ones that initially garnered him praise and respect and the public would 
have eagerly consumed them. But had he done that he would have been artistically and 
personally dishonest. His work would have lacked authenticity.  Ellington was willing to 
risk losing much of his fan base by recording works like Reminiscing in Tempo but did it 
anyway. Baldwin’s label of “disciplined fantasy” was high praise since the hardest thing 
for most improvisational artists to do, who are going outside the normal framework, is to 
produce a work of balance, grace, (and in the case of jazz), swing, while merging many 
seemingly disparate elements-both old and new- in an attempt to create something 
wonderful right away. It is for these reasons perhaps that scholars like Aoki find in jazz 
music, and the musicians who play it, an actual and metaphorical model of being, and it 
is this way of being that is potentially useful to the Curriculum   scholar or student. 
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Indeed, it is ironic that many of those who routinely criticize jazz for its formlessness or 
ahistorical nature; for its patent disregard for tradition (read: standard) would perhaps be 
surprised to learn that the majority of jazz musicians, rather than ignoring all of that 
which came before them musically, hold the standards to such a high regard that they are 
continuously willing to interrogate them and subject them to constant reinterpretation. I 
would argue that this type of adherence and devotion to the standards is preferable to the 
blind devotion practiced by so many. One does not need to look far to find musicians or 
“educators” willing to demonstrate their blind devotion to the standards. A weekend in 
Biloxi, Branson, or Vegas will easily demonstrate this fact; or any class within the current 
field known as “educational leadership.”   Indeed, those who promote standards without 
subjecting them to the type of scrutiny and analysis common to most jazz musicians, and 
improvisational artists, do them a disservice, as they take whatever was vital and 
appropriate for the time and render them impotent.  Formal and informal conversations 
with jazz musicians of the last half-century support this view. For example British 
musician and author, Derek Bailey (1993) writes: 
 …The repertoire of a jazzman such as Dexter Gordon or Lee Konitz, for instance, 
contains probably a fairly small number of different ‘songs’. But they will provide an 
adequate working context, perhaps for a lifetime. Within these boundaries there is a 
continuous process of renewal in which old material is re-shaped and adjusted, 
sometimes rejected, and new material introduced. ‘If I do an hour show, if I’m extremely 
fertile, there will be about fifteen minutes of pure ad-lib. But on an average, it’s about 
four or five minutes. But the fact that I’ve created it in ad-lib seems to give it a complete 
feeling of free form’ (p. 48-49).  
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Toward the end of this passage Bailey is quoting the great alto saxophonist Lee 
Konitz, who speaks for many jazz players as he discusses improv and its ability to refresh 
a standard tune while retaining some or most of what made that standard great in the first 
place. In Paul Berliner’s mammoth study of jazz, (1994) he interviews scores of great 
musicians many of whom echo this sentiment. For example, Herbie Hancock, the great 
pianist of Miles Davis's 1960s quintet recalls: 
What I was trying to do and what I feel they were trying to do was to combine – 
take these influences that were happening to all of us at the time and amalgamate 
them, personalize them in such a way that when people were hearing us, they 
were hearing the avant-garde, on one hand, and they were hearing the history of 
jazz that led up to it on the other hand – because Miles was that history. He was 
that link. We were sort of walking a tightrope with the kind of experimenting we 
were doing in music, not total experimentation, but we used to call it controlled 
freedom (p. 341). 
Davis, like Ellington, could have rested on his laurels after releasing his seminal 
Kind of Blue (1959), the bestselling jazz record in history, in the early sixties. Instead, he 
continuously pushed himself and expected the highest level of artistic creativity from his 
band mates, all of whom held a tenuous but respectful connection with the past, while 
searching for a possible musical future to come. Hancock’s description of this time as 
“controlled freedom” mirrors Baldwin’s assessment of Ellington’s piece mentioned 
earlier as “disciplined fantasy.” These musicians intuitively understand the importance of 
Pinar’s “dialogical encounter” and Giroux’s “dialectical pedagogy.” Thus, despite what 
some people think they hear when they listen to jazz, this is not music where anything 
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goes. Indeed, the majority of great jazz musicians are required to master a rich, deep, oral 
and written tradition- a tradition that at times is comprised of an amalgamation of 
standard tunes. The issue is how they incorporate that tradition in a very demanding, 
ambiguous, present moment that beckons the attentive musician to discover something 
new through improvisation: The music that emerges may be only partially improvised 
and contain elements from the musician’s “bag of tricks,” licks and phrases within the 
idiom that have worked in the past. The point I wish to stress, and the point that is 
repeated by countless musicians, is that even when the musician creates a small amount 
of improvisation, relative to the length of the standard song, most of them feel that the 
piece as a whole is enhanced as a result of that improvisation. Whether or not this 
enhancement results in transcendence is debatable. Still, the musician is given an 
opportunity to dwell in what Aoki (2005) has termed as a “generative” and “ambiguous 
space.” No guarantees but certainly the potential for transformative work.   
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Afterthoughts 
I have shown how improvisation alone, without an environment called for by 
Brook and a participant(s) with a critical stance as described by Giroux, is incapable of 
transforming a standard or a series of standards. Since I have experience as an 
improviser, and work as a high school history teacher, it is only natural to reflect on those 
times when I “teased out” my student’s reactions to the material by consciously avoiding 
the rigidly defined roles of “teacher” and “student”.  Instead, I made an attempt to “meet” 
my students in the way in which I think Buber originally intended. These “meetings” 
inspired by the writings of Aoki and Ayers were experienced infrequently perhaps 
because the majority of my students had been so conditioned to adhere to the rules and 
behaviors as created by our institution and peer groups. Initially, my deviations from the 
norm of lecturer and “expert” were misunderstood and the student’s reactions would 
often be uncomfortable laughter, silence, or bemusement. In time, we were able to use 
and participate in our present moment truth as a means for further inquiry. At no time did 
I observe the students questions or comments approach anything that would have led me 
to believe that they were capable of interrogating our subject to such an extent that the 
consequence of that action would be a transformation on an ontological level.  I also 
spoke with students in five honors English classes, so that I might inquire about their 
feelings (interesting that I didn’t use the term thoughts) regarding improvisation in the 
classroom. I selected this particular English class to speak with because their teacher 
routinely uses a few improvisational games in her class once a week (Monday is improv 
day). It should be pointed out that she is the only teacher to use improvisational games in 
the classroom at our school on a regular basis. According to this teacher, the way in 
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which she uses improv in the class is by acting out vocabulary words and terminology so 
that we can ‘see’ words. On vocab [sic] day, I give a pre-assessment. We discuss words 
and then do different types of improv with them. At class end, students go back to 
assessment and fill in what they have learned. The students are required to learn eight 
words to keep doing improv. 
In this manner she uses improv as a reward and the students clearly view their 
time doing improv as a fun break from the routine of “school,” although one student 
acknowledged that doing improv, “ helps me remember my vocabulary forever; it is also 
easier for me to learn. Once I do my improv, that’s all I do for my test. It reinforces state 
standards because we are learning the vocab set out by state.” None of the English class 
participants that I spoke with stated that using improv in the classroom critiqued let alone 
transformed the standards. Instead, everyone I talked to agreed that improvisation in the 
classroom made learning “fun,” “more efficient,” and improved long-term memory. In 
conversations with the teacher she said that at no time did she recall any student 
questioning the list of state mandated vocabulary or commenting that the list is too 
narrowly focused, incomplete, or ill conceived. Instead, these students simply accept the 
state standard as legitimate and therefore important to know. In some ways they are 
reminiscent of the American improv scene I previously described and are therefore a 
reminder to me and others that are concerned with social justice and in favor of a radical 
pedagogy, that improv alone is insufficient as a weapon for meaningful change. 
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CHAPTER 7 
BRILLIANT MISTAKES AND SERIOUS PLAY: BEYOND PERFORMATIVITY 
AND A COOKBOOK CURRICULUM   
 
There is a sign on the wall of the guidance counselor’s office at the school where I 
teach that reads, “Begin with the end in mind.”  The author of this ubiquitous directive is 
Stephen R. Covey (1989) and this quote comes from his hugely popular book, The 7 
Habits of Highly Effective People.  Covey’s directive and the school’s blind endorsement 
are symptomatic of a larger problem facing schools, and the teachers and students who 
are attempting their way toward a wider education within the confines of these 
institutions. From a theoretical perspective, part of the problem is due to a 
misunderstanding of scientific knowledge, empiricism, and the impact this misreading 
has on the production and acceptance of more general meta-narratives. Instead of viewing 
scientific knowledge as mutable, local, and the product of an arbitrary consensus that is 
tainted by commodification (Lyotard, 1984) (Rouse, 1987), or informed by local needs 
(Blake, et al, 1998) it is viewed as neutral, value free, factual, and immutable (Britzman, 
2003). Teachers, administrators, and students are unknowingly (and partially knowingly) 
suffering within and perpetuating a performative culture (informed by this meta-
narrative) that values an efficient way of learning an uninterrogated standard- imposed 
and legitimated from an external authority -that is understood as immutable and thus 
permanent. If critical thinking, spontaneity, improvisation, and creativity are brought up 
as valuable to one’s education, it is usually only if they can be used as an effective way to 
learn “standards” that have become entrenched and enshrined.  As criticism of this 
problem has grown, viable theoretical solutions have been stuck in an epistemological 
morass which fluctuates between an unsatisfying relativism, Zen- koan, or an over 
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simplistic positivist empiricism, the latter of which is nurtured through a series of 
dominant discourses which are based on the already mentioned, misunderstood scientific 
model.   Practical solutions have fared somewhat better yet still; most classrooms and the 
activity within succumb to the momentum of the times: A performative system that 
values efficiency, clear objectives, and easy assessment is the unfortunate norm. It is 
appealing to politicians, teachers and administrators who wish to demonstrate progress 
toward learning objectives and a convenient, albeit illusory, means of accountability.  In 
this chapter I discuss good teaching, improvisation, and performativity. I discuss the 
largely negative aspects of performativity that have been brought to our attention by 
Lyotard, (1984), Cherryholmes (1988) and others. And I examine the possibility of 
agency which emerges out of an alternative version of performativity that come from 
scholars such as Judith Butler (2007) J. Hillis Miller (2007), Karen Barad (2003), and 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) and in conjunction with those who have written about 
improvisation within jazz and dramaturgical settings, in my attempt to promote a richer 
experience in the classroom. 
 We may inhabit a postmodern/poststructural/posthuman world but the forces that 
propel the “professional inertia” (Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 31) responsible for so much of 
what takes place in our schools can be traced back to the model of success that was first 
suggested by Frederick Winslow Taylor as he sought to maximize production in factories 
by eliminating all wasted motions from the workers. Simply extrapolate Taylor’s 
paradigm as education policy makers have done and apply it to our schools and a 
fundamental problem emerges: Teachers and students are encouraged to take a non-
aporetic stance regarding learning objectives, since there seems to be no sense wasting 
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any time asking whether or not the standards being taught are worth knowing, for 
example, or expending any energy speculating on what isn’t being promoted and why this 
is so. I teach a class created by the College Board called Advanced Placement in United 
States History. The College Board created this class in part to serve as an educational 
bulwark against the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War. They view their 
product (at $91 per test given to roughly 340,000 students worldwide every year it is 
indeed a product) as the “gold standard” of survey classes in United States History. But 
the class is flawed: In their attempt to cover the history of the United States from the time 
of the end of the last Ice Age to the present day, they have been forced to leave out much 
of what has happened. The scope is wide yet the depth remains shallow.  One might 
argue that this is the result of historiography (which can explain the emphasis on some 
subjects and the omission of others); or the nature of all survey classes, however, I would 
argue that much of what the College Board has created is the result of a performative 
approach that generally accepts a standard narrative. Within this narrow context, power 
only flows from the top down. Indeed, a large portion of our time is spent examining the 
strengths and weaknesses of political leaders, or the impact of large scale traumatic 
events, such as war. Perhaps this is why our study of the Gilded Age is heavy with 
information about the Captains of Industry (Robber Barons) and light on the everyday 
life of the factory worker? But product and process, both intimately connected, are 
equally flawed!   Indeed, when most teachers and administrators look for a method of 
teaching, and student learning, (usually, mistakenly understood as separate from one 
another) they often revert to Bloom’s taxonomy. And when they describe this taxonomy 
it is with such high regard one would think they have discovered the secret path to all 
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knowledge, not an arbitrary, albeit comprehensive for its time, way of learning about a 
subject. Product and process have been corrupted by an inaccurate epistemology, itself a 
product of our performative culture.  As Cherryholmes has argued in her seminal book, 
Power and Criticism (1988) schools are operating with certainty regarding a 
“transcendental signifier” that in actuality doesn’t exist and are thus being guided by a 
meta-narrative which is incomplete, misleading, and most incriminating, unable to 
produce a real education. He cites many examples of the performative culture which have 
given rise to this practice as he writes how a  
Vulgar pragmatism results when efficiency is pursued in the absence of criticism, 
when actions are privileged over thought, when practice is valued and theory 
disparaged, when practice is divorced from theory (as if that were possible) for 
the sake of making things work ‘better.’…this is the thrust of educational reform 
proposals that place increasing reliance upon testing in assessing educational 
outcomes. Standardized achievement tests thereby become the standard against 
which student, teacher, school, and system performance is evaluated. The task is 
to raise test scores. Efficiency is the underlying issue (p. 152).  
 
The administrators who run the school, like middle managers from a Sinclair 
Lewis (1922) novel, revel in small percentage gains made each year on a litany of 
standardized tests. At one point Newsweek magazine placed our school in the top one 
hundred schools in the country (emphasis mine) based on the number of students enrolled 
(again emphasis mine) in Advanced Placement courses. From my perspective we are 
deluding ourselves if we think we have created a great school. Unfortunately, I seem to 
be in the minority. When asked on surveys, the majority of teachers and students 
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maintain that our school is a “great place to learn” and they “feel supported by the 
learning environment.” These naïve sentiments are echoed across the pond as reported by 
Anne Storey (2007) who teaches at the Open University in the UK.  Her article is on an 
important cultural shift that has taken place within the teaching profession in England. 
Alarmingly, many new teachers are entering the field from a background of mid level 
managerial positions, outside of the world of education. Although they are being pushed 
out of their old professions because of changes within the economy, their placement as 
teachers is being promoted as a coup for education since their “skills” as managers are 
seen as directly applicable to and desirable in the classroom.  Like the United States, 
England is placing emphasis on “…defining and ‘managing’ the performance of 
teachers” (Storey, 2007, p. 253).   In many respects hiring people who have spent the 
majority of their professional lives dealing with targets, objectives, and assessments 
makes them an easier group to manage, and train to become teachers, especially since 
this managing and training is done with a language they are already familiar with and 
accepting of: performativity. It should therefore come as no surprise that when asked to 
reflect on their performance as a student teacher in the classroom one student reported 
that, “The targets of the sections were clear and the objectives met. My mentor supported 
me to ensure that they passed off smoothly. I afterwards evaluated these teaching 
experiences with my mentor and the feedback was mainly positive-with ideas about 
things I could improve for the next lesson” (Storey, 2007 p. 262). While Storey 
acknowledges (by reiterating Foucault’s explication of power) that the type of control 
exhibited through these new teachers is problematic since “…control has become 
internalized and more insidious” (p. 268), she maintains that  
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the findings of this study challenge the more pessimistic versions of the 
performativity critique. The Associates were at relative ease with targets and with 
evaluations of their performance. At the same time they expressed a strong value 
commitment to creativity in their lessons and had aspirations for a rounded 
education for their pupils. They do not appear to have become reduced to 
‘commoditized’ actants (p. 268).  
While it is true that the participants in the program of teacher training analyzed by 
Storey claim that, “…it was relational skills and creative ways to engage with pupils that 
featured in the data as paramount for these embryonic teachers” (p. 267) significantly, 
none of those creative ways went beyond figuring out seemingly innovative ways to help 
the students engage with the material so as to “master” the content. None of their creative 
energy examined why specific content was on the educational menu or if that content 
could be at all reinterpreted.  Indeed, one of these creative approaches was to use a 
PowerPoint presentation (sarcastic emphasis mine) to “teach” the students about 
American minimalist composers while another teacher created an, “…’electrical circuit 
of bodies with pupils representing the electrons…I realized how much the pupils enjoyed 
this kind of activity and how much they learned from it. I accept that this is not possible 
for all lessons…but it fired the children’s enthusiasm’” (p. 267).  Unfortunately, the 
experiences described by Storey seem to be the norm when creativity in the classroom is 
discussed. It is noteworthy that the teachers in Storey’s essay made no attempt to 
question the selection of the content, its veracity, or its use at this particular stage of 
development, and it is here where the “definition” of teacher and “teaching” is revealed 
and “defined:” Teachers teach by passing along pre-packaged lessons with little or no 
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attempt made at questioning either the choice of content, developmental or historical 
relevance, or any flaws within the content itself. Creative approaches are limited to the 
process of engaging the students so that they can first swallow whole, and then 
regurgitate the material, and nothing more. Indeed, as was the case with their lesson on 
American musical minimalism, there appeared to be no attempt to place this type of 
music within an historical or musical context; or one that was relevant or directly flowing 
from the experiences of the students. The lesson on electrons seemed to suffer from a 
similar disconnect. The “fun” had by the students as they were pretending to be electrons 
was mostly due to the non-traditional approach of conveying the information along what 
is still an assembly line of limited, controlled, knowledge distribution. This fun is a far 
cry from the serious play I discuss. The performative culture which values efficiency and 
controlled access to information hasn’t got time or the ethical will to give students a more 
complete education since that would require doing more than paying lip-service to a 
student’s personalized education. Unfortunately at my school, when administrators 
discuss personalized education they are referring to a student using a computer program 
called “Edgeinuity” (the “clever” juxtaposition of education and ingenuity), a marginally 
interactive program that force-feeds and assesses the content at a student’s pace until the 
content is “mastered” when a passing grade is achieved on a common assessment. In 
many ways it is nothing more than an alternative type of panoptican (observing both 
student and teacher) since a record is made which captures the time spent on the program 
by both teacher and student, and, equally insidious, a way of controlling what information 
is dispensed to the student. 
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 Of course, it’s not as if we haven’t been warned or given a better alternative to 
what exists on the current educational plate. In the School and Society (2001) John 
Dewey explained long ago to those concerned with education, as the industrial paradigm 
was just being applied to public schools, of the importance of placing experience above 
performative needs when he wrote: 
The question of the relation of the school to the child’s life is at bottom simply 
this: Shall we ignore this native setting and tendency, dealing, not with the living 
child at all, but with the dead image we have erected, or shall we give it play and 
satisfaction? If we once believe in life and in the life of the child, then will all the 
occupations and uses spoken of, then will all history and science, become 
instruments of appeal and materials of culture to his imagination, and through that 
to the richness and orderliness of his life. Where we now see only the outward 
doing and the outward product, there, behind all visible results, is the 
readjustment of mental attitude, the enlarged and sympathetic vision, the sense of 
growing power, and the willing ability to identify both insight and capacity with 
the interests of the world and man…When nature and society can live in the 
schoolroom, when the forms and tools of learning are subordinated to the 
substance of experience, then shall there be an opportunity for this identification, 
and culture shall be the democratic password (p. 39).  
There are, of course, many in education, especially those who have written in the 
wake of the reconceptualization, (none, unfortunately at the national or state level who 
make policy), who have taken Dewey’s warnings and advice seriously as they suggest 
ways to counteract some of the negative performative aspects within education, and 
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privilege the “substance of experience.” Carol Wild (2011) is the Course Director of the 
MA Art Practice and Education courses at Birmingham City University in the UK. She is 
aware of what is not being taught when performative efficiency is privileged at the 
expense of the student’s experience. Wild borrows one of Foucault’s suggestions and has 
created in her classrooms “heterotopias… a place that represents, contests and reverses 
culture by allowing difference…spaces which contradict the other spaces that we 
occupy…” (p. 424).  Wild seems to imply that art education, in contrast to so-called more 
academic courses like Science or English, lends itself to the creation of these 
heterotopias, however I think the case could be made that many academic disciplines 
could create similar heterotopias. The sacred place she has created to contest our 
performative culture is an art gallery.  Wild maintains that the art student’s experience of 
touring the art in a gallery, unplanned and ambiguous, unencumbered by the din of 
assessable data, and writing about one’s experience after the fact, can create “…moments 
that cannot be planned for in advance but are recognized with hindsight…” (p. 430).   She 
further maintains that the learning, which emerges from these narrative reflections on 
those moments, is substantially more valuable than one that might be the product of a 
planned objective and its accompanying common assessment. Perhaps one of the reasons 
why Wild’s heterotopia produced a more valuable learning experience is because the 
sacred space that was created was an incomplete space, similar to the incomplete set 
design described by British theatrical director Peter Brook in The Empty Space (2008). 
Instead of rows of chairs arranged in straight lines, with an authority figure positioned 
behind a podium dispensing information like a flight attendant passing out stale peanuts, 
194 
 
 
 
Brook’s “incomplete design” forces the participant to engage with her environment, 
impacting eventually the play itself as well as the participant.  As Brook has explained: 
what is necessary… is an incomplete design; a design that has clarity without 
rigidity; one that could be called ‘open’ as against ‘shut.’ This is the essence of 
theatrical thinking: a true theatre designer will think of his designs as being all the 
time in motion, in action, in relation to what the actor brings to a scene as it 
unfolds. In other words, unlike the easel painter, in two dimensions, or the 
sculptor in three, the designer thinks in terms of the fourth dimension, the passage 
of time (p. 101-102). 
Brooks’ actors, similar in concept to the living child referred to by Dewey, were 
able to create a more vibrant theatrical production because the substance of each actor’s 
experience was allowed to contribute to an incomplete set design that in turn created a 
more realistic, lively production. Instead of forcing each actor to learn her lines, hit her 
mark and be done with it, each actor was able to bring to the set something that was 
uniquely theirs in time, that is to say as the rehearsals evolved and the scenes unfolded, 
and then add that information to the design of the set, and consequently the play itself. 
What might be achieved if classrooms, and the students and teacher within, could evolve 
in a similar fashion? Imagine how much overall learning could be enhanced if standards 
and learning objectives were viewed with the same clarity and lack of rigidity as Brook 
afforded his actors, their set, and ultimately the play. Students and teachers are rarely 
given the opportunity to engage with the material and one another in the classroom this 
thoroughly, and without the encouraged passivity that passes for education these days. As 
Wild’s art students experienced the gallery, and reflected on that experience within the 
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gallery (also an incomplete design but with “clarity”), they were able to view the art on 
display with a gaze that combined the art skills they were being taught and the ambiguous 
substance of their experiences up to that point, in real time. It makes sense that Wild 
views what occurred in this space as preferable to one that treats them as if they were all 
the same, passively learning (an oxymoron to be sure) a variety of art techniques from 
her, since what was eventually gained by the students far surpassed that which they 
would have learned under the current performative model which values efficiency of 
learning an uninterrogated standard.  The very real creative participation of the actors and 
students, (in contrast to the “creative” method of teaching previously mentioned by 
Storey) (2007), and their concomitant impact on theory and practice, contributed to a 
wider, fluid, deeper, education of the art students and a more vibrant theatre, in contrast 
to the few times a limited, controlled, creativity is allowed in the classroom, because the 
unanticipated intelligent responses of the students and actors were encouraged –given 
time to emerge-  and incorporated in both cases. These responses enhanced the 
“standards” the students encountered because they were able to alter those standards as 
they saw fit, in real time. This approach to education is a preferable alternative to a 
destructive pedagogy, which treats the students as passive, inanimate objects, instead of 
one in which both students and the material can benefit as both evolve.   
The limited, deformed, experience afforded most teachers and students in the UK 
and the U.S.A. and other “developed” nations is in contrast to what Julie White (2006), a 
faculty member of the University of Melbourne, is attempting to achieve in her classes 
which train future primary and secondary school teachers. White (2006) acknowledges 
that, “… Australian school systems are increasingly subjected to performative 
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requirements in the form of political control and bureaucratic imperative…” (p. 438). 
Despite this constrictive environment, White has built upon the work of N.K. Denzin, 
Deborah Britzman (2006) and others and suggests a different version of performativity 
that contains within it the opportunity for agency. White tells us that, “…Denzin 
distinguishes between performativity as the ‘doing’ and performance as the ‘done’ (p. 
437).  Consequently, she has developed an approach to teacher training which focuses on 
the “doing,” that on the surface might seem unusual: Rather than a typical teacher 
training program which would require the students to create a weeks’ worth of lesson 
plans, (filled with objectives, references to standards, common, formative, and 
summative assessments) for example, she had her students create an operatic aria, 
complete with narrative story, singing, and choreography. White knows that the finished 
product will be rough since none of the participants come to the program with expertise 
in any of those skills. For her, this is beside the point. White is less concerned with the 
finished product because she argues that pedagogy is advanced when the doing is 
privileged above the done. Citing Britzman’s writings on teaching (2006) she argues that 
important pedagogical information and insights are potentially realized from the 
collaborative struggle by the participants as they negotiate the unknown. White 
maintains: “…The learning involved in becoming a teacher is a complex combination of 
the theoretical, the practical, the personal and the political. Coming to terms with 
dichotomies of the emotional and the intellectual, power and powerlessness, knowledge 
and ignorance, as well as an overriding concern with subjectivity characterizes emergent 
teachers…” (p. 439).  Indeed, their struggle to create a reasonable facsimile of an operatic 
aria put them well beyond their comfort zones, forcing them to collaborate (a struggle in 
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itself) as they strained, and thus perhaps experienced many of the characteristics White 
cites as important to “emergent teachers.” In other words, she could have told them 
something similar to this information using the traditional transfer method of dispensing 
information. Importantly, White knows that the pedagogical impact will be more 
powerful if the participants struggle to come to these conclusions, (changed themselves 
because of the participants activity) on their own.  Equally important in her iteration of 
performativity is her hope that her study will impact other education courses so that they 
will come to know that the, “…process of collaborative creation being valued more 
highly if not equally to the end point products…” (p. 449), will in the end create a 
pedagogy less controlled by bureaucratic necessity, efficiency, alleged accountability, 
sacred standards and more in line with her creative interpretation of performativity, that 
in effect becomes a type of praxis.  This newfound pedagogy will be found to better serve 
the honest needs of students and teachers: That is to say, one that cares more about the 
educational growth of students without sacrificing the clarity of content. 
Performativity, Paralogy, and Serious Play 
 Those who expectedly find fault within the controlled, constrained, 
content of a performative culture might gain some solace in Lyotard’s (1984) idea of 
scientific paralogy, since it contains a destabilizing element in its pursuit of scientific 
truths.  Under this scenario boundaries would be more fluid and thus standards would not 
appear as immutable as formerly thought since an objective truth(s) would be continually 
nurtured, critiqued, and improved. Consequently, pedagogy could be improved within 
this performative approach since mutable standards would encourage a more attentive, 
open-ended approach to education, perhaps akin to that described and desired by Dewey 
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(2001) as he discussed the “living child.”  But as Joseph Rouse (1987) has reminded us in 
his book, Knowledge and Power,  the artifacts that are the products of scientific 
investigations, as well as the impetus behind those investigations, come not from a place 
of general objectivity but are instead specific to the unique conditions of a broadly 
understood laboratory and what is done locally.  And in Ball (2003) and Meng (2009)  
the authors argue that Lyotard’s version of paralogy is revealed as less destabilizing and 
more conservative as previously thought since the social paralogy (itself manipulated by 
corporate interests), which informs and controls the scientific investigation, can 
undermine scientific paralogy’s ability to subvert.  Thus, if science is to contribute to a 
more realistic and truthful epistemology, which in turn can contribute to a healthier 
educational practice, then people who are scientifically literate must reconsider the ways 
in which they view and use the processes and products of scientific investigations. In 
other words the products and processes of science cannot be viewed in isolation. Instead, 
they must be viewed as part of a powerful social fabric so that the influence of that fabric 
can be understood. For only then does social paralogy have a chance to ask the important 
questions and begin investigating what was previously thought as unimportant. It is 
important to note, however, that none of this is possible without minimizing the mostly 
negative effects of commodification and fact denial (making this a seemingly daunting 
task) as the driving force behind or preventing, scientific investigations. In Knowledge 
and Power, Joseph Rouse (1987) offers a nuanced and intelligent perspective on 
scientific understanding that I would argue contributes to a more accurate ontology and 
will suggest an analysis of scientific practice that reveals the local, existential 
character of the understanding it produces. Scientific knowledge is first and 
199 
 
 
 
foremost knowing one’s way about in the laboratory (or clinic, field site, etc.). 
Such knowledge is of course transferable outside the laboratory into a variety of 
situations. But this transfer is not to be understood in terms of the instantiation of 
universally valid knowledge claims in different particular settings by applying 
bridge principles and plugging in particular local values for theoretical variables. 
It must be understood in terms of the adaptation of one local knowledge to create 
another. We go from one local knowledge to another rather than from universal 
theories to their particular instantiations (p. 73).  
Karen Barad (2003), a feminist theorist most closely associated with her theory of 
“agential realism,” acknowledges Rouse’s influence on her writings, and interestingly 
adapts Bohr’s work in quantum physics to describe an epistemology that she claims 
avoids the misunderstandings of scientific product and process previously mentioned, and 
the pitfalls of representationalism (closely related to the former and the dominant 
discourse informing and being informed by our standards) seen in both scientific realism 
and social constructivism. Moreover, regarding performativity, she critiques the 
Austinian idea (and by extension Butler’s) that to say something is to do something, not 
because she seemingly disagrees with Austin or Butler on a fundamental level, but rather, 
because she wishes to end the privileging of words over materiality as either explication 
or agents of change. For Barad, matter matters at least as much as doing things with 
words (although the tensionality between matter and words is important a detailed 
analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter).  She offers a unique epistemology, and thus 
an interesting version of performativity, that might shed some light on why the previously 
mentioned sacred space of Wild’s (2011) heterotopia, or Brook’s (2008) vibrant theatre, 
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or White’s (2006) “opera” were able to contribute to a more honest, fuller, experience in 
the art classroom, theatre, and teacher training, respectively. For a better understanding of 
Barad’s (2003) take on performativity we must first look at her argument regarding 
materiality and its impact on theory and practice. Barad writes that: 
  
This relational ontology is the basis for my post humanist performative account of 
the production of material bodies. This account refuses the representationalist 
fixation on ‘words’ and ‘things’ and the problematic of their relationality, 
advocating instead a causal relationship between specific exclusionary practices 
embodied as specific material configurations of the world (her emphasis)…This 
causal relationship between the apparatuses of bodily production and the 
phenomena produced is one of ‘agential intra-action (p. 814). 
For Barad, words should be understood in the same manner that Rouse 
understood the products and processes of scientific investigations. That is to say, words 
are local, fluid, imbued with meanings by non-verbal cues, and the consequence of 
consensus. Words, separate from their relationship to the local environment, cannot be 
broadly interpreted and applied, since they do not represent an objective truth, with 
universal applications.  Instead, they must be locally interpreted, seen as intertwined and 
better-imagined describing phenomena, which are, “…dynamic topological 
reconfigurings/entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations…” (p. 818). This 
fascinating and complex iteration of performativity offers no easy theoretical or practical 
response to agency. Indeed, Barad writes that, “…Agency is not an attribute but the 
ongoing reconfigurings of the world…” (p. 818).  In other words, agency isn’t something 
we do at will; instead, agency is what we notice can be done if our skills at attentiveness 
201 
 
 
 
to the moment have been honed.  Thus, in the context of Barad’s complex take on 
performativity, the art student’s experiences in Wild’s “heterotopia” must be explained in 
ways which go far beyond art students touring a gallery, as if they were all empty 
canvases waiting to be brushed by paint from the same palette. On any given day these 
students bring with them a varied and sometimes contradictory set of emotions and 
physical manifestations all of which interact with a changing environment: There is the 
young male, torn between his love of art, and his father’s plea for him to learn a more 
“practical” skill who cites this conflict as the cause for his acid reflux; the middle aged 
woman, whose suspicious husband doesn’t completely understand his wife’s need to 
grow, never mind the expense of tuition, which neither of them can afford; the couple, 
who only get to see each other at school since both of them are married but not to each 
other; a young male, talented painter and photographer, who wants to be “out” but is 
waiting for the right moment.  Indeed, each student is different.  And their response to the 
art on display will fall somewhere between the constraints, which are partially formed by 
Wild’s (2011) selection of artwork, the timing of that selection, and the student’s depth of 
knowledge of that art. But their spontaneous responses to those constraints are also 
possibly made up of their emotional and physical state, and things as yet undiscovered. 
Still, the art students were transformed in varying degrees by their experience in that 
gallery because Wild gave them the time and space to take it in, to just be, and honestly 
react. I would argue that this honest and more thorough transformation is pedagogically 
preferable to the performative model currently in fashion and criticized by Lyotard 
(1984), Cherryholmes (1988), Aoki (2005) and Pinar (1994, 2006), for example.  It was 
wise of Wild to let her students view the art in the gallery without any preconceived 
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assignment. And it was wise of her to allow for their unanticipated responses, those little 
improvisations that can happen with the moment when allowed. For it is these 
improvisations that privilege the substance of a student’s experience over the superficial 
tools of education, the instrumentalism exposed by Heidegger (1977) and criticized by 
Aoki (2005), which will perhaps create the possibility of a better education.  Lastly, it 
was wise of her to allow the students to reflect on their experiences and for her to 
evaluate those reflections.  Within all of this activity, planned and unplanned, lies the 
possibility of agency and by that I mean learning on the part of the student; and the 
careful nurturing and critiquing of an important body of knowledge by student and 
teacher.  Barad’s (2003) optimistic argument is attractive for many reasons but perhaps 
the two most compelling reasons are that it holds out the possibility of acquiring and 
contributing to knowledge that is an objective truth, albeit one that is local and intra-
twined, rather than universal; and it suggests the possibility of agency, despite the 
proclamations of some who see agency as foreclosed. If understood and applied, this 
would vastly improve pedagogy, including the writing of standards, but more 
importantly, the process and products which are informed, but not determined, by these 
standards. Thus, within this ontological framework “standards” would be more fluid and 
required to evolve, since they would be informed by analyses of phenomena that are 
relational within local time and space. Indeed, Barad writes:  
Matter plays an active, indeed agential, role in its iterative materialization, but this 
is not the only reason that the space of agency is much larger than that postulated 
in many other critical social theories. Intra-actions always entail particular 
exclusions, and exclusions foreclose any possibility of determinism, providing the 
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condition of an open future. Therefore, intra-actions are constraining but not 
determining. That is, intra-activity is neither a matter of strict determinism nor 
unconstrained freedom. The future is radically open at every turn. This open sense 
of futurity does not depend on the clash or collision of cultural demands; rather, it 
is inherent in the nature of intra-activity—even when apparatuses are primarily 
reinforcing, agency is not foreclosed (p. 826). 
Barad’s take on this “open sense of futurity” would seem to find agency in the 
most dire of circumstances, where art and hegemony live, Adorno (1978) (2002), Jay 
(1973), Benzer (2011). Good news indeed for our performative culture! Still, it makes 
more sense that an “open future” would be more assured if there were less of the 
constraining performativity currently in vogue: paradoxical scientific illiteracy, limited 
access to information, instrumentalism, managing teachers, managing students, and 
ultimately no time for the students and teacher to just be, in what Aoki (2005) poetically 
describes as, “…indwelling in the Zone of Between…” (p. 163).  
  I suggest that the previously mentioned “heterotopia,” borrowed and adapted by 
art instructor Carol Wild (2011) from Foucault, is a good example of the “iterative 
materialization,” which helps compose the “intra-actions” described by Barad, and that it 
allows for greater agency on the part of the students, since there are less educational 
constraints. Indeed, Wild ( 2011) was able to place a non-determining constraint on the 
experience of the art students through her selection of the art that was displayed similar to 
the constraint placed by a professor’s well chosen book list:  Clarity without rigidity.  
Importantly, by affording her students the opportunity to apply their experiences, skills, 
knowledge, (their gaze), in real time, in a defined but not defining space, and reflect on 
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them later (without the typical leading questions favored by instrumental pedagogy), she 
was better able to nudge her students to be more attentive to their moment(s) as they 
experienced it. To be sure there was no guarantee that what would follow from those 
moments would be nuggets of insight. Indeed, pedagogical exercises such as these always 
bring with them the element of risk. But where’s the serious fun if there’s no risk? 
Without risk there can be no growth.  Thus, by giving her students the opportunity to play 
in this very serious manner, they were forced to be attentive and open (or, as open as they 
could be given their “baggage”), and with that attentiveness and openness the chance to 
be creative and participate in the type of performativity favored by those who care about 
learning and adding to real knowledge: Performativity need not be limiting or controlling 
to the point where agency is forestalled and learning stopped. It can be an opportunity for 
the students to take part in a creative relationship with any subject, but for that to occur 
they must be immersed in the doing, instead of being treated like an empty vessel being 
filled with information that is already dead on arrival, immutable. Barad’s (2003) take on 
agency seems to imply that it is always a possibility no matter what the educational 
environment. While I would agree that agency can and does occur in spite of bureaucratic 
heavy handedness and hegemonic forces, students and knowledge in general would be 
better off dwelling in an environment, like Wild’s (2011) heterotopia or Brook’s (2008) 
vibrant theatre.  Ironically, Barad’s (2003) argument should appeal to empiricists 
concerned with accountability and accurate measurement of the educational progress of 
students and schools in general. Indeed, given both the late physicist, Niels Bohr’s 
(analyzed in Barad, 2003) and Barad’s arguments, it appears that schools are making at 
least two mistakes when they assess student achievement and teacher performance with 
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standardized testing instruments: The first is in looking at the test instrument and the 
student as independent, objective, entities. The second mistake (related to the first) is in 
ignoring the influence of the test on the student and thus misinterpreting the results of 
that test. It is both sad and ironic that the very instruments chosen for measurement and 
accountability do neither.   For educators the question is how Barad’s theory of “agential 
realism” can change the day-to-day interaction between students, teachers, 
administrators, and the instruments used, and perhaps discarded, in evaluating the 
education students receive. And, it must be noted, that bureaucrats, who demand 
centralized control and participants, (teachers, students, administrators) used to their 
passive roles, would balk at her theory and consequent practice, since when applied it 
would demand more immediate and instant attention, and a willingness to critique and 
confront what they think to be true. 
 For Karen Barad (2003), Bohr’s and Rouse’s explication of the products, 
processes, and motivations behind science provided her with a novel way to discuss 
performativity that at least privileges materiality as much, if not more, as it privileges the 
impact of doing things with words. In contrast,  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s, Touching 
Feeling (2003) implicitly dares us (a periperformative) to reinvestigate the power of 
words in her discussions of the performative and what she calls the “periperformative,” 
words or phrases, she argues, which allude to performative speech acts, that because of 
their unique characteristics, have the ability to affect agency greater than a performative 
by itself.   As an example, Sedgwick (2003) offers the well-known performative 
utterance, “I dare you!” and two common words spoken at the end of a marriage 
ceremony, “I do” (p. 70), and analyzes its impact. Sedgwick acknowledges the relative 
206 
 
 
 
strength of these performative speech acts to either maintain or challenge the status quo, 
yet she argues that the more nuanced periperformative responses such as, “…I won’t take 
you up on it. Who are you to dare me? Who cares what you dare me to do?…tend to have 
a high threshold of initiative…” (p. 70).   In other words, she argues that the 
periperformative has a greater ability to buck conventional thought. The thing that gives 
the periperformative this ability is its connection to a past and future to come, and its 
location in space. The periperformative, while acknowledging its connection to a past and 
future, occupies a “metaphorics of space” (p. 68), in other words, it is in the 
neighborhood of the performative.  Additionally it is also grounded in history (the 
impetus behind Sedgwick’s analysis is the crime of American slavery) and it is therefore 
because of this fascinating connection that the periperformative seems to have the ability 
to move about in a linear and non-linear fashion, thereby giving the periperformative a 
greater degree of agency. While her book is focused on literary analysis (Eliot, and 
Dickens for example), or political speech (Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address) the 
implications for pedagogy are tremendous. Consider the following fictional exchange: 
TEACHER: (Upset with the lack of effort of her students) I dare you to actually 
read tonight’s entire assignment! Most of you seem to have the ability to do what’s 
necessary to be successful in this class yet for some unknown reason, refuse to do the 
work! (Body language of the teacher suggests disgust/frustration) 
STUDENT 1: (smart, yet seemingly lazy) I can’t tonight, I’ve got a date with 
Halo III. (A popular video game. Some of the students laugh) 
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TEACHER: (Raises voice) Go ahead… make jokes! I don’t care…I’ve already 
got degrees and a job. Enjoy your time as a greeter at Wal-Mart. Hey… some of you 
might want to practice this phrase…in fact everyone repeat after me, “You want fries 
with that?” (Most of the students are collectively rolling their eyes, others have tuned the 
teacher out) 
STUDENT 2 (Usually quiet but now visibly angry) Why should we care what you 
dare us to do? Why don’t you ever ask us what we want to do? (Some of the students are 
nodding their heads in approval) 
TEACHER:  (at her wits end) You know what… forget it. I’m done! I want 
everyone to take out their textbooks, turn to page 497 and read it until the end of the 
chapter. If you have time before the bell rings answer the questions at the end of the 
chapter. If not, it’s for homework. 
STUDENT 1 (Still in wise guy mode) You actually gonna grade it this time? 
TEACHER: (angry) That’s enough…get to work!  
The teacher’s performative of “I dare you…,” might have been an improvised 
response, but it was one that had been used often enough so that any force that might 
have motivated the students to work harder had been diminished. Indeed, many 
improvisational responses are phrases frequently used and suggest a lack of novelty 
rather than a fresh approach to what is usually an ongoing problem. It would have taken 
an extraordinary improvisational response from the teacher to shift the mood of that class. 
In order to be effective, the teacher’s improvisational response needed to include at least 
an acknowledgement of what, if any, they as a class had accomplished in addition to the 
time(s) that were wasted. In other words the teacher needed to admit something to the 
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students that they intuitively understood about the class, even if they were incapable of 
articulating their concerns. Instead, in this exchange, it was a student who suggested 
initiative, in the honest periperformative uttered by student 2, when she said, “Why 
should we care what you dare us to do? Why don’t you ever ask us what we want to do?”  
This student’s response to her teacher’s performative attempted to push the class in a 
different direction. It is also an example of serious play in that the student risked being 
disciplined as she openly confronted the teacher. Unfortunately, this teacher seemed more 
concerned with respect for her authority than she was with a way to genuinely motivate 
her students to work harder and interact with the material content of the class. Discipline 
had lost its more important meaning of to teach. Instead, recognition of authority 
appeared to be not only the means but also the end in our fictive, yet often repeated, 
exchange. Indeed, the teacher was continuing with a performative approach that 
privileges control from a central authority and a non-aporetic stance on the part of the 
students.  Ironically, like “Chinese handcuffs” that tighten as one pulls harder to escape, 
the teacher’s performative of, “I dare you,” simply caused the students to retreat further  
into the space of disengagement and unfortunately contributed less to the lived world of 
teacher and student.  
 In our current performative culture, students who are grade conscious tend to do 
the assignment without questioning its importance or relevance. Ironically, the class that 
was briefly dramatized was better poised to further inquiry because they had an aporetic 
stance regarding what was put on their educational plate. Unfortunately, they chose to 
completely shut down and thus any gains they might have had as students, and any 
changes to the curriculum   were forestalled. I would argue that neither the class of 
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“teacher pleasers” nor the class that refused to do their work is pedagogically desirable. 
Instead, I suggest that good teaching would include the following elements, however it is 
important to note that these suggestions do not constitute a method: spontaneous and 
reflective input from the students regarding their course of study (developmentally 
appropriate); second, an attentive teacher aware of the power or lack of power of various 
performatives and Sedgwick’s (2003) periperformatives; and lastly, time spent by 
students and teacher on “dwelling in the zone of between” (Aoki, 2005, p. 161).   
 Performatives and periperformatives work because of the context in which 
they are generated and  received. I would argue that Sedgwick’s periperformative might 
be more effective because of its ability to seemingly play with time, in the sense that 
there is more to focus on than simply the thing that came before. To play with time is to 
reach back in the past, or anticipate a future as a response to a wholly demand from a 
present moment. To play with time is to change the tempo, which in turn, can change the 
tone of the response to a present demand:  past, present and future to come, remain 
somewhat open, depending on the response of the participant.  A performative of this 
nature is similar to Derrida’s idea of the performative writes scholar and lifelong friend of 
Derrida, J. Hillis Miller (2007, 2009).   In his essay, Performativity as Performance/ 
Performativity as Speech Act: Derrida’s Special Theory of Performativity,  J. Hillis 
Miller (2007) takes issue with the variety of definitions surrounding what has become a 
somewhat large and contentious field of performativity studies. He argues,”… that it 
would be a catastrophe to blur different meanings of ‘performativity’…” (p. 220).  And 
while the thrust of his essay is, not surprisingly, on the centrality of literary analysis as a 
way to end the confusion surrounding different versions of performativity, I would argue 
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that Miller’s essay contains valuable insights for the student and teacher concerned with 
good teaching.  Indeed, he promotes what he maintains is the most accurate version of 
performativity by discussing Derrida’s take on George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. In this 
manner he is able to critique Austin and Butler’s work on performativity, place Derrida 
as the intermediary between Austin and Butler, and critique those who misunderstand 
their work. His bone of contention with Butler is that she, “…invented a new and 
immensely influential theory called performativity, that is, the notion that gender is not 
inherent but is engendered by disciplinary pressures that coerce us into performing, that 
is, behaving, in a way society assumes is appropriate for a certain gender…” (p. 224).  In 
other words, his criticism is on the privileging of social construct theory at the expense of 
the things that make us innately what we are, or what others term as materiality. Indeed, 
in a brief but I suspect sarcastic jab Miller writes, “Blessings on you Wikipedia and on 
you too, Judith Butler!…” (p. 224),  as a way to demonstrate that one cannot do all things 
with just any words, since those blessings would have to be conferred upon them by a 
god that may or may not exist; or be inclined to bestow blessings. Of course, it might 
seem unfair to extrapolate a version of performativity that was designed for gender 
studies and adapt it for literary analysis. Miller seems less at odds with Austin. Clearly, 
Miller prefers Derrida’s take on performativity as seen by Derrida’s own analysis on 
Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. For in both Derrida’s and Miller’s analysis of Eliot’s novel is 
Miller’s criticism of Austin’s performativity and support for the Derridean version. 
Regarding that novel Miller writes: 
Daniel Deronda is a performance, or reading it is a performance, like performing 
a Mozart sonata, or, in this case, since the novel is long, complex and echt 
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Victorian like performing a Liszt piano concerto. Daniel Deronda is also an 
extended performative utterance of a peculiar kind. It generates a virtual literary 
reality that can be ‘accessed’ only by way of the performative efficacy of the 
words on the page as I read them. Those words call or conjure into existence, like 
specters in broad daylight, Gwendolen, Daniel, all the other characters, their 
‘worlds,’ and all that they do and say (p. 235).  
Miller seems to imply that the ability or lack of ability of a performative utterance 
to bring about a change that Derrida would liken to “…an absolute rupture between the 
present and the past…” (Miller, 2007, p. 231), and bring about a desired future yet to 
come hinges on the performance that serves as the context for that performative 
utterance. Indeed, it was the strength of Eliot’s novel that insured that her character 
Daniel could organically, yet surprisingly, follow the demand made of him by Mordecai. 
Without that context Mordecai’s demand would have fallen flat, much like the demand 
made by the ineffective teacher previously dramatized by me earlier in this chapter. Had 
that teacher created a different context (a series of classes as an extended performance) 
and then, uttered her performative, one that comes from an understanding of her students, 
we might have seen a better outcome.  In other words, we might have seen the students 
respond to a demand, which came from a “wholly other,” with an educational leap 
instead of authoritarian derision.  
Despite the lack of consensus regarding the different versions of performativity, 
what Miller (2007) praises in Derrida’s is seemingly what occurred in the previously 
mentioned “heterotopia” of Wild’s (2011) art gallery, and the theatre created by Brook 
(2008) as they both achieved success: One can view Wild’s (2011) sacred space of an art 
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gallery as a performance and the demand made on the students coming from the art on 
display in that gallery. The student’s effective improvisational response to that demand 
(their serious play) was ensured by the strength of that performance (the carefully chosen 
art on display) yet in no way was it guaranteed. Similarly, it was the clarity without 
rigidity of Brooks’ (2008) rehearsals (the performance) which allowed his actors to 
respond to his demand(s) (performative utterances) with an unexpected response which 
created that “rupture in time” that in turn ushered in his play yet to come but desired.   
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Chapter 8 
CODA AS CURRICULUM 
 We dwell in tensionalities, and yet these tensionalities can go unnoticed or 
perhaps misunderstood. Or simply avoided if the tension seems too great and resolution 
out of reach. When this lack of attentiveness, misunderstanding, and avoidance comes to 
its inevitable conclusion, we see mediocre results: For example, take the jazz performer 
on, perhaps an off night. His turn to solo is fast approaching and yet his bandmate offers 
up a less than interesting combination of notes. What Edward Sarath (2013) calls a jazz 
referent. A referent can be made up of a “standard tune” or be “original.” Importantly, if 
it’s a good referent, what Sarath would call a, “highly malleable referent” (p. 192), it is 
because it contains ideas that are precise yet also ambiguous. But to return to my example 
of our musicians and their off night, a bad referent is offered to a fellow player who in 
turn responds with an uninteresting or perhaps clichéd response. In contrast, a “highly 
malleable referent” is put out there to be picked up and responded to by the attentive 
player. Instead of mediocrity we hear a purely spontaneous response that for Sarath 
(2013) is the result of a resolved tensionality between the self and the Self. For Sarath, 
the self is the individual self and the Self is what can, perhaps, best be described as the 
collective consciousness. And, there is dialectical tension between the self and the Self. 
Complicating matters even further is the tension within the self. In this case it is tension 
between the person who exists with the person to come, an Other if you will. Sarath 
(2013) argues that when all of these tensions are addressed and “resolved” the 
improvisational player moves beyond “ordinary consciousness” (p. 181) and achieves, 
“…an over-arching sense of an eternal present, where past and future connections are 
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subordinate…” (p. 181). Sarath is distinguishing improvisation as different from 
composition, even though he acknowledges that composition which is linear, for the most 
part, and improvisation, which is non-linear for the most part, both can create paths to the 
creation of something “transcendent” (p. 180).  For Sarath (2013), what is important is, 
The basic principal…that individual consciousness, or the personal self, is but a 
facet of collective consciousness, which is the transcendent Self, and therefore all 
human behavior manifests itself against, and is informed by, this transcendent 
collective backdrop. If the collective field is permeated by stress, tendencies 
toward outer stressful behavior are greater; if the field is more harmonious and 
coherent, so will be thinking and action (p. 402).  
Indeed, Sarath who is a believer in meditation would be surprised, perhaps, at the 
ability of Chaplin, discussed in chapter 4, to overcome “outer stressful behavior” and 
create something so beautiful and spontaneous. The distinction between Sarath’s (2013) 
idea of the perfect improvisational situation with that of Seldes’ (1957) description of 
Chaplin’s response to a stressful referent brings up an important point: improvisational 
responses, the forces which provoke those responses, and the creativity contained within 
those responses, are unpredictable. Sarath might seem to prefer a cooperative “collective 
field” as the best environment for his “eternal present” and heightened consciousness. 
But if this is true, why then, have others been able to use constraint to improvise? To be 
sure improvisation is a skill that can be developed. It is therefore conceivable that, in my 
earlier discussion of performing improvisation in front of a crowd of drunken Shriners in 
chapter 4, had one or more members of our group had more talent, say approaching the 
level of Chaplin, we might have been able to elicit a different response to our 
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improvisations. On the other hand, it’s possible that no amount of talent could have 
overcome the overweening distraction placed on the hundreds of Shriners by alcohol and 
the prostitutes in their laps. In effect, these drunkards dwelled not in the tensionality 
between our presentation and their collective consciousness, but rather their tensionality 
was dissolved in their complete absorption into alcohol and sex. While it’s possible that 
these “Ignoramuses” and their “schoolmaster” might have arrived at a Rancièrian 
approachment, the “equality of intelligence” would at least have to wait until another 
time: A sober and non-sexual time. Indeed, this notion of environment and the action 
going on within that environment would appear to bolster the claims of Peter Brook 
(2008) discussed in chapter 6. Brook’s rehearsals were similar to Sarath’s “referent” in 
that in both the rehearsal space and the jazz referent the actor and performer, respectively, 
were given something precise and something ambiguous. The tensionality between the 
precise and ambiguous provoked the player to respond with something original, despite 
the fact that their response might have contained something already done before.  Indeed, 
if we recall the Noguchi statue brought to our attention by Peter Appelbaum (2012) in 
chapter 3, it could be said of that statue that it contained precision and ambiguity. In this 
manner the statue serves as a potent referent albeit one that must be responded to by the 
attentive observer; not passive but provoked into thought of a playground to come. 
Similarly, as we saw in Miller’s (2007) description of two characters in an Elliot novel, 
Mordecai and Daniel, that Mordecai’s performative utterance, his demand on a “wholly 
other” was answered, and answered well because of the context of that performative 
utterance.  
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Context was crucial for the characters in my play in chapter 5. To be sure they 
were able to dwell in tensionality as they tried to eke out an education within the 
constraints of a dystopic future. Importantly, they were at their best when those 
constraints were not there. You may recall that when they were learning on their own in 
the abandoned warehouse in the scene entitled “woodshedding” (a term used by jazz 
musicians when they practice in order to increase their technical skills or “chops”) they 
had honest conversations regarding history. Ironically, even when they were in an actual 
prison (in contrast to the prison of school) the characters were able to engage in an 
authentic discussion, one in which improvisation was provoked and responded to 
authentically. But importantly, as I hoped I demonstrated in the previous chapters, these 
contexts, these environments, while important, vary: our Cuban improvisers who made 
up “Playback Theatre,” brought to our attention by the anthropologist Meer (2007), most 
certainly worked in an environment that encouraged self-censorship and yet they were 
able to improvise honestly. My original conclusion was that the difficulties of Cuban life 
predisposed them to improvisation. I still largely agree with that assessment, but I would 
like to leave room for another one that is connected to the first. Perhaps we can think of 
their life in Cuba as similar to the aforementioned jazz referent or the Noguchi statue. If 
this is true then it’s not their predisposition that was the determining factor in their ability 
to improvise. Instead, it was the Cuban people’s response to a request that was 
ambiguous and precise; a response made all the more potent because of their 
understanding of who they were, their self, and who they could be; that is to say the self 
that dwells within the self: In other words the self to come. 
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I found a similar dynamic in my discussion of Gil the “turntablist” brought to our 
attention by his extraordinary teacher Leif Gustavson (2008) in chapter 6. Importantly, 
Gustavson was able to take on William Ayer’s (2004) request to, “… become students of 
our students” (p. 66). As he and Gil turned their teacher s-student relationship into 
partnership, as allies they dwelled within a unique tensionality. This one pitted the 
pedagogy that organically grew out of Gil’s practice of sampling and spinning against the 
one they inherited. Indeed, what they inherited and what they were able to successfully 
fight against was the pedagogy which promotes a passive stance in contrast to the one 
that grew out of the very serious “play” of Gil and his associates and admirers. 
Fortunately, neither Gustavson nor Gil succumbed to a passive stance or what I termed 
earlier as a non-aporetic stance. It seems that Gustavson dwells in the space between 
what Aoki (2005) has described as the “… ambiguous, ambivalent space between this or 
that, between planned curriculum   and live(d) curriculum …” (p. 421-422). To be sure 
their live (d) curriculum was rich in the skills and ambiguous concepts that fill the work 
of historians, fiction writers with a good amount of mathematical and technical, or 
scientific, thinking. Indeed, what Gustavson found in Gil’s tremendous achievement is 
reading in its broadest sense. Perhaps the best description of this “art” comes from De 
Certeau (1984) who writes 
Reading thus introduces an ‘art’ which is anything but passive. It resembles rather 
that art whose theory was developed by medieval poets and romancers: an 
innovation infiltrated into the text and even into the terms of a tradition. 
Imbricated within the strategies of modernity …the procedures of contemporary 
218 
 
 
 
consumption appear to constitute a subtle art of ‘renters’ who know how to 
insinuate their countless differences into the dominant text (p. xxii).  
Gustavson found in Gil someone who was able, in the Certeauean (1984) sense, to 
“insinuate” his differences into the “dominant text.”  Indeed, unlike Babbit or our white 
improvisers, whom Certeau reduces to a largely “silent majority” (p. 96) from the 
American comedy scene, Gil was able to overcome the marginality of a minority group 
as he reappropriated the constraining order of place and circumstance. Of course it 
remains to be seen whether or not his “insinuation” is enough to overcoming the stifling 
aspects of the pedagogical stance both he and Gustavson are trying to overcome. And it 
remains to be seen if those who learn from their example can overcome the problems of 
representation and mimesis which were suggested by Rancière (2009) and Appelbaum 
(2006, 2012, and 2013).  Still, there is strength in what Gil, Gustavson, some of our jazz 
musicians, and some of our improvisational actors achieved. Indeed, they all were willing 
to dwell within a tensionality and engage with those tensionalities in such a way as to 
give them a space to notice and mold their nascent moment of creation, guided by a 
disciplined wandering, that has commanded my interest since the beginning of this study.   
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